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British forces captured the Cape of Good Hope from the Batavian Government in 1806. The 
archaeological investigation into the Battle of Blaauwberg aims to identify the strategic use 
of the landscape by both sides focusing on specific geographic areas. Metal detector surveys 
and the mapping of archaeological material clarified the various battle positions within the 
reconstructed historical environment. Analysis of the artefacts provided insight into their use 
and the strategies followed by both armies. Altogether the evidence illuminated the use of 
the landscape and its influence on the course of the battle. This unique multi-pronged study 
of a South African battlefield and its material cultural record sheds new light on the 1806 
battle, thereby complementing and refining prevailing historical interpretations. It explores 
methodological issues and approaches that are critical to the domain of battlefield 
archaeology in South Africa, where a large number of battle sites still await archaeological 
investigation. 
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Britse magte het die Kaap die Goeie Hoop in 1806 van die Bataafse Regering verower. Die 
argeologiese ondersoek na die Slag van Blaauwberg is gerig op die identifikasie van die 
strategiese gebruik van die landskap deur beide kante met die fokus op spesifieke 
geografiese areas. Metaalverklikkeropnames en die kartering van argeologiese materiaal het 
die onderskeie gevegsposisies in die gerekonstrueerde geskiedkundige omgewing opgeklaar. 
’n Ontleding van die artefakte het insig gebied in hul gebruik en die strategieë wat beide 
gevegsmagte gevolg het. In die geheel gesien, belig die getuienis die gebruik van die 
landskap en hoe dit die verloop van die geveg beïnvloed het. Hierdie unieke meervlakkige 
studie van ’n Suid-Afrikaanse slagveld en sy materiële kultuurrekord werp nuwe lig op die 
1806-veldslag en sodoende word bestaande historiese interpretasies aangevul en verfyn. Dit 
verken metodologiese kwessies en benaderings wat kritiek is vir die domein van 
slagveldargeologie in Suid-Afrika waar ’n groot aantal gevegsterreine nog argeologies 
ondersoek moet word. 
ISISHWANKATHELO 
Imikhosi yaseBhritane yayihlutha iKoloni Yethemba eyayibizwa ngokuba yiCape of Good 
Hope, iyihlutha kurhulumente waseBatavia ngonyaka we-1806. Uphando lwezixhobo 
zakudala zexesha ledabi iBattle of Blaauwberg lujolise ekuqwalaseleni ubuchule 
bokusetyenziswa kobume belizwe ngala macala mabini, lugxininisa kwiindawo ezithile. 
Isifundo sembali senza uqikelelo lobunjani bedabi, kwaqhutywa iintlolo zimvo ezisebenzisa 
izixhobo zesinyithi nokuphengululwa kwezixhobo ezifumaneke kwizakhiwo zakudala 
nezacacisa iindawo ezahlukeneyo zedabi. Izixhobo zokusebenza ezafunyaniswayo zatyhila 
ulwazi lwendlela ezazisetyenziswa ngayo namacebo obulumko awayesetyenziswa yimikhosi 
yamacala omabini.  Ubungqina bacacisa ukusetyenziswa kobume belizwe nefuthe lobo bume 
ekuqhubekeni kwedabi. Le ndlela ikhethekileyo, nenobuchule obuziindidi ezahlukeneyo, 
yokufunda indawo yedabi laseMzantsi Afrika, nengxelo yezinto zenkcubeko, inika ulwazi 
olutsha ngeli dabi lowe-1806, kwaye yongeza ikwacolisisa indlela yokutolika imbali yeli dabi. 
Kuphandwa imibandela yeendlela zokwenza namacebo abaluleke kakhulu kwicandelo 
lophando lwezixhobo zakudala zamadabi eMzantsi Afrika, apho iziza zamadabi eziliqela 
zisalinde ukuba kuphandwe ngazo. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Wijnen (2015:3) suggests that the archaeological research into a battlefield contributes to 
our knowledge and understanding of the engagement. The main goal of such research is the 
pursuit of knowledge and to understand the sequence of events, the military engagement, 
the strategy or logistics from an archaeological perspective. The focus of this research into 
the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg was to investigate the impact the historical environment had 
on the battle events. Even though it became clear that contemporary maps position the 
battle incorrectly, the research went beyond merely correcting locational issues of the 
battle.  
To address the locational issues of the battle events, the reconstruction of the historical 
landscape was required. Subsequently, the impact of the environment on these battle 
events could be evaluated. A large assemblage of battle-related artefacts, retrieved through 
systematic field surveys, were analysed to provide insight into the battle. The research 
incorporated several metal detector operators and volunteers that contributed towards a 
successful project that provides an archaeological perspective on the 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg. 
1.1. 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg Archaeological Project 
The 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg marked the capture of the Cape of Good Hope from the 
Batavian Republic by British forces and formed part of the strategic international positioning 
of Britain to counter the advances made by France under Napoleon. The battle was fought in 
an area over 250 hectares, and all the related activities, including deployment, attack and 
retreat, and the clearing of the battlefield, lasted only a couple of hours (Anderson 2008; 
Erasmus 1972; Krynauw 1999; Steenkamp 2005). This remarkable event has been the focus 
of extensive historical research, and in 2006, the 200-year celebration was the impetus for 
the creation of the Battle of Blaauwberg Interest Group. This group has since lost some 
vigour but still has a very active website. However, since the inception of the archaeological 
investigation into the battle, local awareness of this event has been rekindled. 
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During the early 1990s, initial research was carried out to identify the exact site of the 1806 
Battle of Blaauwberg. Garry Thomson, Dan Sleigh, Major Tony Gordon and Willem 
Steenkamp conducted this research, but it was never concluded. The researchers, with the 
help of metal detector operators, surveyed a small portion of the battlefield, mainly 
surrounding the location of the farmhouse of Justinus Keer, which was used as a field 
hospital after the battle. The locations of the retrieved artefacts were recorded and mapped, 
while the artefacts were retained and made available for the current research. 
In the meantime, the Friends of Blaauwberg Conservation Area (FoBCA) arranges public 
events and educational outings to increase awareness of the Blaauwberg Nature Reserve 
(BBNR). Several public meetings focusing on the cultural and historical aspects of the BBNR 
have been held, most notably presentations by archaeologists: Jonathan Kaplan, Graham 
Avery and Jayson Orton; historians: Dan Sleigh, Major Tony Gordon, Willem Steenkamp and, 
more recently, Ian van Oordt, to enhance the awareness of the rich cultural remnants of the 
greater Blaauwberg area. 
On 23 February 2013, the FoBCA, under Roy Fuller-Gee, was granted permission by Heritage 
Western Cape (HWC) to use metal detectors on the site of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg, to 
identify the defensive battle line of the Batavian forces. Permit conditions stipulated that no 
items were to be dug out or removed from the site. Harriet Clift, an archaeologist associated 
with the City of Cape Town, was required to be present during the exercise at the request of 
HWC. It was, however, decided to test or sample a few of the stronger signals, showing 
either large objects or objects close to the surface since, by signal alone, it could not be 
determined if the identified artefacts were battle-related or not. Items were photographed 
and reburied in the exact same spot. The investigation of a small portion of the site of the 
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg on 23 February 2013 showed that metal detectors were effective 
to identify sub-surface metal objects. 
The positive results obtained from the February metal detector survey was the impetus for 
the establishment of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg Archaeological Project under the 
directorship of Louisa Hutten, with Willem Hutten as the project manager. 
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The FoBCA and the Battle of Blaauwberg Interest Group joined forces with the Department 
of Archaeology at the University of Cape Town (UCT) to conduct archaeological research on 
the battlefield. The aim of the archaeological research was to determine the exact location 
of the battle-related events, by investigating, amongst others, cannon projectiles. HWC 
issued a permit (Permit No. 130730TS01) valid until August 2016, but an extension was 
obtained for another three years, to August 2019. I believe that a better understanding of 
the battle and its location, could lead to better management of this significant heritage 
resource. 
A vast amount of information and primary research data about the battle and its aftermath 
have been collected but despite the information, the exact location of the battle lines 
remained unclear. Contemporary maps (Chief Directorate: Surveys and Mapping 2010) show 
the location of the battle near Blaauwbergsvlei farm, while historical maps1 also show the 
battle much closer to Blaauwberg Hill than it really was (Anderson 2008; Erasmus 1972; 
Krynauw 1990; Steenkamp 2005). While the actual location of the battle lines remains 
unclear, the topography, accessibility, cannon fire range, together with the known 
deployments of the two sides suggest more likely locations for the battle lines than shown 
on the historical maps.  
Until the institution of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg project, no archaeological research has 
contributed to the analysis of this significant historical event. Archaeological research on the 
battlefield could be challenging since limited archaeological evidence would be available 
from a single event that lasted only a couple of hours. Despite this challenge, archaeology 
can certainly help to provide new perspectives and insights in any academic assessment of 
the conflict (Hughes & Trigg 2011: 19). 
The study area falls within the BBNR and large portions of the reserve are infested with alien 
vegetation, the Acacia saligna, also known as Port Jackson willow. Ninety-six hectares of 
alien vegetation were cleared and burnt to stimulate the regrowth of the critically 
endangered Sand Plain Fynbos. Unfortunately, the burning also activated the regrowth of 
Acacia saligna so much that further weeding was required. From a biodiversity point of view, 
                                                     
1 NL-HaNA, Janssens/Kaarten, 4.JSF, inv.nr. 13; Smart 1809; M1/2064 - 2071; M3/21; Castle Military Museum 
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access to the 96 hectares of Sand Plain Fynbos restoration area was limited as it could 
influence the growth of the fynbos. The archaeological research had to utilise the window 
period for access to this area prior to starting the weeding programme. This area was the 
initial focus of the research, with metal detector surveys traversing the open landscape. This 
is also the area known as the British artillery positions since the British forces initially located 
their artillery within this area.  
Since the rapid regrowth of the Acacia saligna hampered the effectiveness of metal detector 
surveys, it was decided to conclude the surveys within the British artillery area after the 
identified study area had been surveyed. Subsequently, surveys of the battlefield continued 
in the southern parts of the BBNR following a rigid survey plan to traverse every single 
survey block within the identified study area. The surveys were then extended to include 
outlying areas such as the field hospital and Kleinberg. 
Over 40 survey days were spent on the battlefield with volunteers, ranging between six and 
18 in number, covering the greater part of the battlefield. Numerous battle-related artefacts 
were retrieved during surveys. Survey training and survey workshops were conducted to 
establish a comprehensive methodology that would both benefit the research and develop a 
healthy relationship between archaeological research and hobby metal detector operators. 
Research into the battle comprised not only field survey but also incorporated analysis of the 
retrieved artefacts to obtain a full comprehension of the battle events. Historical and 
archival research provided enough background information pertinent to the research. The 
research not only provided insight into the various aspects of the battle while answering 
specific research objectives but was also a catalyst for secondary research to be conducted 
on aspects and areas related to the battle. Marius Breytenbach (2016) investigated the 
location of Justinus Keer's farmhouse which was used as the field hospital after the battle. 
Breytenbach (2017) subsequently explored the sequence and settlement at Blaauwbergsvlei 
during the 18th and 19th centuries. Further, Francois van Lill (2016) studied the British 
campsite in Melkbosstrand before the battle. 
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1.2. Research question and research objective 
Historians have studied and produced accounts of the course and events of the 1806 Battle 
of Blaauwberg but there was still uncertainty about the exact location of the battlefield and 
associated strategic positions. Archaeological research has not been applied to enhance the 
historical record and give a greater understanding of this event. Despite this, archaeology 
can provide additional insight into an academic review of the conflict (Hughes & Trigg 2011: 
19). Foard (2003: 6) emphasises that battles and the campaigns of war cannot be adequately 
understood without the study of the historical terrain at various levels, and hence an 
archaeological investigation into the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg is required. 
Foard (2003: 7) further stresses that the documentary record must be supplemented with 
appropriate archaeological evidence. Foard (2003: 7) identifies two essential components of 
this holistic study: firstly, to place the events within the larger landscape by using 
topographical evidence in the historical records that, in turn, can be tested through the 
archaeological evidence collected; and secondly, once the locational issues have been 
resolved, landscape reconstruction can enable research into the impact of the terrain on the 
historical events. 
To resolve the locational issues, insight into the engagement must be obtained and Krynauw 
(1999: 90) relates that General Jan Willem Janssens (commander of the Batavian forces) 
executed his defensive strategy as planned, by occupying the main north–south route from 
Cape Town up the west coast of South Africa. General David Baird mentions in his 
despatches to Lord Castlereagh that on the morning of 8 January 1806, the British army 
formed into two brigades, marched towards Cape Town, and confronted the Batavian 
defensive line (James 1837: 44). 
Although, the exact location of the battlefield of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg or the 
associated strategic military positions and deployments were still unknown within the larger 
area demarcated as a heritage site. However, where the historical record is incomplete or 
vague, the archaeological evidence could provide an opportunity to augment our 
understanding of the events. 
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The aim of this research was, therefore, to investigate how the landscape influenced the 
decisions and movements of the opposing parties through the identification of the various 
significant battle-associated areas during the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg, using a historical 
archaeological approach within an interdisciplinary framework.  
I have reconstructed the historical landscape using a combination of archaeological survey 
and analytical techniques, by identifying the main and subsidiary routes utilised. Further, I 
matched the natural features still present today with those mentioned in documentary 
accounts and maps, thus developing an understanding of the topography and geology of the 
area. 
The archaeological evidence emphasised and confirmed the geographic and spatial 
distribution of the historical battle-related events within the larger landscape. This provided 
guidance on how the landscape was strategically utilised by both opposing commanders, 
and how the landscape influenced specific battle events. Carman (2005: 216) states that the 
primary interest should not focus on the identification of the place where battles have 
occurred, but rather on gaining insight into the experience of battle by understanding how 
space might have been used by the participants. It was therefore important not only to 
identify the location of the battle, but also to investigate aspects that influenced the battle. 
Although the concept of space encompasses a variety of aspects, this research only focused 
on the physical landscape and its influence on the military engagement. 
To achieve the aims of the research, five main geographic areas within the battlefield 
landscape were investigated and are discussed in this dissertation: firstly, the positioning 
and extent of the Batavian defensive line in terms of north–south spatial distribution, and 
the east–west placement of the different Batavian regiments; secondly, the identification of 
actual locations of the defensive artillery positions forward and towards the flanks of the 
Batavian line; thirdly, confirming the British strategic heavy artillery positions and the routes 
used for the advance of the British regiments and field artillery; fourthly, investigating the 
initial skirmish on the outlying area of Kleinberg; and finally, identifying and surveying the 
locality and the extent of the main area of engagement. 
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The five geographic areas identified provided a framework from within which the fluid 
nature of the battle was investigated and tested. The identified areas could also not be 
examined in isolation but needed to be considered as important aspects within the larger 
event.  
1.3. Research significance 
To explain the importance of the archaeological research of any battle, the significance of 
the event must be fully understood. Ragragio (2005: 102) justifies the study of battlefields 
firstly because battles are pivotal historical events and ‘written by the victor’. Archaeology 
provides an independent check of these past events as written accounts are not always 
reliable and may often be biased. Secondly, battlefields are unique sources of information 
about the past. Thirdly, if recorded and preserved properly, battlefields can serve as tourism 
and educational resources. Lastly, battlefields evoke vivid images of struggles and invoke the 
emotions of those who took part (Ragragio 2005: 103).  
Wyllie (2014: 216) states that the significance of battlefields is situated in the culture of a 
nation and expressed through art, literature and music to create a sense of national identity. 
The 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg might not be part of the popular dialogue in terms of nation 
building in South Africa in the 21st century but it is very significant in several other aspects. 
Colonialism in the South African context has become a topic of much contention within the 
current political sphere. The British campaign to take political control of the Cape of Good 
Hope is seen as the first advance of British colonial rule in South Africa. Although South 
Africa became a Republic, breaking with the British Commonwealth in 1961, the subsequent 
government was neither elected by nor representative of the population of South Africa 
(Cameron 1992: 293). Many historically disadvantaged South Africans have since fought for 
political freedom during what is known as the struggle years, occupying the second half of 
the 20th century. Politically, this struggle, its related events, and its heroes have become the 
theme for nation building (Cameron 1992). Many colonial era or European related events 
have since become less important, hence the low level of public awareness about the event 
of this research. This, however, does not lessen the significance of the violent change of 
government that occurred in 1806. 
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According to Kane (2006: 12), the importance of battlefields is also situated in the fact that 
the events are often used as propaganda to grip public interest and support. Unfortunately, 
as previously mentioned, the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg is no longer part of the popular 
discourse in South Africa, although public support for awareness of the event has flourished. 
This is clear in the community groups, web pages, events and meetings that commemorate 
the event and stimulate dialogue on the broader history of the whole area. Further, by 
evaluating the military engagement and gaining insight into the events, propagandistic 
claims might be more critically assessed. Evaluating the use of the landscape by both military 
commanders during the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg can, for example, illuminate any 
misrepresentation of the battle, such as the notion that General Janssens went into battle 
unprepared. 
Although not an explicit aim of this research, the identification and elimination of a specific 
bias and inaccuracies in the representation of the battle events can be achieved through a 
representative account of the events as depicted in the data accumulated in this research.  
An archaeological perspective on the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg is significant as it provides 
additional insight into the prevalent historical interpretation of the events. Only a few 
primary sources specifically relate to the battle events, while a further number shed light on 
the events leading up to the battle and its aftermath. It is consequently a difficult task to 
comprehend the battle events from limited sources available. Historians have attempted this 
and produced descriptions of the events, but the bias and lack of detail in certain areas could 
not be accounted for. Vencl (1983: 117) states that military activities are coupled with 
political power, which do not produce material remains, or at least the remains are difficult 
to interpret. This, according to Vencl (1983: 117), leads to a biased perception of 
developments and activities. Kane (2006: 12) argues that from the archaeology it is possible 
to obtain an accurate understanding of the events during a conflict, while Pollard and Oliver 
(2002: 45) suggest archaeology presents the details of the events that the historical sources 
omit. The analysis of material culture associated with the battle can fill in many details and 
images of a conflict or battle that are neglected in traditional historical accounts (Pollard & 
Oliver 2002: 8). The research into the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg has encountered similar 
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challenges, as seen in one aspect of the battle. The locational issues of the battle could be 
assumed from the historical maps and documentation, but these are all positioned within 
the larger landscape. No details about positioning are available; consequently, it is the aim of 
the research to address the detailed locational issues by making use of archaeology.  
Few people are untouched by war because of increased violence and conflict in the modern 
era (Kane 2006: 1). Vandkilde (2003: 126) adds that war is associated with power, control 
and cruelty, and often leads to social reproduction and change. A change of government is a 
significant event in any country, and an archaeological investigation into this battle could 
enhance our understanding of the events. The battle events must not be forgotten, but 
should be presented in a balanced and accurate manner that does not glorify war and 
violence (Sutherland & Holst 2005: 9). In South Africa, archaeologists continuously 
emphasise the lack of exposure to archaeology within the school curriculum, to create an 
awareness of the historical events and the field of archaeology. There is much debate about 
the need for exposure to the larger public, to advance the relevance of archaeology in the 
South African context. Besides the relevance of the subject, the relevance of the topics of 
research also requires an elevation in interest. It has become imperative for researchers to 
focus on the importance of their focused research for various reasons, including, but not 
limited to, research funding and tourism development. Further, the commemorative 
significance of a battle site can never be subordinate to the research objectives and 
outcomes.  
The 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg is of international significance as several countries were 
directly or indirectly involved and affected. Couzens (2004: 62) reveals that 13 nationalities 
took part in a typical European-style battle that would have been a distant part of the 
Napoleonic wars, in southern Africa. South Africa has seen a range of battles and wars, but 
the involvement of a diversity of European countries in association with local troops elevates 
its significance. Besides the two major role players during the Napoleonic wars, Britain and 
France, soldiers from other nationalities were also involved in the battle. The intricacies of 
international politics also contributed to this diverse participation, as the Cape of Good Hope 
was, at the time of the battle, under the Batavian rule. The Cape, which was previously 
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under the rule of the Dutch East India Company2, became home to people from across the 
world. Slaves, from amongst others, Mozambique, Madagascar and Indonesia (Shell 1994) 
made significant contributions to the battle, while the indigenous Hottentot Light Infantry3 
were also involved. A large contingent of German mercenaries from Waldeck, the 5th 
Regiment and the Jaeger Regiment, formed the supposed backbone of the Batavian 
defensive line. It is therefore clear that the significant participation in this battle is not 
limited to two countries, but instead extends to several countries.  
Battlefields represent perpetual shrines and memorials, which should be treasured and 
admired (Sutherland & Holst 2005: 5). Incorporating places and events in the general and 
recently revitalised trend for public war commemoration ought, therefore, to be 
encouraged. Further, an accurate portrayal of the battle can stimulate commercial 
opportunity in that the battlefield and associated areas attract tourism and enhance a public 
interest. The site of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg was declared a National Monument 
under the National Monuments Act of 1969 and is protected under the National Heritage 
Resources Act (NHRA Act 25 of 1995) as a Provincial Heritage site. Since the inception of the 
current BBNR, resources have mostly been allocated to the environmental aspects of the 
reserve, while the heritage significance has, regrettably, been lacking in financial support. 
Through publications, reports and by creating public interest, the research into the battle 
tries to elevate the remembrance of the battle to be noteworthy within the larger 
Blaauwberg historical landscape. 
The research had little local reference to similar studies, and therefore the contribution the 
archaeological perspective on the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg offers the domain of battlefield 
archaeology in South Africa cannot be underestimated. The investigation will add to the 
debate on battlefield archaeology and provide a reference for continued archaeological 
research. It is anticipated therefore that the establishment of this specific approach will 
bring about further debate and lead to the development of this field of research within the 
South African context. 
                                                     
2 Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), an international Dutch trading company 
3 The name of this group at the time of the battle, later became known as the Cape Corps and subsequently the 
South African Cape Corps Service Battalion 
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1.4. Project location 
The site of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg lies within the BBNR, on the West Coast of South 
Africa, approximately 25 km from Cape Town. Within the Cape floral kingdom, the BBNR is a 
global biodiversity hotspot and a significant project of the City’s Biodiversity Strategy. This 
area represents a diverse lowland habitat near Cape Town on the edge of the West Coast 
floral kingdom. 
The BBNR (inland section is located on the R27 near Melkbosstrand (Figure 1). The coastal 
section of the BBNR is not significant to this research and is not indicated on the map. 
 
Figure 1. Location of the study area on an extract from 1:50 000 topographical maps (3318CB, CD, DC and DA 
c2000) showing the assumed location of the Battle of Blaauwberg (Chief Directorate: Surveys and Mapping 
2010) 
The location of the inland section of the BBNR is indicated on an extract of the 3318CB, CD, 
DC and DA 1:50000 topographical maps of 2010 (Figure 1). The positions of Blaauwberg Hill 
(referred to as Grootberg on the map) and Kleinberg are visible, while the position of the 
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg is also shown on the map extract. 
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The location of the study area (Figure 2) is shown, superimposed in red, on aerial images 
3318DC 01, 3318DA 21, 3318 CD 04/05, 3318CB 25 and 24 (Chief Directorate: National Geo-
Spatial Information 2014).  
 
Figure 2. Location of the study area on aerial images (Chief Directorate: National Geo-Spatial Information 
2014) 
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Figure 3. Features significant to the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg 
Figure 3 depicts the areas and features significant to the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg and 
provides clarity on the location of the features in relation to each other.  
1.5. Conclusion 
The West Coast of South Africa is a unique biodiversity hotspot that provides a multitude of 
destinations for tourists who visit the area. The BBNR is also favourably positioned to offer 
tourists travelling from Cape Town a gateway to the biodiversity the area is rich in. Its 
proximity to Cape Town is ideal for tourist activities, not only those en route elsewhere, but 
also local visitors. Besides the endangered vegetation and diversity of fauna found within the 
BBNR, the cultural heritage which the reserve protects makes the greater BBNR an appealing 
new destination. 
Cultural heritage in the larger Cape Town area is, because of its long and rich history, 
important and it receives the required protection and management. While archaeological 
research has contributed positively to the historical knowledge of the area, the 1806 Battle 
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of Blaauwberg has been neglected, with no archaeological research yet on this significant 
site. This research project has, at its core, an archaeological perspective of the 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg, incorporating archaeological surveys and fieldwork to evaluate the historical 
event. 
An investigation of the previously unspecified battlefield was not the only aim of the 
research; it was also my intention to use the locational information to understand the 
intricacies of the battle. This provided the opportunity to test aspects of the battle by 
making use of both archaeological data and primary documentary sources.  
Archaeological battlefield research that investigates the developing nature of a battle is 
unique in the South African context, while the battle itself is significant in various ways. 
Although public interest has diminished, if it ever really existed, this does not reduce the 
battle's significance in South African history. South African history is rife with many examples 
of skirmishes, battles and wars, and research into these events is important as it provides 
valuable insight into the volatile political nature of this country's past. The archaeological 
approach used in this study is, therefore, an important point of reference for future research 
in this field.  
1.6. Chapter outline 
The discussion in CHAPTER 2 focuses on the domain of battlefield archaeology and evaluates 
various battlefield archaeological projects conducted in Europe and North America. The 
importance of including such terms of reference cannot be ignored as both the methodology 
used and analysis conducted were influenced by established approaches on similar projects 
around the world.  
CHAPTER 3 analyses several secondary sources in which the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg is 
described. While some of these sources were produced purely as tourist guides, others 
provide valuable information and have sound reference lists. The historiographical overview 
gives further insight into the battle from different writers' points of view but was 
approached with caution as various errors occurred. CHAPTER 4 offers eyewitness accounts 
of the battle by assessing available primary documentation produced at the time of the 
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg – an archaeological perspective 
15 
battle. Secondly, and a critical aspect of the research, the maps produced to represent the 
battle and surrounding landscape were evaluated and compared for insight into the 
development and course of the battle. It further emphasises the archaeological record 
retrieved from the battlefield by providing context to its specific location.  
South African history is rich in a variety of conflicts ranging from precolonial era uprising to 
more recent wars, revolts and conflicts, and the methodological approach, as seen in 
CHAPTER 5, is guided by the battle, the era of the battle, and by the research question. The 
field surveys were developed over time and became more efficient and effective, while not 
relinquishing any accuracy. The reconstruction of the historical landscape is an important 
aspect of CHAPTER 5, while the surveys and analysis of the artefacts are also discussed in 
detail. Selected artefact classes were analysed as they provide valuable insight into the 
battle.  
The results of the analysis of artefacts are discussed in CHAPTER 6, while the historical 
landscape and its impact on the course and development of the battle also receive the 
required attention. While most of the results are based on the outcome of the analysis of 
artefacts, primary sources, maps and the battlefield itself, the results of the field surveys and 
the associated location of artefacts, as evident on location maps, provide for a fascinating 
interpretation and discussion. CHAPTER 7 provides the conclusion of the research and serves 
to connect all the discussion into a meaningful insight into the battle.  
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CHAPTER 2. BATTLEFIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 
Various historians studied the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg, but this dissertation provides the 
first archaeological perspective on this significant battle. Archaeological research cannot be 
conducted in isolation and needs to be grounded within a domain through which 
comparisons and contrasts can be drawn. CHAPTER 2 provides the context within which the 
research was conducted and discusses the association of battlefield archaeology and conflict 
archaeology within the context of historical archaeology. Further, by studying various 
examples of archaeological research conducted on battlefields across the world and in South 
Africa, it provided the terms of reference to develop a suitable methodology. 
2.1. A brief introduction to the context of the research within battlefield archaeology 
The definition and scope of historical archaeology are continuously being debated, while 
also being expanded into areas previously confined to history (Ragragio 2005: 101). Ragragio 
(2005: 101) continues that a defining characteristic of historical archaeology is its focus on 
the past in the small scale, while Gilchrist (2005: 330) adds that historical archaeology refers 
to contextual associations of small groups during short time spans.  
Orser (2004: 19) defines historical archaeology as a “multi-disciplinary field that shares a 
special relationship with the formal disciplines of anthropology and history, focusing its 
attention on the post-prehistorical past, and seeks to understand the global nature of 
modern life.” Hall (2000: 2) elaborates on this definition that the historical archaeologist has 
long been concerned with the “small things” of everyday life, while Beaudry and Mrozowski 
(1998) allude to historical archaeologists working on sites and the remains of historical 
events with many documentary sources as well as those with no written records. Hall (2000: 
4) also defines historical archaeology as a modern and creative field, compared to imagining 
the past that are remote and unknown, before being interpreted. 
Theune (2013: 243), however, argues that it has become increasingly clear that both written 
and oral sources only shed light on specific aspects of the past. Besides the skewed 
perception of history, sources could provide contradictory views of the past and therefore 
only tell part of the story. The study of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg falls within this 
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domain of historical archaeology because it utilises the documentary sources to complement 
the archaeological study. Orser’s (2004: 19) definition of historical archaeology describes the 
approach as multi-disciplinary, with the involvement of military historians, historians, 
archaeologists and metal detectors, but also included landscape reconstruction and a 
Geographic Information System (GIS).  
Orser (2004: 20), in describing the documentary resources available to archaeologists, points 
out that each source was created by a different person for a unique reason. Therefore, its 
purpose might not be focused or even relevant to the specific research aim, but could still 
provide valuable information. Besides the focus on the source material, Galloway (2006) 
states it has long been recognised that material culture and documentary sources represent 
independent lines of evidence. This study of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg makes use of 
documentary sources and the material culture retrieved from the surveys to reconstruct the 
events during this battle. The material culture is a most valuable source of information to 
the archaeologist and differentiates the archaeologist’s research from that of the historian. 
The aim of a material culture studies approach is to explore the relationship between people 
and objects (Tilley et al. 2006). From the point of view of archaeological research into the 
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg, material culture is central in the understanding and 
reconstruction of the battle events. Accurate documentation and recording are vital in 
developing a spatial distribution pattern of the material culture. Specifically for this research, 
the spatial distribution is critical to understand the battle. Deetz (1996: 36) comments that 
material culture reveals cultural meaning, and even though the material remains of the 1806 
Battle of Blaauwberg do not necessarily reveal aspects of everyday life, they disclose 
valuable information about warfare. 
While much debate continues around the domain of historical archaeology, this battle event 
falls within the greater sphere of historical archaeology. However, this battle event must be 
researched and contextualised under the helm of battlefield archaeology under the auspices 
of the broader conflict archaeology.  
Ragragio (2005: 102), though, raises the question: "Why study battle sites?" She elaborates 
that a new branch of historical archaeology was born in south-eastern Montana - referring 
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to the Battle of Little Bighorn - studying the faint traces of a brief yet explosive event. The 
research conducted at the battle site of Little Bighorn is widely regarded as the pioneering 
work in this new field of archaeology. The study of a battlefield offers many challenges such 
as that the remains of battle events rarely remain above ground, and, as with the 1806 
Battle of Blaauwberg, contain no permanent features. The identification of the battlefield 
then becomes a problem, as no features are visible. Vencl (1983: 117) states that war and 
warfare relate to activities involving only a limited amount of material. However, the 
opposite is true: battlefields are huge sources of significant and almost unused historical 
information, which the archaeologist can study (Sutherland & Holst 2005: 1). The battle 
remnants need to be identified, retrieved, recorded and analysed to make relevant 
conclusions. 
To understand the ambit of the study of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg within the 
archaeological context, it is important to look at specific definitions of this field of study. 
According to Saunders (2010: 18), there is a difference between the narrowly focused 
battlefield archaeology and what is considered a more inclusive and interdisciplinary conflict 
archaeology. Conflict archaeology is concerned with investigating events and is focused on 
conflict as a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. These events may leave a variety of 
physical traces in many places, all or most of which can possess multiple meanings, and may 
change their meanings over time (Saunders 2010: 19). Kane (2006: 1) defines battlefield 
archaeology as the archaeological study of ancient or historical conflict, while Sutherland 
and Holst (2005: 2) define it as an all-inclusive term describing the discipline of the 
archaeology of ancient or historical conflict. They argue that the term battlefield 
archaeology is confusing, as the focus is on the battle and ignores the role of the field in 
which the battle was fought. It is therefore clear that the discussion is ongoing and possibly 
depends on the specific event.  
Foard (2003: 6) criticises recent developments in battlefield archaeology, arguing that it 
primarily investigates the physical evidence left by the action rather than the archaeology of 
the battlefield itself. The pioneering work conducted at the Little Bighorn battle site in 
Montana in the 1980s (Scott et al. 1989) could be the initial spur to involvement in 
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battlefield archaeology (Carman 2005: 216). However, during the 1950s, Oman and Weller 
investigated sites of the Peninsular Campaign (1808–1813) in Spain and Portugal with the 
focus on the documentary evidence for battle action (Carman 2005: 216). Subsequently, 
during the research at the Little Bighorn site in the United States of America, the recording 
of artefacts, topographic research and the search for remains of the dead, brought 
battlefield archaeology to the fore. Archaeologists all over the world explored similar 
approaches, for example, the studies of the Killiecrankie Battlefield in Scotland (Kilpatrick & 
Bailie 2015), the Newtonian Battlefield in Missouri (Cubbison et al. 1997), the Chalmette 
Battlefield in Louisiana (Cornelison & Cooper 2002), and at the Lookout Mountain Battlefield 
in Chattanooga, Tennessee (Heckman 2002; Alexander & Heckman 2004). 
Further, the work by Banks and Pollard (2001) at the 1879 Zulu war site at KwaMondi near 
Eshowe introduced battlefield archaeology to South Africa, while their continued work led to 
the establishment of the University of Glasgow’s Centre for Battlefield Archaeology. The 
archaeological excavations at Rorke’s Drift in KwaZulu-Natal by Webley (1990) focused on 
the structures used by the British military as fortifications during attacks by Zulu warriors 
during the Anglo-Zulu war. Mason (1975) investigated the 1880–1881 fort at Potchefstroom 
that was the site of an 11-week siege in which the British tried to seize control of both Natal 
and Transvaal during the First Anglo-Boer War. Research at the site of an outpost of a 
voluntary British military unit, Steinaecker’s Horse, during the Anglo-Boer War, was started 
in 1997 to reconstruct aspects of their daily life (Van Vollenhoven et al. 1998: 114). 
Investigations into the defensive structures used by the Boers in 1881 during the battle of 
Rooihuiskraal (Van Ewyk 1986) and the ongoing archaeological research into the military 
fortifications of Pretoria (Van Vollenhoven 1995) further contributes to the domain of 
battlefield archaeology in South Africa.  
Battles, wars, skirmishes and conflicts have been the focus of many historical studies in 
South Africa. Webb (2014) focused on the Cape Colony’s Frontier or Xhosa Wars in 1799, and 
De Villiers (2013) provided a perspective on John Graham’s involvement in the fourth 
Frontier War. The Anglo-Boer or South African War has also produced numerous historical 
perspectives (Judd & Surridge 2013; Nash 1999; Pretorius 1999; Wessels 2000) intended to 
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describe and interpret the events, while Van Schalkwyk and Smith (2004) provided an 
archaeological perspective to reinterpret the Maleboho War when Government troops from 
the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek4 invaded the Bahananwa chiefdom in 1894. 
Numerous researchers have followed suit in this relatively new domain of historical 
archaeology, but already it is exciting to witness the development of the field of study. For 
the research team involved with the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg, it has become clear that the 
South African context with many battles and skirmishes provides a large scope of work. It 
has therefore been of utmost importance to know of the latest ideas in research and make 
useful contributions towards the ambit of battlefield archaeology. 
Unfortunately, few historical accounts consider the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg (Anderson 
2008; Erasmus 1972; Krynauw 1990; Steenkamp 2005) through the review of primary 
documentation. Only a relatively small number of primary sources are available that refer to 
the specific battle events, but fortunately, more documentation exists that provides insight 
into the planning, events leading up to and the aftermath of the battle. Even though 
historical research makes valuable contributions, the archaeological evidence provides 
specific details for this event (Carman 2005: 215). The material evidence presents itself as 
scatters across an area of land rather than an occupation scatter (Carman 2005: 218). Unlike 
previous archaeological investigations in the South African context of battlefield 
archaeology, which focused mainly on the physical structures associated with conflict, in this 
dissertation I use a broad landscape approach with due emphasis on the spatial distribution 
of artefacts. Not only is the focus on the identification of the battle remnants, its spatial 
distribution and subsequent analysis and interpretations, but also on the impact of the 
environment on the battle events. 
Sagona (2015: 34) argues that the original function of weaponry and relics retrieved from 
battlefields assume new roles, standing as tangible reminders of the human cost of war, of 
the extreme conditions and of regret. These artefacts have their own life, because they were 
so recently used that they share collective memories of global histories and family histories. 
Not only the histories of families but also the ideas and thought processes of the 
                                                     
4 The Transvaal Republic 
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manufacturers and leaders at the time are evident in the artefacts. These artefacts also 
exhibit the technological advances that the field of warfare has made. Their spatial 
distribution resembles the cognitive processes of the role players in the battle, as their 
specific documented positions reveal the various positions within the larger landscape. 
These positions were used for strategic purposes and could have been beneficial or 
detrimental to the outcome of the battle. 
While battlefields appear to be the least organised space occupied by humans, and are a 
messy, chaotic and often tragic expression of our capacity for violence, they are the scenes 
where the courses of nations are charted (Ragragio 2005: 102). Militaries around the world 
act on behalf of governments and leaders and execute prevailing political will. Successful 
military campaigns depend on several factors such as resources, tactics, leadership and 
discipline. Experience in the art of warfare originates from a system that has proven its 
success over many battles. British campaigns during the Napoleonic era drew from their 
experience in past battles and executed this in the new campaigns. Even though it seems as 
if no order existed and chaos reigns, these events all function within a well-documented 
system of warfare.  
To provide direction to the research into any battlefield, a critical analysis and evaluation of 
similar projects around the world needs to be conducted. Selected examples of 
archaeological studies conducted on battlefields are discussed in the following section.  
2.2. Examples of battlefield archaeology 
2.2.1. Battle of the Little Bighorn 
The Battle of Little Bighorn, or Custer's Last Stand as it is also known, occurred in south-
eastern Montana during 1876, when Colonel John Gibbon, General Alfred Terry and General 
George Crook of the United States army tried to drive the Sioux and Cheyenne back into 
reservations (Scott 2010). The later substantial archaeological endeavours at the battlefield 
describe how the artefacts and other mute physical evidence are interpreted to augment the 
written record.  
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The main aim of the research was to reconstruct and interpret the behaviour and 
movements of the opponents during the ensuing battle to lay to rest the ongoing debate 
about the actual events. During the research, the interdisciplinary nature of the project was 
emphasised as historians, archaeologists and various specialists worked together to achieve 
a single outcome (Scott 2010; Johnson 1990: 110).  
In terms of a field survey methodological approach, a large grid system of 100 m x 100 m 
was established to guide the survey within which transects with a spacing of three to five 
metres were surveyed. The researchers estimated that coverage of 35 per cent was obtained 
with this methodology, which was enough sample to analyse and make meaningful 
interpretations (Scott 2010: 46). Three groups were utilised during the field survey, 
comprising survey, recovery and recording. The survey team, with the help of metal 
detectors, located and marked the artefact; subsequently the recovery team excavated the 
artefact but left it in place. The recording team next photographed, recorded and removed 
the artefact, ensuring that the location was duly documented. Detailed analysis and curation 
of the finds in the laboratory then followed. 
Scott (2010; Johnson 1990), however, argues that artefact patterns provide insight into 
behaviour, while individual artefacts provide details about troop behaviour, and the 
relationship of an artefact or an artefact group gives context and provenience. Similarly, the 
research into the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg has made use of methodology applied and 
tested on other battlefields. As outlined in CHAPTER 5, a grid system was employed, and 
surveys were conducted in linear transects. The transects, opposed to the three to five-
metre spacing used at Little Bighorn, spanned an average of two metre spacing per transect. 
This spacing was determined by the arm-swing of the detector, with the aim being a more 
complete coverage of the survey area. However, it must be considered that the overgrown 
vegetation impacted on the survey transects, hence influencing the coverage of the study 
area. 
The researchers at Little Bighorn made use of a re-inventory survey, to survey 
predetermined grids utilising tighter linear transects, rather than the three to five-metre 
normal survey transect. By comparing the results, they determined that, even though a 
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higher number of artefacts were retrieved, the artefacts retrieved during the initial survey 
statistically represented an accurate sample (Scott 2010: 50). 
The groundbreaking work of researchers during this project was an excellent reference work 
and guide in establishing research objectives and a methodology for the research at the site 
of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg.  
2.2.2. Killiecrankie battlefield 
The Battle of Killiecrankie, the initial battle of the First Jacobite Rising in Scotland, took place 
on 27 July 1689 between the army of William of Orange and Jacobite forces of Scots and 
Irish under the command of John Graham of Claverhouse. After the battle, the campaign 
continued for a couple of years until William offered the Jacobite forces a pardon in 
exchange for their oath of allegiance in 1691 (Kilpatrick & Bailie 2015: 7). 
Archaeological surveys were initiated and completed between 12 and 16 August 2015 and 
on 13 October 2015. Surveys on more than 25 hectares of land yielded over 500 artefacts of 
metal origin. Only high-performance metal detectors were used that could discriminate 
between ferrous, non-ferrous, and all other metals. Linear transects at 10-metre intervals 
were surveyed across the fields in predetermined grids. In smaller fields, a tighter linear 
transect with a spacing of five metres was used. Only targets identified within the topsoil 
were recovered, while deeper targets were left in situ. Finds were accurately recorded, 
cleaned, stored and conserved (Kilpatrick & Bailie 2015: 8). 
The artefacts retrieved from the battlefield, such as musket, carbine and pistol balls, 
provided insight into the routes and the areas of close combat (Kilpatrick & Bailie 2015: 17). 
Further, areas of intense fighting were identified from the presence of pistol balls, as their 
effective range is 25 to 30 metres. 
The Killiecrankie battlefield project confirmed the information and provided a better 
understanding of the 1689 uprising. It also highlighted the effective use of metal detecting 
and archaeological survey techniques to interpret battle events. The 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg archaeological project followed a similar methodology, but a unique analysis of 
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the results was made to provide a thorough and comprehensive perspective of the events. A 
similar approach was used, by surveying within predetermined grids that guide the survey, 
to cover most of the study area. This approach proved valuable as a structured approach to 
the survey yielded a comprehensive sample of battle-related remnants. Even though the 
survey with metal detectors only covered a percentage of the battlefield, because of the 
swinging nature of the machine’s operation, a complete sample collected from the 
battlefield, was obtained.  
2.2.3. Battle of Prestonpans 
The Battle of Prestonpans, first conflict of the Jacobite rising of 1745, was fought on 21 
September of that year between the English government forces of George II and the 
Jacobites loyal to the Scottish Stuarts. Urban development has since encroached on parts of 
the battlefield, but there are areas which remain relatively unscathed by development. The 
core of the battlefield is still open but is traversed by roads (Pollard & Ferguson 2008). 
Detailed historical maps show the exact location of the battle, whilst eyewitness accounts 
provide further insight into the battle. The objectives of the research were to determine the 
extent of the battlefield and how it survived within the modern landscape. Community 
involvement and co-operation were important to enhance the local importance of the site 
(Pollard & Ferguson 2008). 
Pollard and Ferguson (2008: 9) indicate that historical research, topographic survey, trial 
trenching evaluation, and metal detector surveys formed part of their approach. The 
trenches and geophysical surveys were conducted at a later stage and not included in the 
initial phase of the research. According to Pollard and Ferguson (2008: 9), “traditional 
archaeological methods such as excavation are not suitable to record or recover these 
artefact scatters.” Through systematic metal detector surveys artefacts, comprising metals 
such as lead, iron and copper alloys, were identified and retrieved. 
A common approach used by archaeologists during the surveys of battlefields is to utilise 
metal detectors since they do provide an adequate sample of the artefact scatter. Other 
geophysical equipment, undoubtedly, offers additional ability to identify and retrieve 
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artefacts. Since the artefacts are located as a scatter, the value lies in their spatial 
distribution that could provide extensive information about movement, development and 
deployment. The accurate recording within the pre-determined survey areas was therefore 
of utmost importance. 
2.2.4. Battle of the Boyne 
The Battle of the Boyne on 12 July 1690 is a well-known and politically significant battle in 
Irish history. It is a well-documented battle, and historical work has been conducted on the 
battle between the Williamite and Jacobite armies. However, little archaeological research 
has been carried out to provide data for the management and preservation of the site 
(Cooney et al. 2002: 8). 
One aspect of the research involved the use of gradiometer surveys to identify the location 
of the historical settlement. Further, seven ploughed fields were surveyed through 
geophysical instruments and phosphate surveys to assess the range of evidence of past 
human activities. Magnetometer and side-scan surveys of the river were conducted to 
identify the possible five locations where the Williamite army crossed the river (Cooney et al. 
2002: 9).  
Illegal metal detecting at the battle site resulted in the loss of a significant number of battle-
related material that could have been useful in interpreting the battle events. Metal 
detecting surveys were used to survey the area. All occurrences of metal were recorded and 
compared to the results of the geophysical surveys. Four test pits were subsequently 
excavated yielding positive results related to the research questions (Cooney et al. 2002: 10). 
The archaeological project at the Battle of Boyne was designed as a pilot assessment for the 
archaeological potential of the battlefield and has proven successful. Key areas of the 
battlefield were identified and material associated with the battle recovered. The use of 
geophysical equipment within a specifically designed framework is helpful and assisted in 
achieving a variety of objectives. 
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The researchers only conducted test excavations to examine the effectiveness of the 
methodology, therefore the battlefield still offers a huge archaeological potential that could 
be researched. Of further significance to the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg was the 
incorporation of environmental conditions that influenced the battle events. This avenue of 
research was further explored during this study of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg.  
The value of geophysical equipment used during the research of battlefields should not be 
underestimated since it has the potential to provide answers to specific research questions. 
The Battle of the Boyne project used the geophysical surveys for specific areas of research 
and was highly effective. Since this project was only to determine the potential of the 
battlefield for future studies, a range of equipment and techniques were employed that 
could now be tested, evaluated and possibly used for future studies. As outlined in CHAPTER 
5, a similar approach was planned for the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg, but early on during the 
establishment of the methodological approach, the use of magnetometer surveys was 
considered ineffective. The presence of ferricrete just below the surface influenced the 
results, so the magnetometer survey was discontinued.  
2.2.5. Battle of Caulk's Field 
On 30 August 1814, British navy Captain Sir Peter Parker came ashore with a raiding party of 
about 150 men hoping to surprise the force at the Kent County militia camp on Maryland's 
eastern shore in the United States. Parker and his men were instead ambushed, with Parker 
and 13 other soldiers losing their lives during an hour-long skirmish. This skirmish at the 
Battle of Caulk's Field was a victory for the Americans who suffered only three men 
wounded (Sharpe 2013: 43). 
Metal detector surveys were employed, as a single layer of shallowly buried artefacts were 
present compared to the multiple layers created by continuous habitation of a site. The 
researchers' aim was to compare the archaeological remains to the written record, the 
features of the landscape and the knowledge of military tactics (Sharpe 2013: 44). Linear 
transects were surveyed using metal detectors and the locations of all artefacts were 
precisely marked. Many artefacts were retrieved and marked, and through a detailed 
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analysis of musket balls, canister shot, buttons and buckles, a clear pattern was observed 
that could be interpreted. These results resolved several issues about the battle, such as the 
extent of the battlefield, the British approach to the battlefield, and their retreat. Further, 
the location of a second American camp, used after the battle, was revealed (Sharpe 2013: 
44).  
The research into the Battle of Caulk's Field shows how the archaeological evidence and the 
historical record coincide to produce a better understanding of the events. Equally, the 1806 
Battle of Blaauwberg used archaeological evidence to reach a better understanding of 
events, but the historical sources also contributed valuably to the research. It became clear 
that the analysis and interpretation of the data were crucial in the complete comprehension 
of the historical events. Sharpe (2013: 44) also comments on the difference between the 
remnants of a battle compared with the remnants of a site, over long periods of habitation. 
The research framework was designed to suit a single layer of artefacts compared with 
multiple layers of artefacts. A site with a single layer of artefacts requires a different 
research approach and framework from a site with multiple layers of occupation and 
artefacts. Instead of excavations, surveys are rather used on battle sites. Excavations are 
perfect for determining the sequence of occupation, but the spatial distribution of battle-
related remnants is crucial in interpreting a battle site. 
2.2.6. Battle of Monmouth 
The Battle of Monmouth on 28 June 1778 was one of the largest and longest battles during 
the American Revolution. The battle was fluid, traversing nearly 30 km where the British 
forces of approximately 21 000 men opposed the American army with about 15 000 men 
(Sivilich & Stone 2009: 101). To assess the battlefield, the archaeological project could not 
have been approached by using traditional archaeological techniques. The evaluation had to 
be quick and efficient in locating artefacts while mapping and interpretation of the data 
occurred. The Monmouth battlefield is the first Revolutionary War battlefield to be 
completely excavated and surveyed through metal detector surveys (Sivilich & Stone 2009: 
103).  
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Interpreting the events relied heavily on the locational data of the artefacts. The data 
collection became more precise over the course of the fieldwork resulting in predictive 
models suggesting firing positions of artillery and men. By organising artefact classes into 
different layers within the GIS, it was possible to isolate specific events and features. By 
analysing the clusters of artillery shot, it was possible to identify a significant feature, such as 
the orchard, into which the Americans aimed most of their shots, and it concurred with the 
historical documentation about this aspect of the battle (Sivilich & Stone 2009: 108). 
The archaeological project on the Battle of Monmouth shows how battlefield archaeology 
can be used to interpret historical events. The results from metal detector surveys, within 
the confines of a clear methodology and objective, together with a detailed analysis of 
retrieved material, provided the researchers with the much-needed evidence to complete 
the investigation. The study of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg has noted the methodology 
and process of analysis conducted by the researchers at the Battle of Monmouth, which has 
resulted in significant advances in the comprehension of the events. The analysis of artefact 
classes and the associated GIS mapping, implemented during the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg 
project, were influential in making concise conclusions about the positions and routes used 
to advance. 
2.2.7. Rorke's Drift battlefield 
Rorke's Drift is famous because of the achievements of a small group of British soldiers 
defending the military post against a large Zulu army. This battle formed part of the Anglo-
Zulu wars and occurred on 22 January 1879 (Webley 1990: 9). In 1988, archaeological 
excavations were undertaken to locate the foundations of the historical hospital, while 
excavations during the following year were conducted to locate the foundations of the 
British store (Webley 1990: 10). Webley (1990: 11) concludes that the archaeological 
evidence contributed to historians' understanding of the events and provided a more 
detailed and accurate picture of the battle. 
The Rorke's Drift research is significant in South African battlefield archaeology as it offers 
insight into how archaeology and historical sources could be utilised to study an event. 
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Webley (1990: 11) states that treasure seekers systematically looted the site, and possibly 
other similar sites, resulting in only a small number of metal artefacts being retrieved. It 
would be interesting to use metal detector surveys around the military post of Rorke's Drift 
to establish if enough battle remnants can be retrieved to interpret additional aspects of the 
battle.  
Webley (1990: 11) alludes to treasure seekers looting the site of Rorke's Drift. Similar looting 
forced the research team to proceed cautiously and not to publicise the archaeological work 
on the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg. Since the BBNR has not been enclosed until recently, it 
was decided to not promote the research in the public domain for fear of uncontrolled 
access to the battle site. It was argued that public knowledge of retrieved artefacts might 
encourage illegal activity on the site. Further, Anglo-Boer War (or South African War) sites 
have become the target of illegal detecting and retrieval of artefacts. This could be 
attributed to these sites having become well known and the artefacts associated with the 
sites sought after. Becker (2009: 30) observes that metal detecting on archaeological sites 
for personal gain results in the loss of scientific data and information. Metal artefacts from 
historical sites resemble only one type of artefact class that could be used for interpreting a 
site. A skewed perception will result from both the retrieved metal and the archaeological 
assemblage without metal artefacts. The relevant authorities need to address the illegal 
looting of the sites as it may have detrimental effects on future research at these sites.  
The research at Rorke's Drift had a different focus from the research on the 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg. The focus at Rorke's Drift was primarily on the fortifications and not on the 
battlefield itself. It, therefore, incorporated the sequence of settlement, events and activities 
at the site over a long period. Future research on similar sites might include the associated 
battlefield. 
2.2.8. 1880–1881 Fort, Potchefstroom 
During the First Anglo-Boer War, or the First Transvaal War, of 1880–1881, the Fort at 
Potchefstroom was the site of a 14-week siege by Transvaal forces against the British forces 
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occupying the fort. The earthwork fort itself was hastily constructed to serve the purpose of 
the military enterprise.  
The archaeological excavations at the fort were intended to determine the original structure 
of the fort and to establish the content of the archaeological deposits (Mason 1975: 2). The 
challenge during the archaeological project was to distinguish between the materials from 
different eras occurring in the excavated material since precolonial artefacts and post-fort 
materials were identified. These could be attributed to the earthwork during the 
construction phase of the fort bringing in alluvium material containing Stone Age artefacts, 
and possibly the later construction of a nearby railway line using the fort site (Mason 1975: 
7). 
Mason (1975: 8) argues that the excavation and proposed reconstruction of the 
Potchefstroom Fort fills a gap in South African archaeology, as there is a need for objective 
historical education. Public facilities at archaeological sites with important historical 
relationships should be coordinated with education in South Africa.  
The research at Fort Potchefstroom is another example of battlefield archaeology in South 
Africa, but also, once again, differs from the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg archaeological 
project. The focus of Mason's work was the military fortification associated with the military 
siege and not the battlefield itself. Although the advances made by Mason are significant to 
South African archaeology, there are still several aspects that could be investigated.  
Mason's argument about the value of objective historical education and the public facilities 
at important historical and archaeological sites is still relevant in South Africa. It is also 
pertinent that the significance of a site is elevated through public opinion and participation, 
and hence the involvement of volunteers and community-based organisations is crucial to 
establish sites that can be commemorated. Public awareness, the involvement of volunteers 
and community-based organisations form an important aspect in promoting and conserving 
archaeological sites. More important is that their involvement must be within a predefined 
framework. The quality of the research ultimately depends on planning and leadership to 
achieve the eventual desired outcome.  
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2.2.9. Steinaecker's Horse outpost 
Colonel Ludwig von Steinaecker, commander of a voluntary British military unit called 
Steinaecker's Horse, was active in the Lowveld and Swaziland during the Second Anglo-Boer 
War (or South African War) from 1899 to 1902. The main objective of the research was to 
reconstruct aspects of daily life at the outpost (Van Vollenhoven et al. 1998: 114). Archival 
and literature survey provided much-needed information about the existence of the unit. 
Archaeological excavations at the site established the location and extent of the structures, 
and the extent and depth of the midden.  
The researchers (Van Vollenhoven et al. 1998: 120) concluded that even though little 
historical information exists about the site, the archaeological excavations revealed enough 
information to make significant conclusions about the site. Numerous artefacts were 
recovered from the middens, suggesting military uniforms and other remnants. Interpreting 
the widespread nature of the artefacts indicated the poor discipline of a volunteer unit, 
rather than a disciplined military unit. From the artefacts, the diet of the occupants could be 
derived as mostly comprising the standard military issue of canned beef, sardines and ham, 
but that these were supplemented through hunting and fishing.  
The authors identified the location of the site as part of a larger project documenting 
military-historical sites in the Kruger National Park and in the former Transvaal. This is 
significant as numerous military sites exist in South Africa, creating a large prospect for 
future archaeological work. Within the confines of the Kruger National Park, a spatial project 
to identify military-historical sites is significant since the conservation and ultimately the 
heritage management of the sites will be effectively monitored. Within the larger area, 
military sites or conflict sites have become prone to looting, especially if they are situated 
near urban and other development sites.  
2.3. Conclusion 
Historical archaeology and battlefield archaeology as the ambit of the 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg research is a field of study that is well established in large parts of the world. In 
South Africa, both conflict archaeology and battlefield archaeology have the potential to 
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develop into major fields of study. South African history is rich in war, conflicts, battles, 
skirmishes and protests, but has not yet been in the vanguard of archaeological research. 
Although much research has been conducted on sites of military importance, little research 
has focused on the development of the battle as an event.  
The sample of research conducted on battlefields and sites across the world and in South 
Africa, discussed above, was used to identify specific aspects that could guide the research 
into the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg. As a reference to studies conducted on similar events 
and on military sites in South Africa, the approach utilised by researchers and the challenges 
they had to overcome were invaluable to the success of this research project. Not only was 
the methodological approach used by others on similar projects important, but the analysis 
and conclusions drawn from results were significant in gaining an understanding of the 1806 
Battle of Blaauwberg. The metal detector surveys were therefore conducted within a grid 
system to cover the study area. Accurate documentation of the retrieved artefacts was 
necessary to obtain a complete picture of the location of artefact and was used to make 
significant conclusions. 
South Africa has a rich military history and therefore requires extensive research, not only 
from a historical point of view but also from an archaeological perspective. CHAPTER 3, 
therefore, provides a historiographical overview of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg, before 
CHAPTER 4 evaluates the primary documentation and maps.  
  
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg – an archaeological perspective 
33 
CHAPTER 3. HISTORIOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW 
Various authors and historians provided their own accounts and interpretations of the 
events by making use of the available primary resources. The following authors produced 
accounts on the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg: 
• L.J. Erasmus's Master's dissertation (History), ‘Die tweede Britse verowering van die 
Kaap, 1806’ (Erasmus 1972); 
• D.W. Krynauw & G.S.J. Möller's book, Blouberg ons beroemdste strand (Krynauw & 
Möller 1994); 
• D.W. Krynauw's book, Beslissings by Blouberg – triomf en tragedie van die stryd om die 
Kaap (Krynauw 1999); 
• T. Couzens' book, Battles of South Africa (Couzens 2004); 
• W. Steenkamp's book, Assegais, Drums & Dragoons – a military & social history of the 
Cape (Steenkamp 2012); 
• M.R.D. Anderson's book, Blueberg – Britain takes the Cape (Anderson 2008); 
• N. von der Heyde's book, Field guide to the battlefields of South Africa (Von der Heyde 
2013); and 
• J.D. Grainger's book, British campaigns in the South Atlantic (Grainger 2015). 
Although the authors used the same primary sources, differences occur in the various 
accounts and representations of the battle events. Some discrepancies that appear in the 
secondary sources or popular historical accounts of the battle are illustrated. These 
inaccuracies and inconsistencies are sometimes subtle but cast doubt on the authority of the 
source. These inaccuracies have also become part of the popular history that is spread about 
the event. As this dissertation focused on the battle events, only the descriptions and 
discrepancies relating to the battle events were noted. Further, aspects of the battle that 
could be archaeologically investigated were also briefly discussed. 
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3.1.  L.J. Erasmus's Master's dissertation 
Lourens Jacobus Erasmus produced a commendable dissertation for a Master’s degree in 
History focusing on the second British occupation of the Cape of Good Hope in 1806. Not 
only the Battle of Blaauwberg but also the political and economic aspects surrounding the 
events were investigated. Erasmus’s (1972) core focus was an investigation of the military 
history of the events leading up to, during and after the battle. 
According to Erasmus (1972: 121), Janssens departed from Cape Town on 6 January 1806, 
heading towards Rietvlei to be within reach of the British forces. On 7 January at six o'clock 
in the morning, the Batavian forces marched northwards and continued until three o'clock in 
the afternoon to reach Blaauwbergsvlei, where they settled in and prepared for battle. 
Erasmus (1972: 124) argues that during the march towards Blaauwbergsvlei, the Batavian 
forces extended from the coastal dunes up to the inland plains, with the troops set up in 
what would be their subsequent battle formations and positions.  
On the morning of 8 January, Janssens wanted to move early but received word that the 
British forces were already approaching. Janssens attempted to reach the heights but failed 
to do so as the British were already descending the heights next to Blaauwberg Hill. Erasmus 
(1972: 127) describes how the Batavian force extended their line across the plain to create 
the impression that their capacity matched the British line. In addition, Janssens also 
ordered a one-eighth rotation to further the impression that they matched the British force. 
Erasmus (1972: 128) shows the positions of the various Batavian troops as the light dragoons 
and mounted artillery being on the right flank, and further left the 9th Regiment Jaegers, 
with two howitzers and three 6-pounder cannons, the 22nd Dutch Regiment of Infantry, the 
French Marines, the 5th Regiment of Waldeck and then the burgher cavalry. The artillery was 
taken out of the line and positioned where required. Erasmus (1972: 128) continues by 
stating that no fewer than 50 men, consisting of jaegers and the Hottentot Light Infantry, 
were positioned in the dunes between the sea and Blaauwberg Hill.  
Erasmus (1972: 130) indicates that the British forces drove off the Batavian light troops on 
the beach, on their way to ascending the heights of Blaauwberg Hill. Erasmus (1972: 136) 
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reports that the Waldeck soldiers turned around and fled as soon as the first cannon shot 
landed amongst their right flank. Despite Janssens’ best efforts, he could not manage to stop 
their retreat. The 22nd Regiment also collapsed under the British Second Brigade's bayonet 
charge, while the French Marines fought valiantly. Unfortunately, heavy losses amongst the 
French forced them to retreat, with the jaegers and grenadiers also making an orderly 
withdrawal. Lieutenant Pelegrini and his mounted artillery, which continued firing gallantly 
at the British, were the last to depart from the battlefield after Janssens ordered them to 
retreat (Erasmus 1972: 136). 
Erasmus (1972) provides a comprehensive analysis of the battle and associated events, and 
presents the sequence of events chronologically with in-depth discussions on the rationale 
behind specific decisions. Erasmus's account and description of the events is closely aligned 
with the accounts as depicted in the primary sources.  
3.2.  D.W. Krynauw & G.S.J. Möller's Blouberg – ons beroemdste strand 
D.W. Krynauw and G.S.J. Möller (1994) briefly describe the location and history of the 
Blaauwberg area in their book, Blouberg – ons beroemdste strand. The depiction of the 
battle itself forms a small portion of the narrative but provides an astute view of the battle. 
Krynauw and Möller (1994: 35) state that Janssens and his troops marched from Rietvlei on 
the morning of 7 January 1806 towards Blaauwberg Hill. They stopped close to the farm 
Janssensgift, from where Janssens and a couple of officers continued onward to observe the 
British. Janssens could do nothing to stop the British from landing as the artillery cover from 
the large fleet of British ships was overwhelming. The Batavian force spent the night of 7 
January at Justinus Keer's farm, Blaauwbergsvlei. On the news that a British force had landed 
in Saldanha Bay and was heading towards Cape Town, Janssens decided to attack the 
invaders the next morning. He sent notice to Cape Town of his intentions, but also indicated 
that should he be forced to withdraw, all horses and wagons had to be sent to him at the 
Hottentots Holland Mountain, as planned beforehand. 
Krynauw and Möller (1994: 36) describe the location of the farmhouse at Blaauwbergsvlei as 
near the water’s edge, but slightly further south and inland. The Batavian defensive line was 
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set up between the farmhouse and the southern tip of Blaauwberg Hill, or the so-called 
Kleinberg. Krynauw and Möller (1994: 36) further relate that as soon as the British scaled the 
small ridge to the east of Blaauwberg Hill, they noticed the Batavian forces and immediately 
started with a howitzer bombardment. On their approach, the Second Brigade shot the first 
volley of musket balls at 250 metres from the Batavian line and subsequently the second 
volley at 150 metres. After this proved ineffective, General Ferguson gave the order for a 
bayonet charge at 50 metres. According to Krynauw and Möller (1994: 37), the British ’paid’ 
heavily during this charge, suggesting that they suffered heavy losses. 
In evaluating the battle, Krynauw and Möller (1994: 38) assert that Janssens chose the plain 
as the battleground because neither of the two parties would be able to gain strategic 
advantage from the battlefield. All that would matter was quality and quantity, in both of 
which Janssens was at a disadvantage (Krynauw & Möller 1994: 39).  
Krynauw spent a large amount of time collecting archival sources on the battle because the 
battle fascinated him. He also visited the battlefield and his photographs and descriptions, 
albeit almost 150 years after the battle, are insightful since the area has subsequently been 
subjected to development and large-scale invasion of alien vegetation. 
3.3.  D.W. Krynauw's Beslissings by Blouberg – triomf en tragedie van die stryd om die 
Kaap 
In his later title, D.W. Krynauw (1999) provides an authoritative account of the 1806 Battle 
of Blaauwberg in Beslissing by Blouberg – triomf en tragedie van die stryd om die Kaap. 
Krynauw (1999) describes this event from the lead-up to the battle, the battle itself, and the 
aftermath up to the capitulation. 
The British fleet fired their cannons continuously during the evening of 7 January, to such a 
degree that the magisterial clerk in Tulbagh noted it. Krynauw (1999: 88) argues that 
Janssens consequently did not attempt to challenge the British near the coast, as his forces 
would have had to leave the safety of the dunes and hills and be in the open, certain to 
become targets for the heavy artillery fire. 
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According to Krynauw (1999: 90), even though the early movement of the British on 8 
January surprised Janssens, he set up his defences as he had intended to do. He positioned 
50 sharpshooters in the dunes between the sea and Blaauwberg Hill, while mounted 
burghers waited on Kleinberg. Janssens' left flank consisted of burghers, the Hottentot Light 
Infantry, infantry and jaegers, the Waldeck Regiment, the French Marines, the 22nd Dutch 
Regiment and the 9th Regiment Jaegers. Janssens' right flank comprised the mounted 
artillery and dragoons. 
The battle started when the British ascended the heights and soon after, opened fire with 
their howitzers (Krynauw 1999: 92). General Baird subsequently ordered the First Brigade to 
dislodge the burghers on Kleinberg, which they accomplished with heavy losses in personnel. 
The Second Brigade was ordered to advance towards the Batavian line and fired two 
ineffective rounds of musket fire at too great a distance before a bayonet charge started. 
Krynauw (1999: 93) believes, even though it is not stated anywhere in the primary sources, 
the Batavian forces also opened fire with their smoothbore front-loading muskets. 
With the collapse of the Waldeck Regiment and Janssens' desperate attempt to persuade 
them, the 22nd Regiment of Infantry and the French Marines still fought gallantly (Krynauw 
1999: 94). Unfortunately, however, under the might of the heavy onslaught, they also 
crumbled while both the dragoons and the jaegers continued to fight and hold their 
positions, only to retreat soon afterwards. During the general retreat, heavy cannon fire still 
came from the Batavian right flank, in the form of Pelegrini's mounted artillery (Krynauw 
1999: 95), who persisted with firing until Janssens eventually ordered them to depart the 
battlefield. 
Krynauw (1999) provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg, and gives tremendous insight into the battle and associated events. Krynauw 
further makes intriguing comments and interpretations of various aspects of the battle, 
which certainly are not contained within the primary sources consulted. Krynauw then 
presents his interpretation of the duration of the battle and the number of casualties. 
According to Krynauw (1999: 153), the battle started at five o'clock in the morning and the 
Political Board in Cape Town received notice of the defeat at half past eleven in the morning. 
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Krynauw's calculations, therefore, state that the battle ended around ten o'clock in the 
morning, therefore lasting five hours. 
Krynauw (1999: 154) further comments that according to General Baird, the losses on the 
British side were 15 dead, 189 wounded, and eight soldiers missing, which is a relatively low 
percentage. Taking into consideration John Graham's comments that the Dutch were 
bringing down the 24th Grenadiers with every shot (Atkinson 1940: 75), it is difficult to 
determine whether Baird's account of the number of fatalities during the battle is accurate 
or not, and this will require further investigation. Further, no information about graves is 
available, but for Justinus Keer commenting that he buried the dead near his farmhouse. No 
graves have since been identified and the location of the burials remains a mystery.  
3.4.  T. Couzens' Battles of South Africa 
Tim Couzens visited and describes several of South African battles and battlefields in his 
book, Battles of South Africa (Couzens 2004). Although Couzens unambiguously states that 
this book is not intended to be comprehensive, nor an "expert military analysis of warfare in 
South Africa" (Couzens 2004: 7), he provides a fascinating view on the domain of battles and 
associated battlefields within the South African context. 
Couzens illustrates the lead-up to the Battle of Blaauwberg briefly indicating that Janssens 
spent the night of 7 January 1806 at Rietvlei (Couzens 2004: 42). Then he appears to 
contradict himself by subsequently declaring that in the late afternoon of 7 January, 
Janssens had already departed when several British ships bombarded Rietvlei. Janssens had 
then taken up a position at Blaauwbergsvlei on the plain east of Kleinberg (Couzens 2004: 
43). 
According to Couzens (2004: 44), Janssens extended his force, straddling the wagon road 
leading to Cape Town, to 1600 metres, while Baird divided his force into two brigades. The 
two brigades marched side-by-side over the ridge and descended to the plain. Couzens 
(2004: 44) continues by stating that the battle started when the grenadiers of the 24th were 
sent to dislodge the Batavian forces on Kleinberg. Further, the Second Brigade extended its 
line to face the whole of the Batavian line and pushed the First Brigade into reserve. 
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In his brief description of the battle events, Couzens (2004: 44) describes the distance 
between the initial artillery positions of both sides as being 1800 paces apart. The Waldeck 
Regiment, however, collapsed when a few cannon balls landed amongst them, with the 
French Marines and the Hottentot Light Infantry standing firm. Shortly after, the 22nd 
Regiment also retreated upon which Janssens consequently ordered a general retreat 
(Couzens 2004: 45).  
Couzens' description of the battle needs to be viewed in the light of the intended purpose of 
producing the account. The intention was not to give a military analysis of the battle, but 
rather to provide a brief informative picture of one of the many battles in South Africa. 
Couzens further provides distances for several aspects on the battlefield. It is not clear how 
these distances have been obtained, or how they have been calculated, but there is a 
possibility he calculated them from visiting the battlefield and by making assumptions about 
battle positions. Without the archaeological evidence, these calculations or distances cannot 
be verified.  
Couzens also relates that the British brigades marched side-by-side over the small ridge; 
while Krynauw (1999) says the First Brigade marched to the west, and the Second Brigade to 
the east of the small hill. The historical maps of the battle,5 depicting the advances made by 
the British, also show the First Brigade to the west and the Second Brigade to the east of the 
small hill. Despite Couzens' inaccuracies about the battle, his version still contains valuable 
information that provides the reader with a comprehensive idea of the battle and is suitable 
as an informative guide to the public. 
3.5.  W. Steenkamp's Assegais, Drums and Dragoons – a military & social history of the 
Cape 
Willem Steenkamp (2012) provides a comprehensive account of the military and social 
history of the Cape in his book, Assegais, Drums and Dragoons. The book does not aim to be 
“a military history textbook” but rather “readable for both the military specialist and 
anybody else”. Steenkamp presents a wide-ranging explanation of the relevant situation in 
                                                     
5 NL-HaNA, Janssens / Kaarten, 4.JSF, inv.nr. 13; Smart 1809; M1/2064 - 2071; M3/21; Castle Military Museum 
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the Cape, as well as the rationale behind political and military decisions taken, and analyses 
the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg. 
Steenkamp (2012: 232) alludes to General Janssens' preparedness for the British invasion by 
commenting that with the British fleet in Table Bay, "his carefully calculated defence plan 
kicked in without delay." In commandeering the troops and preparing for the imminent 
invasion, Janssens was in fact well prepared. He was, however, hampered by British delaying 
tactics and could not commit to a specific area to set up his defence (Steenkamp 2012: 233) 
since the British attempted false landings in various locations. 
In his description of the men Janssens had at his disposal, together with the artillery and 
ammunition, Steenkamp (2012: 234) states that the Javanese Artillery were armed with light 
bronze swivel cannons, called lantakas that were hastily mounted on big-wheeled field 
carriages. These cannons were not on the Batavian inventory and according to Steenkamp 
where they came from were long forgotten. Besides these cannons, Janssens had two 
howitzers, six 6-pounders, two 3-pounders and six 1-pounder field cannons. This gave him an 
advantage over the British as they only had two howitzers and six 6-pounder field cannons. 
The British continued the landing of the troops in Melkbosstrand on 7 January, while 
Janssens advanced to the Blaauwberg from Rietvlei, where they spent the night (Steenkamp 
2012: 244). Once again, Steenkamp alludes to Janssens' preparedness for battle in that he 
advanced in an extended line, a battle formation, instead of the usual column formation. 
Janssens and his men spent the night before the battle at Justinus Keer's farm, 
Blaauwbergsvlei, where it was decided to attack the following morning. 
The morning of 8 January 1806 saw a full-scale battle fought in the European style on the 
African continent south of the Sahara (Steenkamp 2012: 248). Before Janssens could 
advance early in the morning, he was notified that the British forces were already well on 
their way. Janssens, therefore, had to set his force into the battle formation by stretching 
them out to create the impression they covered the entire British front. Steenkamp (2012: 
249) describes how the Batavian defensive line was positioned between Justinus Keers's 
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farmyard and Kleinberg. Two artillery field pieces were deployed to the lower slopes of 
Kleinberg with burgher dragoons occupying the small hill.  
Describing the British advance, Steenkamp (2012: 252) states that the Second Brigade 
arrived at the crest of the hill, from where they perceived the enemy drawn up on the other 
side. The Second Brigade advanced in line and in file from the heads of the companies, as 
allowed by the terrain. Steenkamp (2012: 251) further describes the nature of the landscape 
through the account of Major John Graham (Atkinson 1940: 75): “it was impossible to give 
an idea of the difficulty of the march on the ground over which they had to go, the great 
irregularity of the surface, the deepest sand he has ever seen and covered with almost 
impenetrable brushwood”. 
As the Second Brigade advanced, Janssens' men had still not fired a shot from their 
smoothbore muskets as the distance was too great, but Steenkamp (2012: 254) writes “at 
228 metres the Batavians fired a hopelessly premature volley (supposedly because of a 
misunderstood order) and another at about 137 metres. But soon the Highlanders were 
within effective range, and clouds of white gun smoke bloomed out in front of the Batavian 
line as its soldiers started firing”. At 60 metres, the Highlanders were ordered to fix bayonets 
and advanced at a steady pace under heavy fire of round shot, grape and musketry 
(Steenkamp 2012: 255). 
Steenkamp (2012) mentions that the Batavian forces fired a volley of musket balls at a 
premature distance of 228 metres. This is incorrect as Janssens related that the British 
Second Brigade fired a volley at too great a distance with no effect. Janssens also states that 
his orders were accurately conveyed as if on the parade ground, which contradicts 
Steenkamp's comment about an apparent misunderstood order. Further, Janssens asserts 
that he waited to give the order for his men to fire until the British were close enough, which 
would consequently have a murderous effect. Unfortunately, however, the Waldeck 
Regiment retreated in great confusion, distracting him and possibly he never gave that 
order. 
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Steenkamp, as a military historian, argues that the Second Brigade advanced in line and file 
format according to the ground. This comment is significant in the context of the battle, as 
the deep sand, the thickness of the shrubs or vegetation most probably had an influence on 
the format of the British advance. Lastly, Steenkamp comments that the Javanese Artillery 
was additionally armed with light bronze swivel cannons, called lantakas that were hastily 
mounted on big-wheeled field carriages. He continues that there was no evidence to 
substantiate this claim, but that besides these cannons, Janssens had two howitzers, six 6-
pounders, two 3-pounders and six 1-pounder field cannons. This puts the total number of 
cannons at Janssens' disposal, the 16 on Janssens register plus the number of lantakas. Van 
Oordt (2016: 48) argues the number of cannons being 16, while on the lantakas he further 
explains that after the battle Mrs Marie Koopmans de Wet apparently requested the 
commanding officer at the Castle for her four lantakas to be returned. According to Van 
Oordt, this could have contributed to the confusion about the lantakas. 
Steenkamp's (2012) account of the battle focuses not only on the events during the battle 
but covers the complete invasion and British campaign. It provides a wealth of information 
that is valuable. Steenkamp's (2012) version is authoritative and contributes to the 
promotion of this significant historical event. 
3.6.  M.R.D. Anderson's Blueberg – Britain takes the Cape 
Mark Robert Dunbar Anderson (2008) provides an elaborate account of the 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg in his book, Blueberg – Britain takes the Cape. A major shortcoming in his 
account is that he provides no references and therefore renders his account solely a story 
rather than a history (Anderson 2008: 9). From Anderson’s acknowledgements, one can 
gather that extensive research was conducted to produce this account, but while there is 
valid criticism, the inaccuracies that occur make it of little value. 
On 6 January 1806 Janssens' army arrived at Rietvlei but had to move slightly inland to 
escape artillery fire from the British fleet. The army spent the whole of the next day at 
Rietvlei (Anderson 2008: 150). In the camp at Rietvlei, Janssens informed his staff that they 
would march early in the morning of 8 January to contest the landing and occupy the crest at 
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Blaauwberg Hill, and the high-lying area towards the east that would give them a height 
advantage (Anderson 2008: 151). Early in the morning of 8 January, Janssens' men marched 
from Rietvlei towards Blaauwberg Hill but with the bombardment of Rietvlei continuing, 
Janssens decided to take up a position behind Blaauwberg Hill.  
Anderson (2008: 157) recounts that “in the first warmth of the morning”, the Dutch arrived 
at Justinus Keer’s farmhouse at Blaauwbergsvlei, and while the troops relaxed around the 
spring, Janssens finalised his plans for setting up the defensive line. Janssens realised that he 
would not reach the crest of Blaauwberg Hill as the British were already approaching. The 
Batavian line was spread out over the plain from Kleinberg in a long double line of men. The 
British rose at three o'clock in the morning and were ready by a quarter to six, moving out in 
two columns. Before they reached the crest of the high-lying area east of Blaauwberg Hill, 
Baird received news that the Batavian forces were taking up positions on the plains below 
(Anderson 2008: 165). Baird immediately formed two separate columns, with the First 
Brigade on the left and the Second Brigade on the right, against Blaauwberg Hill.  
Baird observed the Batavian long double-ranked line, with most of the hundreds of cavalry 
below the slopes of Kleinberg. He gave immediate orders to bring the howitzers into action 
(Anderson 2008: 165). While the howitzer fire from the British continued to aim at the 
centre of the Batavian line, the Batavian cannon, high on the slopes of Kleinberg, fired at the 
British (Anderson 2008: 166). 
A glaring inaccuracy in Anderson's account is about the advance of the Batavian forces to 
Blaauwbergsvlei. Anderson writes that Janssens and his men marched on the morning of the 
battle from Rietvlei to Justinus Keer's farmhouse. This is in stark contrast to Janssens' report 
in which he states that they had already arrived at Justinus Keer's farmhouse on 7 January. A 
further inaccuracy, which again undermines the credibility of Anderson's version of the 
battle, is the map produced by William Smuts. While the map is a clear visual depiction, it 
contains several conspicuous errors. Firstly, the Second Brigade is erroneously referred to as 
the First Brigade, while the British (English) Brigade is named the Second Brigade; the 
numbers of the brigades therefore need to be switched around for clarity. The map also 
contains numbers depicting specific battle events in sequence as they occurred. It states that 
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the British 24th Regiment moved forward and took Kleinberg and two cannons, while the 71st 
Regiment also moved forward and took the two cannons held by the Javanese Foot Artillery. 
This brings the total number of cannons lost by the Batavians to four, according to Anderson. 
This was never the case as the British captured only one cannon (Van Oordt 2016: 48).  
As a source or reference work, the Anderson’s version cannot be regarded as reliable since 
he references none of his work. The style of writing is that of fiction and the work, while 
entertaining, is not relevant for academic research. 
3.7.  N. von der Heyde's Field guide to the battlefields of South Africa 
In her book, Field guide to the battlefields of South Africa, Nicki von der Heyde (2013) briefly 
describes the context, action and aftermath of the battle, while a chronology of all the 
battles in South Africa shows the Battle of Blaauwberg to be the second colonial battle 
fought in this area after the 1795 Battle of Muizenberg. 
The account of the battle provided by Von der Heyde (2013: 331) is not intended to be 
comprehensive and only provides the broad sequence of events. Von der Heyde (2013: 332) 
writes that Baird chose the route inland of Blaauwberg Hill rather than the sandy track 
between the hill and the sea. This is also where the main route north from Cape Town was 
situated. Baird divided his forces into two brigades with the Second Brigade to the left, 
presumably the east, and the 24th, 59th and 83rd Regiments to the right, or the west. 
According to Von der Heyde (2013: 332), General Janssens spent the night at Rietvlei and 
marched his men north to take up a position on the flat plain east of Blaauwberg Hill. 
Rietvlei is situated around nine km from the plain east of Blaauwberg Hill. Von der Heyde 
further states that the battle began at five o'clock in the morning on 8 January 1806. This 
appears to be highly unlikely as the marching of 2000 men and positioning of the artillery on 
either side of the Batavian line must have taken a considerable amount of time and 
contradicts what Janssens recalls in his report (VC806). 
                                                     
6 VC80. Verbatim Copies. Western Cape Provincial Archives and Records Services. General Janssens report to 
Schimmelpenninck on the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg, compiled 27 January 1806. 
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As a general work that summarises battles in South Africa, this book is acceptable. However, 
as a reference book for research, it is inadequate. 
3.8.  J.D. Grainger's British campaigns in the South Atlantic 
In his book, of the same title, John D. Grainger (2015) covers “the British campaigns in South 
Africa and South America” and provides valuable insight into the campaigns. Grainger 
further describes the attempt by Britain to control the Cape as unnecessary, and argues that 
under continued Dutch control the history of South Africa would have taken a different 
course. 
From a military point of view, Grainger (2015) illustrates the rationale in keeping the 
Batavian forces in suspense as to where the landing was to take place. This prevented 
General Janssens from preparing his defence of the Cape well in advance. Janssens marched 
out of Cape Town on the afternoon of 7 January 1806 with the main Batavian force and 
camped at Rietvlei (Grainger 2015: 22). On the morning of 8 January, he marched again at 
three o'clock in the morning, to catch the British forces still in a state of confusion, only to 
apprehend that the British forces had occupied Blaauwberg Hill the previous day and were 
advancing towards him. Grainger states that Janssens was too late for the surprise he 
intended, creating the impression that he was ill-prepared.  
Grainger (2015: 23) further states that General Baird had sensibly let the Batavians do most 
of the marching, as the battle took place close to the British camp. Further, it is asserted 
(Grainger 2015: 24) that Major Graham of the British light troops had to race a group of 
Batavian jaegers for possession of a hill to the right of the battlefield. This hill on the west of 
the battlefield is known as Kleinberg, and it is where a skirmish occurred between the 24th 
Regiment and the Batavian burghers. 
Grainger (2015: 25) makes several statements about the military decisions taken during the 
battle that require discussion. He suggests that although the British were victorious, the 
British commanders displayed such incompetence as deserved to be punished by more than 
a few casualties. Grainger lists the following mistakes: 
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• Advancing without proper supplies; 
• Dividing the army; 
• Separating the brigades; 
• Firing the volley too soon; 
• Failing to secure the flanks; 
• Beginning the bayonet charge from too great a distance, causing the men to be out of 
breath; 
• A disorganised formation; and  
• Allowing the Batavian forces to retreat unmolested. 
Grainger (2015: 26) describes a further mistake by Baird in that he ignored the main body of 
the Batavian force as he marched towards Cape Town, after he had requested more men at 
the outset of the campaign because he was convinced Janssens had more troops at his 
disposal. If Baird was convinced that Janssens had men at his disposal, similar in number to 
the British forces, as he stated in his despatches to Lord Castlereagh (Hook 1832; Theal 
1899), he may well have been trapped between the fortifications of Cape Town and 
Janssens' troops. According to Grainger, this was a potentially dangerous mistake on Baird's 
part. 
3.9. Conclusion 
The various secondary sources available that depict the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg share a 
similar interpretation of the battle events. There are, however, several mistakes evident in 
the secondary sources. These mistakes or irregularities have been highlighted, and include 
aspects such as the place where the Batavian forces spent the night prior to the battle and 
the setup of the British two brigades. 
For the public, or as tourism guides, these versions provide valuable insight into the 1806 
Battle of Blaauwberg, and other battles in South Africa, but must also be read with caution 
as they contain inaccuracies. Erasmus's, Krynauw's and Steenkamp's versions contain 
detailed references of primary sources and include a valuable analysis of the events that go 
beyond merely informing about the events. As historical sources, they contribute 
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significantly to our understanding, not only of the battle, but also to all the other aspects 
surrounding the battle.  
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CHAPTER 4. EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS AND MAPS OF THE BATTLE 
The main sources of information pertinent to this dissertation are the identified 
archaeological material or physical remains of the battle but the eyewitness accounts and 
maps produced at the time of the battle also provide valuable information. Not all the 
accounts provide a comprehensive picture of the battle, but they contain specific aspects 
relevant to this research. 
4.1. Eyewitness accounts of the battle 
The personal account of the battle by General Jan Willem Janssens, the commander of the 
Batavian forces, proved a most valuable source of information (Janssens 1806; Theal 1908; 
Couzens 2004; Krynauw 1999). Similarly, the personal report on the battle by General David 
Baird, commander of the British forces, in the form of despatches to his superior, Lord 
Castlereagh, gives insight into the events. Baird shared the planning and administration 
leading up to the battle, the strategies used, equipment and men at his disposal. Further, 
descriptions by the Reverend Henry Martyn, Lieutenant Robert Campbell, Brigadier General 
Ronald Craufurd Ferguson, Major John Graham and Ensign Thomas Lucas are invaluable, 
while General Wilson's account, even though he did not partake in the battle, adds to our 
comprehension of the battle. 
The following eight primary sources or eyewitness accounts were used to investigate the 
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg: 
• General David Baird's despatches to Lord Castlereagh (Hook 1832; Theal 1899); 
• Captain Ronald Campbell's journal (Cannon 1848); 
• Brigadier General Ronald Craufurd Ferguson's letter to General Baird (Cannon 1852); 
• Captain John Graham's letter to Thomas Graham (Atkinson 1940); 
• General Jan Willem Janssens' report to Schimmelpenninck;  
• Thomas Lucas' letter to Joshua Fennel (Lucas 1806); 
• Reverend Henry Martyn's diary (Smith 1892); and  
• Lieutenant Colonel Robert Thomas Wilson's biography (Theal 1899). 
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These sources focus on a variety of topics and while they do not all deal with pertinent 
issues related to the focus of the research, they contain relevant information that can be 
used. In the following discussion only the aspects pertinent to the research were considered. 
4.1.1. General David Baird's despatches to Lord Castlereagh 
General David Baird was born in the town of New Byth in Scotland in 1756 and joined the 
military at the age of 15 years. In 1779 he visited the Cape of Good Hope for the first time en 
route to India where he was wounded and captured during combat. After four years as a 
prisoner of war, he was released after a peace accord was signed. During the next couple of 
years, he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on his return to India when war broke out 
again in 1790. Baird was involved in several battles in which he played a leading role, until he 
went back to England in 1797. During the first British occupation of the Cape of Good Hope 
from 1795 to 1803, Governor Macartney asked Baird, on his way back to England, to remain 
in Cape Town to assist with the training of troops. During this time, Baird became well 
acquainted with the defence system of Cape Town, the topography and the coastline, using 
this to his advantage during the 1806 conquest of the Cape of Good Hope (Krynauw 1999). 
According to Baird's despatches to Lord Castlereagh, he formed two brigades, the First 
Brigade towards the west and the Second Brigade towards the east. The army was 
accompanied by two howitzers and six light field pieces and they moved towards the road 
leading to Cape Town. His troops dislodge the enemy's light troops, and when they ascended 
the summit of Blaauwberg Hill, Baird discovered that Janssens had drawn his main body of 
troops into two lines and was advancing to anticipate the British approach. According to 
Baird, the enemy's force comprised about 5000 men of which the greater portion was 
cavalry, with 23 cannons yoked to horses (Hook 1832: 112; Theal 1899: 271). 
Baird immediately summed up Janssens' tactics and counteracted by dividing the British 
army into two brigades. According to Baird, Janssens had positioned the defensive line in 
such a manner to reserve their right flank. Baird's reaction was to send the Second Brigade 
down the main route, while the First Brigade took the defile of the mountains (Hook 1832: 
112; Theal 1899: 272). 
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The Second Brigade advanced steadily, but under constant and heavy cannon fire by the 
Batavian artillery. Round shot, grapeshot and musketry were used to bombard the Second 
Brigade. Baird mentioned the high number of Batavian soldiers that maintained their 
position obstinately under British fire; only once the Second Brigade charged did the enemy 
retreat (Hook 1832: 113; Theal 1899: 272). The First Brigade was excluded from the main 
battle action because of their position on the battlefield. The 24th Regiment's flank 
companies took part in the action by dislodging the horse and riflemen on the heights of 
Kleinberg (Hook 1832: 113; Theal 1899: 272).  
Baird conveyed the hardship his men endured during the battle. He described the 
environment as “deep, heavy and dry sand, covered with shrubs, scarcely pervious by light 
bodies of infantry; and above all, the total privation of water under the effect of a burning 
sun that nearly exhausted our gallant fellows in the moment of victory; and with the 
greatest difficulty were we able to reach Rietvlei” (Hook 1832: 113; Theal 1899: 272). This 
description of the battlefield by Baird was significant within the context of the battle. 
Baird's account of the battle provides valuable information crucial to the research, but 
several aspects require discussion. Firstly, Baird stated that, as they reached the summit of 
the hill, they observed that the Batavian forces were drawn up in two lines, about 5000 men, 
the majority being cavalry, with 23 pieces of cannon. From Janssens' records (VC80), we 
established that the Batavian forces comprised a mere 2000 men, inclusive of drivers and 
assistants. So why did Baird overestimate the number of Batavian forces on the battlefield? 
Was this done to elevate the achievement of his campaign or could the set-up of the 
Batavian line have caused Baird's miscalculation? Janssens' infantry was drawn in two files 
and the men were spread to cover the full extent of the British front. Further, Janssens 
ordered his line to rotate one eighth to create the impression that they covered the entire 
British front (VC80: 25). While both reports concur about the two lines, it is not clear why 
Baird estimated the Batavian forces at 5000 men. One explanation could be that by the time 
Baird compiled his despatch to Lord Castlereagh on 12 January 1806, he knew the exact 
numbers of the Batavian troops that took part in the battle, and those that Janssens left 
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel von Prophalow. Janssens left behind in Cape 
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Town a force of more than 1200 men, comprising burgher cavalry, artillery, and men in 
hospital. It is possible that Baird combined the number of men left in Cape Town with the 
men on the battlefield to arrive at an estimated number of 5000 men.  
Secondly, Van Oordt (2016: 48) argues that the number of artillery pieces Janssens had at his 
disposal during the battle was only 16 in total. Baird, however, mentioned that the Batavian 
forces had 23 pieces of cannon, while Janssens stated that they had two howitzers, six 6-
pounders, two 3-pounders, and six 1-pounders, making 16 in total. Van Oordt (2016: 48) 
further argues that after the Cape's capitulation, Baird had access to the Castle's records, 
which stated that the Cape had access to 23 pieces of cannon, which could explain the 
number Baird mentioned in his despatch. Not all these cannons were however employed on 
the battlefield. 
Thirdly, Baird further stated that the Batavian forces held their positions obstinately under 
British fire, only to retreat once the Second Brigade charged. This contrasts with Janssens' 
report in which he stated that the Waldeck Regiment showed signs of discomfort when the 
first British shells exploded amongst them and then retreated in great confusion and fled 
disgracefully (VC80). Janssens created the impression that the Waldeck Regiment retreated 
before the general charge by the British Second Brigade when the first couple of British 
shells exploded amongst their right flank. Once again, this might be a matter of bias in the 
reporting of General Baird to elevate the fighting endeavours of his forces. From a Batavian 
point of view, it was fatal that the Waldeck Regiment retreated as early as they did. The 
repercussions of the collapse of the Waldeck Regiment were substantial in the progress of 
the battle.  
4.1.2. Captain Ronald Campbell's journal 
Captain Ronald Campbell, of the 72nd Regiment, provided an alternative perspective on the 
battle in his journal, as contained in the historical records of the 72nd Regiment. Campbell 
briefly mentioned the excessive suffering the soldiers endured through the march and 
battle. He compared the heat to as intense as he had ever felt in India. He continued that 
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despite the suffering, the grenadiers still requested the pipers to play the regimental 
quickstep, astounding the 59th Regiment, which was close behind them (Cannon 1848: 40). 
The historical records of the 72nd Regiment compiled by Richard Cannon contain further 
information on the battle that proved to be supportive in understanding the battle events. 
Cannon used the original regimental reports, letters and journals in the compilation. On the 
morning of 6 January, the 71st, 72nd and 93rd Regiments were ordered to effect a landing in 
Melkbosstrand, and soon afterwards, they had to chase away some Dutch sharpshooters, 
killing and wounding 13 of the enemy. Early on the morning of 7 January, the 72nd Regiment 
advanced with one 6-pounder cannon to surprise the enemy encamped at a small village. 
The Dutch, however, made a hasty retreat, after which the regiment returned to their base 
(Cannon 1848: 38). 
On the morning of the battle, the troops scaled the summit of the hills; the Batavian army 
was already formed with 23 cannons. The grenadiers of the 24th Regiment immediately set 
off to drive the Dutch mounted riflemen and jaegers from the heights on the right flank. The 
Second Brigade advanced to engage the opposing army, which opened fire with 19 cannons. 
At about 500 yards (457 metres) the Dutch fired grapeshot, while at about 250 yards (228 
metres), the enemy fired with muskets along the whole front. However, the enemy could 
not aim accurately as the brigade advanced too rapidly. At 150 yards (137 metres), the 
Second Brigade returned the musket fire, while advancing and firing from 60 yards (55 
metres) the order to charge was given by Brigadier General Ferguson. The general charge by 
the Highlanders caused the Dutch to flee, with the Highlanders in pursuit. The Dutch artillery 
on their right flank continually fired with two cannons but were soon driven off by Captain 
Campbell and the grenadiers. After pursuing the Dutch for five kilometres, the 72nd 
Regiment was ordered to a halt (Cannon 1848: 39–40). 
Cannon (1848) offers valuable information about the battle event, and although not 
everything appears to be primary sources, it provides logical insight into the events. The 
account of Captain Ronald Campbell, as a primary source, also highlights aspects for 
deliberation significant to the research. Similarly to the despatch of General Baird, Captain 
Ronald Campbell described the deep impassable sand and heat as major obstacles to the 
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progress and advance of the British. The men suffered severely, while Captain John Graham 
observes in his letter that men died from lack of water, added to the other adversities they 
endured. This together with the fact that the men might have been unfit or in poor health, 
as Krynauw (1999: 103) suggests, possibly led to the British not pursuing the Batavian forces 
as they retreated (Atkinson 1940: 76). For the archaeological research, this was significant as 
it alluded to the possible southern perimeter or extent of the battlefield. 
Cannon (1848: 39) provided accounts on what distances muskets were fired. At distances of 
500 yards, 250 yards, 150 yards and 60 yards, musket volleys were fired by the opposing 
armies. Prior to the archaeological investigation, some argued that if these volley patterns 
were clear in the archaeological record, it would be possible to delineate the battlefield 
according to these measurements.  
Once again, as argued before, there is a disparity in the number of Batavian artillery pieces 
mentioned by Cannon (1848: 39). Unfortunately, inaccuracies or discrepancies place the 
account in doubt. However, the account provided much insight into the development and 
course of the battle. 
4.1.3. Brigadier General Ronald Craufurd Ferguson's letter to General Baird 
On 19 January 1806, Brigadier General Ferguson addressed a letter to General Baird, adding 
to our understanding of the battle events (Cannon 1852: 60). This letter is contained in the 
compilation of historical records of the 71st Regiment by Richard Cannon. In the letter, 
Brigadier General Ferguson requested the allowance granted for the capture of two enemy 
cannons to be shared amongst the 71st, 72nd and 93rd Regiments.  
Cannon (1852: 58) briefly described the battle, as compiled from the regimental records of 
the 71st Regiment. On the morning of 8 January 1806, the British divided into two columns 
and moved up the heights of Blaauwberg Hill. From the heights, the enemy was seen to be 
drawn up in two lines, totalling about 5000 men, a large proportion of which was cavalry, 
with 23 cannons.  
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The Dutch stood firm until the charge of Second Brigade started, at which point they were 
completely routed. Three cannons were captured, and the Dutch lost 700 men, while the 
71st had only Colonel Robert Campbell, two sergeants, and 64 regular soldiers wounded, and 
five men killed (Cannon 1852: 58).  
Brigadier General Ferguson's letter to Baird contains another contentious fact about the 
Batavian artillery pieces (Cannon 1852: 60). Ferguson claimed that two Batavian cannons 
were captured, but Van Oordt's (2016: 48) explanation for the inaccuracies suffices. In his 
study and clarification, Van Oordt makes use of a range of calculations to determine the 
number of Batavian cannons present on the battlefield. Van Oordt calculates this through 
comparing the number of men per artillery unit to the number of men Janssens accounted 
for in his report. In a crosscheck, Van Oordt calculates the number of horses required by an 
artillery unit, and comparing it to the number Janssens accounted for in his report. Van 
Oordt, therefore, concludes that the Batavian forces only had 16 cannons on the battlefield 
and that 15 of them were accounted for after the battle, therefore determining that only 
one cannon was captured by the British (Van Oordt 2016: 48). However, the account of the 
battle, provided by Cannon (1852), provided valuable insight into the battle. Used with 
similar documents, a better understanding of the battle was obtained. 
4.1.4. Captain John Graham's letter to Thomas Graham 
Captain John Graham's letter to Thomas Graham (Atkinson 1940) is another detailed and 
invaluable eyewitness account of the battle. Graham wrote that on the morning of 8 January 
1806 he was ordered to form the advance guard to wait on General Janssens. He described 
the difficult terrain they had to traverse as deep sand, covered with impenetrable 
brushwood. Once they ascended the hill that ran perpendicular to the beach, they could 
observe the enemy three kilometres ahead. The enemy drew their troops in battle order as 
the British appeared over the crest (Atkinson 1940: 75).  
The grenadiers of the 24th Regiment were sent to occupy the low hill to the right when they 
saw 20 to 30 Dutch mounted riflemen gallop to the hill. This was a cause for alert and 
Captain Graham stated that he ordered the light company of the 24th Regiment to assist 
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(Atkinson 1940: 75). The Dutch sharpshooters were bringing down the 24th Grenadiers with 
every shot. The Dutch subsequently also opened fire with their cannon on the 24th Regiment 
which convinced Graham that he needed to capture these cannons. When a soldier shot one 
of the Dutch from the 24th Light Company, the Dutch retreated hastily, while only the Dutch 
cannons still fired during the retreat. Graham stated that the British soldiers were too tired 
to pursue the retreating Dutch (Atkinson 1940: 76). During the action on Kleinberg, Graham 
noted that the British line across the plain was advancing at an astonishing pace towards the 
enemy who opened fire with all their cannons. The British artillery returned the compliment 
with a round of fire (Atkinson 1940: 75). 
Graham concluded his reference to the battle events by stressing the severe conditions the 
men had to endure and that several men dropped dead from thirst. Was it not for the later 
access to two small ponds the consequences could have been terrible (Atkinson 1940: 76). 
Graham's account of the battle provided a detailed description of the action during the 
battle, which particularly interested this researcher. The following aspects of Graham's 
account are mentioned: firstly, the deep sand and impenetrable brushwood already 
discussed; secondly, the action or skirmish on Kleinberg; thirdly, the artillery fire from both 
the British and the Batavian; and fourthly, the Dutch sharpshooters and British losses during 
the skirmish on Kleinberg. 
Graham noted that the Batavian artillery positioned one cannon near Kleinberg, but from his 
description, it is not clear if the cannon was positioned on the hill or on a high-lying area 
close to the hill (Atkinson 1940: 76). Graham further noticed, from his vantage point near 
Kleinberg, the advancing British Second Brigade and the artillery fire from both sides. 
Graham's assessment of the pace at which the Second Brigade advanced is contradictory to 
the impression created of the difficult conditions the men had to endure while marching. I 
found his comments on the artillery fire from both sides of great interest. Military doctrine 
of the time directed the field cannons to advance near the foot regiments. The general 
opinion was that the proximity of the return fire of the 6-pounder cannons boosted the 
morale of the troops when subjected to an artillery bombardment, and they had to stand 
their ground in close formation (Caruana 1977: 7; Dawson et al. 2007: 203). In the absence 
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of horses drawing the cannon carriages through the thick sand, the marines volunteered to 
pull the cannons. This would severely hamper the speed at which the cannons could advance 
across the battlefield. The advance of the British artillery is fully discussed in CHAPTER 6. 
The comment by Graham that the Dutch sharpshooters brought down British men with 
every shot fired (Atkinson 1940: 78) is an issue Krynauw (1999: 154) also addresses, as he 
questions the accuracy of the official casualty report. Baird (Hook 1832: 113; Theal 1899: 
272) stated that the British losses were 189 wounded, eight missing and only 15 dead. 
Krynauw argues that these numbers could have been tampered with, to once again, 
promote Baird's achievements of this campaign. This, however, remains a topic for 
discussion, which could be clarified once the graves have been identified and excavated. 
Unfortunately, the objective for this research project and mandate for the permit conditions 
did not include the identification and excavation of graves.  
4.1.5. General Jan Willem Janssens' report to Schimmelpenninck 
General Jan Willem Janssens' report on the battle events to Schimmelpenninck, completed 
on 27 January 1806, is significant and provides an abundance of information. Although the 
document housed at the Western Cape Provincial Archives and Record Services, Cape Town, 
is a verbatim copy of the original document7, it is accepted as being accurate and true to the 
original. It must, however, be acknowledged that since handwritten copies of the originals 
have been made, errors could have been made that will be unknown without consulting the 
original documents.  
Janssens (VC80: 17–18) reported that on the morning of 7 January 1806 the army advanced 
from Rietvlei with the left flank in the dunes, the centre to the right of the dunes in the 
plains and the right wing further into the plain. Janssens specifically mentioned the various 
positions of the different regiments as they advanced with two companies of the Hottentot 
Light Infantry to the left, the 9th Regiment Jaegers, burgher cavalry and a party of light 
dragoons. The 22nd Infantry Regiment was deployed in the centre with the 5th Regiment of 
                                                     
7 Copied by G.M. Theal from original document – Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Collectie 036 Janssens, 1700-
1906, nummer toegang 2.21.092, inventaris nummer 70. 
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Waldeck, the French Marines and the artillery, while a squadron of light dragoons, the horse 
artillery, the Jaegers of Waldeck and the burgher cavalry covered the right wing.  
Janssens (VC80: 19) further reported that at nine o'clock the army halted their approach and 
Janssens with some staff continued forward to scout the position of the enemy forces. At 
three o'clock the afternoon the Batavian forces advanced further, to reach Blaauwbergsvlei 
where they took in position and made preparations.  
Janssens (VC80: 20) described the risks of attacking the British at their camp in 
Melkbosstrand, as it would have exposed his men to the cannon fire from the ships. He 
would then need to approach from behind Blaauwberg Hill, but that the British could then 
also decline the battle by marching south, leaving Cape Town unprotected. Janssens was 
further convinced that victory was impossible and, therefore, arranged to withdraw inland 
after the initial conflict. 
At three o'clock on the morning of 8 January, Janssens (VC80: 24) reported that the soldiers, 
from all over Europe, the East and even Mozambican slaves, were ready to proceed to the 
position from where he observed the enemy the previous day. The officers were to take the 
men to these positions to familiarise them with the situation. However, before this plan 
could be effected, reports were received that the British forces were already approaching. 
Janssens, however, did not alter his plans (VC80: 25). 
From four o'clock, the enemy was seen appearing in line with the Batavian right flank and 
Janssens ordered his defensive line to rotate by one-eighth of a circle to create the 
impression that his forces covered the whole of the enemy's line. The positioning of the 
different regiments according to Janssens (VC80: 25–26) was, from the right wing: 
• The greatest part of the squadron of light dragoons; 
• The horse artillery; 
• The 9th Regiment Jaegers; 
• Two howitzers and three 6-pounders; 
• The 22nd Regiment of Infantry; 
• The French Marines; 
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• The 5th Regiment of Waldeck; 
• The two Hottentot Light Infantry companies; 
• Three 6-pounders and six 1-pounders with the Javanese Artillery; 
• The Waldeck Jaegers; 
• The burgher cavalry of Captains Linde and Human; 
• The division of burghers of Captain Wium; and 
• In the dunes, between the beach and the hill, about 50 men, of which 20 jaegers and 
30 of the Hottentot Light Infantry.  
The cannons were occasionally moved to positions where they were required and Captains 
Linde and Human also moved to the heights with a small contingent of burghers. The 
defensive line was positioned properly but not too close, as it would not have matched the 
extended line of the enemy (VC80: 27). The cavalry was arranged in single file with an 
extended space between the individuals. The infantry was positioned in two files with a 
space between the men, and an extended space between the different regiments. Janssens 
(VC80: 27) argued, that due to the obvious lack of the British cavalry, the two files and 
extended space between men and corps could be used. 
The British attacked their left wing at five o'clock by passing through the dunes towards the 
hill. Janssens was surprised at the number of horses the British had at their disposal, and 
that they had six field cannons. The enemy's howitzers opened fire first, and the aim was 
directed at the centre of the Batavian line, where General Janssens was positioned (VC80: 
27). Janssens' orders were conveyed speedily and correctly as if on parade. However, when 
the first howitzer shell landed in the right wing of the Waldeck Regiment, it caused more 
confusion than he had expected. The cannon fire from both sides continued and the 
Batavian cannon fire influenced the British movement as it caused them to alter their 
movements (VC80: 29–30).  
The Second Brigade advanced in front of the Batavian infantry and discharged a round of 
muskets at too great a distance to have an effect. Janssens waited to give the order for his 
men to fire until the British were close enough, which would have a murderous effect, but 
unfortunately, the Waldeck Regiment retreated in great confusion. Janssens had to turn his 
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attention to persuading them not to leave, but to no avail, as they did not simply retreat but 
disgracefully fled (VC80: 32). 
On his return, Janssens (VC80: 33) noticed that the left flank of the 22nd Regiment was also 
retreating, but on hearing his orders, they stood fast again. The French Marines were now 
also forced to retreat, with great loss, as they were abandoned on both their left and right 
flanks. Janssens also noticed that the grenadiers and jaegers were falling back, while the 
dragoons formed together, and on receiving his order, they too retreated. Janssens ordered 
Adjutant General Rancke and later Colonel Henry to re-assemble the soldiers at Rietvlei.  
According to Janssens (VC80: 34–35), the artillery performed bravely, and only lost one 
cannon under the command of Lieutenant Dibbetz. After the general retreat, Janssens heard 
continuous cannon fire from the right flank, and on investigation, found the horse artillery, 
under command of Lieutenant Pelegrini, still bombarding the British with well-directed 
shots. Janssens ordered him to retreat, while covering the general retreat, and promoted 
him to captain for his bravery (VC80: 35). 
Janssens and his men assembled at Rietvlei and, after dispatching the Waldeck Regiment, 
marched inland. According to Janssens, this was done for the good of the town, as he would 
be in a better position to negotiate the capitulation (VC80: 36).  
Janssens (VC80) stated that the British artillery aimed their initial fire at the centre of the 
Batavian line, which caused much confusion amongst the 5th Regiment of Waldeck. The first 
cannon shot landed on the right flank of the Waldeck Regiment, which was a vital piece of 
information for the archaeological research. Since General Baird had two 5½ inch howitzers 
(Van Oordt 2016: 49) at his disposal, specifically designed to fire, explosive or incendiary 
shell (Caruana 1997: 7; Muller 1779: 65), it is most likely that the initial shot aimed at the 
centre of the Batavian line was howitzer hollow shot. Some researchers argued that if the 
British howitzer shells can be identified within a specific area, the battlefield could then be 
easily delineated. This is further clarified and discussed in CHAPTER 6. 
The Waldeck Regiment's retreat left the Batavian line in disarray and reduced the resistance 
Janssens provided. This also created another aspect the archaeological research attempted 
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to clarify. Janssens set up his defence with the German mercenaries (or Waldeck Regiment) 
in the centre, as they were assumed to be well trained and brave. The cavalry and a mobile 
artillery unit were positioned on the right flank to provide additional power once the space 
between the two forces had been reduced. However, since a gap was created in the centre 
of the Batavian line there is a possibility that the British forces targeted the weakness in the 
defensive line, and veered away from the force on the right flank of the Batavian line. Some 
have argued that this was one of the aspects the archaeological record could identify. The 
British movement across the battlefield is discussed in CHAPTER 6. 
Janssens further commented that the Second Brigade discharged their muskets at too great 
a distance, not affecting the Batavian forces. This would mean that should several shots be 
fired aimed at a distant target, the musket balls would come to land in a pattern similar to 
the firing line. It was argued that if this assumption was correct, the archaeology could 
identify this line. The analysis of musket balls was identified as an important aspect in the 
research and is discussed in CHAPTER 6. 
According to Janssens (VC80), the different regiments, such as the 22nd Infantry Regiment 
and French Marines, resisted courageously, but from Janssens' description, it is assumed 
that the fighting did not occur along a single extended line. From an archaeological point of 
view, this aspect of the battle was also investigated and provided clarity on the course of the 
battle.  
Janssens' account of the battle contains much detail invaluable to the archaeological 
research. The details Janssens shared were exactly the detailed information that was 
required to investigate archaeologically. Even though the objective of this research was not 
to be specific about every aspect of the battle, future analysis of the archaeological record in 
association with the historical record could clarify much finer details of the battle. 
4.1.6. Thomas Lucas' letter to Joshua Fennel 
Sometime in 1983, Joe Walsh, from Cahir, County Tipperary, Ireland, rescued a letter 
addressed to Joshua Fennel from Thomas Lucas, from a dustbin heading for an industrial 
shredder (Joe Walsh, pers. comm. 15 February 2017). Lucas' (1806) letter provides a 
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personalised eyewitness account of the battle and shares valuable information about the 
event. Lucas dated the letter 17 March 1806, and included his address at the time as Cape of 
Good Hope, Simon’s Town Headquarters. Lucas (1806) states that on 8 January they came 
into view of Janssens' army, but that the action only started at 12 o'clock. The action 
continued throughout the day and was a bloody affair as the enemy were scattered in all 
directions with 10, 15 and 20 bodies lying in a heap at their feet. 
Lucas (1806) stated that they lost only a few men even though the enemy's artillery 
continually fired upon them. The Batavian forces had 25 cannons and some howitzers, but 
these had little impact as they advanced so swiftly. Further, Lucas noted that, besides the 
grenadiers of the 24th Regiment, only the Second Brigade engaged with the enemy. He 
described his position to the right flank of the 72nd Grenadiers and mentioned that it was a 
wonderful sight to witness while the bagpipes played during the charge.  
Joe Walsh's efforts to save and subsequently conserve another eyewitness account of a 
significant event in history are noteworthy and needs to be applauded. The letter contains 
inaccuracies, but still includes valuable information about the battle action itself. The morale 
and experience that these men had to endure provide insight into the human aspects of the 
battle that cannot be ignored. The exaggeration or bias is clear from a young man penning 
his own personal experiences which clearly left a huge impression on him. As Lucas only 
wrote down his experiences over two months after the battle, the possibly inaccurate time 
of the battle sequence can be understood. Further, Lucas was part of the infantry and was 
therefore probably unaware of the exact number of cannons the Batavian forces had at their 
disposal. 
4.1.7. Reverend Henry Martyn's diary 
The Reverend Henry Martyn's diary provides another eyewitness account of, not the battle 
itself, but of the events and circumstances immediately after the battle. Martyn's diary 
provides much insight into specific details of the battle (Smith 1892).  
Martyn stated that soon after seven o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1806 tremendous 
artillery fire was heard coming from behind the mountain. Martyn was still on board the ship 
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at this point, and only came ashore later. Martyn saw smoke from the small hill to the right 
of Blaauwberg Hill, with troops running down towards the other side. Soon, there was a 
long-drawn fire of musketry that made everyone on the ship shudder. As soon as the noise 
stopped, Martyn saw the enemy retreating along the low ground towards Cape Town (Smith 
1892: 121–122).  
Martyn joined a party under Major Lumsden to march the nine kilometres through soft, 
burning sand, to the battlefield. As they ascended the heights, they were attracted to the 
small hill to the right where they observed some English soldiers. There they found wounded 
men from the 24th Grenadiers, but these had already received treatment, while three men 
were found to be dead. Captain Foster was found dead on top of the small hill, with more 
dead soldiers near him. From here, Martyn and his party descended to the plain where the 
two armies fought (Smith 1892: 123). 
Martyn came across a British marine who recounted the battle, and later they met soldiers 
and an officer of the 59th Regiment who declared that they had escaped unhurt. Towards the 
rear of the enemy's army, were a couple of farmhouses that were converted into a field 
hospital and contained over 200 wounded soldiers, mostly English, with some enemy 
soldiers among them (Smith 1892: 123). 
Martyn described the scenes at the field hospital as “horrid” with the wounded covered in 
blood and gore. Martyn walked into the field of battle with a surgeon, and on the right flank 
where the enemy engaged with the Second Brigade, saw many knapsacks lying around and 
concluded that the dead and wounded could have lain strewn in great numbers. Martyn had 
a conversation with a wounded Frenchman and a couple of other wounded men, all of 
whom begged for water (Smith 1892: 123–124).  
Martyn's diary is an invaluable source of historical information, not just on the battle itself; 
Martyn also shared his views about the trip to Cape Town and the time after the battle. 
Relevant aspects in his account of the battle were described in much detail. Marius 
Breytenbach (2016) used Martyn's description of the farmhouses to gain insight into the set-
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up of Justinus Keer's farmhouse and the field hospital, for his study on the field hospital used 
during the aftermath of the battle.  
Martyn's description of the events on Kleinberg further contributed to our understanding of 
the battle. While his view might have been obscured by both Blaauwberg Hill and Kleinberg, 
his experience of the battlefield was useful to this research. 
4.1.8. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Thomas Wilson's biography 
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Thomas Wilson's biography (Theal 1899) provides further insight 
into the battle, even though Wilson did not experience the battle himself, because he was 
sent to Saldanha Bay. Wilson briefly recounted that the 59th Regiment was ordered to take 
the route via the sand hills, while the main body ascended the heights. The British line 
descended the heights without hesitation and when they were within reach, General 
Ferguson received the order to lead the charge with the Second Brigade, with the enemy 
giving way. The British took several cannons and left about 500 enemy soldiers dead or 
wounded. Only the 71st and 72nd Regiments encountered resistance but still drove off the 
enemy with no interruptions (Theal 1899: 332). 
Wilson further noted that several sailors died of exhaustion and thirst while dragging the 
cannons through the deep sand in the heat of the sun. Fortunately, a small dam was located 
and General Baird himself supervised the distribution of the water (Theal 1899: 332). 
Wilson's account highlights specific aspects of the battle that provided valuable information 
to the research. Even though he did not experience the battle first-hand, he was able to get 
important information from his fellow officers. Wilson's biography is a valuable source as it 
depicts many aspects of the battle, even if it refers to the battle itself only briefly. His 
account of the battle confirms the general course of the battle, while it highlights the tough 
conditions the men endured. 
4.2. Maps 
Several maps were drawn to record and depict the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg and were 
commissioned for various purposes. These maps were drawn from memory or copied and 
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altered to depict various aspects of the battle. There are several similarities in the maps and 
some discrepancies, which complicate the analysis of the maps. Similarities in the maps 
include the distribution of the different regiments as they were lined up before the battle, 
but the discrepancies emphasise, just as the similarities, important aspects of the historical 
landscape and the battle events that require discussion. Discrepancies in the maps might not 
be major differences, but enough to cloud the accuracies of different maps. Comparisons 
between maps were made to identify the differences to first conduct a reconstruction of the 
historical landscape and secondly to clarify locational issues of the events.  
GIS software was used to import digital copies of the historical maps, and by making use of 
identifiable geographic and specific features, these maps were geo-referenced. Besides 
historical maps depicting the battle itself, other historical maps of the specific and larger 
area were used to reconstruct the historical landscape. Early aerial photographs further 
provided insight into the environmental conditions and layout as far back as 1938.  
The following 5 historical maps were used to reconstruct the historical landscape: 
• General Janssens' map of 18068 (NL-HaNA, Janssens / Kaarten, 4.JSF, inv.nr. 13); 
• Henry Smart's map of 2 February 18099 (Smart 1809); 
• Captain Read's map of 180610 (M1/2064 - 2071); 
• Captains Read and Long of the Royal Staff Corps' map of 24 September 180611 
(M3/21); 
• Royal Engineers' map of 1819/182012 (Castle Military Museum) 
                                                     
8 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag. 1806. J.W. Janssens - Kaarten en Tekeningen. Nummer toegang 4.JSF. 
Inventarisnummer 13 
9 Smart, H. February 1809. Sketch of the country between Cape Town and Blue Berg shewing the point of 
debarkation of the British army under the Command of Major General Sir David Baird K.C. on the 6th and 
their subsequent movements in the action of 8th January 1806 against the Batavian Troops under the 
Command of the Governor Lieut. General Janssens. Library of Parliament, Cape Town 18447(1) 
10 Read, C. 1806. Map of 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg. M1/2064-2071. Western Cape Provincial Archives and 
Records Services, Cape Town 
11 Read, C. & Long, H. 1806. Map of 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg. M3/21. Western Cape Provincial Archives and 
Records Services, Cape Town 
12 Royal Engineers. 1819/1820. Map of 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg. Castle Military Museum, Cape Town 
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Important aspects that were interpreted on the maps included the location of the roads or 
routes, the locations of specific geographic features and the relative positions of the 
different forces and regiments as depicted on the maps. These aspects were crucial in 
determining the accuracy of the maps, but also to orientate the maps and retrieve specific 
information.  
4.2.1. General Janssens' map of 1806 
The General Janssens map13 of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg (included in ANNEXURE 1) 
provides valuable information about the battle that warrants analysis, as a variety of aspects 
must be considered. Janssens' map shows a sequence of events at various times during the 
British campaign. It shows the campsite used by the British after debarkation, the approach 
routes towards the battlefield and the setup before the battle and the British approach 
towards the Batavian defensive line are indicated. 
Besides the troop movement, this map also shows the geographic features relevant to the 
battle. These geographic features were used during the analysis of the maps. The analysis 
focused on determining the accuracy of the map, drawing comparisons between maps and 
evaluating the maps against the available historical documentation. The noticeable 
geographic features requiring discussion include the positions of Blaauwberg Hill, Kleinberg, 
the settlement of Jan Mostert's farm, Blaauwbergsvlei farm, and the road network. Also 
clear on the map is the large dune field between the coastline and Blaauwberg Hill that 
made passing through with a large army impossible. The main route from Cape Town 
northwards was therefore situated inland of Blaauwberg Hill. General Baird, from his 
previous visit to the Cape of Good Hope, would have known about this (Hook 1832; Theal 
1899). 
                                                     
13 NL-HaNA, Janssens / Kaarten, 4.JSF, inv.nr. 13 
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg – an archaeological perspective 
66 
 
Figure 4. An enlargement of Janssens' map14 
An enlargement of Janssens' map (Figure 4) shows the British troop positions before the 
engagement and the Batavian defensive line. The geographic features pictured in the map 
extract include the hill, routes and the positions of both Jan Mostert's farm and 
Blaauwbergsvlei. The main north-south route between Cape Town and Jan Mostert's farm 
splits into multiple routes and rejoins into a single route just before Jan Mostert's farm. This 
could probably be attributed to the difficult sandy conditions with travellers choosing easier 
routes to navigate the harsh environment.  
According to the map, (Figure 4) the Batavian defensive line was situated well forward of 
Blaauwbergsvlei farmhouse. The left and right flanks of the Batavian line were reinforced by 
artillery positioned well in front of the line, strategically placed to cover the east-west 
routes. Further, two more artillery positions are indicated slightly in front of the Batavian 
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line and situated between the 9th Regiment Jaegers and the 22nd Regiment of Infantry and 
between the 5th Regiment of Waldeck and the Jaegers of Waldeck. This does not correspond 
to the verbatim copy of Janssens' report housed at the Western Cape Provincial Archives and 
Record Service, Cape Town. The document states that the Javanese Artillery was stationed 
between the Hottentot Light Infantry, to the east, and the Jaegers of Waldeck, to their west 
(VC80: 26). According to Janssens' map, the Waldeck Regiment and the Jaegers of Waldeck 
were situated next to each other with the artillery slightly in front and in line with the gap 
between the regiments. To assess which document, the map or the verbatim copy is correct 
required access to the original documents. However, for this research, it suffices to 
acknowledge the discrepancy that exists. 
The Batavian defensive line does not line up perpendicular to the network of roads to 
defend the route, as one would expect. This might correspond to the slight adjustment in 
the line that Janssens ordered during their positioning. Janssens ordered his defensive line to 
rotate by one-eighth of a circle to create the impression that his forces covered the whole of 
the enemy's line (VC80: 26). Therefore, the Batavian line matched the approach line of the 
British Second Brigade and placed their line almost parallel to the British line.  
4.2.2. Henry Smart's map of 2 February 1809 
The map drawn by Captain Henry Smart of the Royal Engineers dated 2 February 180915 
(Figure 5) depicts the coastline of Table Bay and the adjacent interior. The map shows a time 
sequence of the British debarkation and campsite in Melkbosstrand, their positioning before 
the battle and their subsequent approach towards the Batavian defensive line. The map 
further portrays the position of the Batavian defensive line and the placement of the various 
Batavian regiments.  
                                                     
15 Smart, H. February 1809. Sketch of the country between Cape Town and Blue Berg shewing the point of 
debarkation of the British army under the Command of Major General Sir David Baird K.C. on the 6th and their 
subsequent movements in the action of 8th January 1806 against the Batavian Troops under the Command of 
the Governor Lieut. General Janssens. Library of Parliament, Cape Town 18447(1) 
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Figure 5. Sketch of the country between Cape Town and Blue Berg showing the point of debarkation of the 
British army under the command of Major-General Sir David Baird K.C. on 6 January and their subsequent 
movements in the action of 8 January 1806 against the Batavian troops under the command of Governor 
Lieutenant-General Janssens (Smart 1806) 
By enlarging a specific portion of Figure 5, the battlefield becomes visible (Figure 6) and 
illustrates several aspects about the battle and the environment. Firstly, the troop positions 
of the Batavian defensive line are distinguishable towards the south straddling the main 
north-south routes. Secondly, the British forces are indicated in two positions, representing 
their initial positions as they arrived on the battlefield and subsequently their positions as 
they approached the Batavian defensive line.  
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Figure 6. An enlargement of Figure 5 (Smart 1806) 
An objective of this study was to reconstruct the historical environment, therefore, the 
geographic features, the routes and settlements or farmhouses were of specific interest. 
Most of the routes have since 1806 fell into disuse and have consequently become 
overgrown and are not easily visible. The geographic features and settlements or 
farmhouses are still present today and are constant reference points. The accuracy of this 
map is, however, a contentious topic and needs to be verified against modern maps. The 
historical maps were drawn with a specific purpose in mind, therefore, the scale, orientation 
and positions of various map elements might not be accurate.  
To analyse the historical maps, the relative positions of the hills, the farmhouses and the 
roads need to be compared and discussed. The map drawn by Captain Henry Smart (Figure 
6) appears to be relatively accurate about the positioning of the hills and the houses of Jan 
Mostert's farm, although the position of the current Blaauwberg farm, (Jan Mostert's farm) 
is slightly further north than the position showed on the map. The map, however, fails to 
indicate the position of Blaauwbergsvlei and the houses of Justinus Keer. It shows a green 
patch near the location of Blaauwbergsvlei, which could represent the farm. The orientation 
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of Blaauwberg Hill and Kleinberg is relatively accurate, although Blaauwberg Hill is indicated 
as apparently three separate hills, while it is, in fact, one hill.  
The Smart map shows one main route from north to south divided into a series of five tracks. 
These tracks split and rejoin, ultimately, to represent the same north-south route. This could 
be attributed to the sandy landscape that hampered travelling by horse and cart or wagon so 
much that once a track became worn, a new track would be developed. Several east-west 
connecting routes are also indicated on the map, of which one leads through the neck 
between Blaauwberg Hill and Kleinberg and the others south of Kleinberg and towards the 
north of Blaauwberg Hill, respectively. 
The positions of the different regiments and troops depicted on the map are of interest as 
these concur with the positioning and order of troops as Janssens described in his report on 
the battle (VC80). Several aspects of the troop positions warrant discussion. Firstly, the 
British Second Brigade followed the longer route to reach the battlefield, but their approach 
towards the Batavian defensive line was made easier due to the multiple routes. The British 
First Brigade, however, did not have the advantage of any routes for their approach, and this 
could therefore possibly explain the Second Brigade's first engagement with the enemy. The 
thick sand dunes they had to cross hampered the First Brigade's approach to Kleinberg. 
Secondly, the Batavian defensive line straddles the main north-south route towards Cape 
Town, while the position of the Batavian artillery on the right flank is also indicated. Thirdly, 
the Batavian forces on Kleinberg are indicated, strategically positioned to guard the routes 
from the west, to protect the Batavian left flank. 
The positions of the Batavian artillery on the left and right flanks respectively are also of 
interest. Both the artillery positions were forward of the defensive line, with the artillery 
near Kleinberg far in front of the defensive line. These artillery positions strategically cover 
the approach routes towards Cape Town and the east-west route. The proximity of the 
artillery positions to the routes also shows the importance of the network of routes for their 
approach to the battlefield and their later departure or retreat from the battlefield. 
Unfortunately, the British artillery is not indicated on the map.  
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Comparing the Janssens' map16 to the Smart map, it is obvious to note the difference in scale 
between the two maps. The Smart map portrays the complete coastal area from beyond 
Melkbosstrand in the north, to further than Cape Town in the south, while Janssens' map 
only shows Melkbosstrand and the area surrounding the battlefield. The latter map is more 
focused and only includes the features and events surrounding the 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg. 
4.2.3. Captain Read's map of 1806 
Captain Read's map of 180617 (M1/2064–2071) is physically a very large map covering 
various sheets of paper and it is therefore pointless to include the complete image. Figure 7 
portrays an extract of the area of interest that covers the battlefield. The Read map 
(M1/2064–2071) has, similarly to the Smart map (Smart 1806), a small scale and therefore 
covers a larger area but with little detail. Although geographic features, such as Blaauwberg 
Hill, Kleinberg, Melkbosstrand, the road network and the farmhouses of Jan Mostert and 
Blaauwbergsvlei, are clear on the map, the details of the battle event are lacking.  
                                                     
16 NL-HaNA, Janssens / Kaarten, 4.JSF, inv.nr. 13 
17 Read, C. 1806. Map of 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg. M1/2064–2071. Western Cape Provincial Archives and 
Records Services, Cape Town 
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Figure 7. Extract of the Read map of 1806 (M1/2064-2071) 
Blaauwberg Hill and Kleinberg appear to be accurately depicted, while the road network and 
positions of both Jan Mostert's farm and Blaauwbergsvlei appear to be inaccurate. The 
battlefield associated with the road network, therefore, becomes skewed and positioned 
incorrectly. Jan Mostert's farm is situated north–north-west of Blaauwbergsvlei, but when 
orientating the Read map (M1/2064–2071), Jan Mostert's farm is situated towards the 
north–north-east of Blaauwbergsvlei. This impact on the distances measured between the 
N 
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actual battlefield and Blaauwberg Hill. This is, however, also the case on both Janssens' 
map18 and the Smart map (Smart 1806). 
Further, the distances between Blaauwberg Hill and the coastline showed on the Read map 
(M1/2064–2071) ranges between 1400 metres and 2400 metres, while in reality it ranges 
between 1900 metres and 2800 metres, averaging a difference of about 400 to 500 metres. 
Compared to both Janssens' map and the Smart map (Smart 1806), which appear to be 
much more accurate, the Read map (M1/2064–2071) is inaccurate. 
The Read map (M1/2064-2071) indicates the positions of the British campsite in 
Melkbosstrand and the positions of both the British First and Second Brigade before the 
battle. It also shows the different routes the British brigades took to reach the battlefield. 
These routes are indicated by means of a dotted line and show the British First Brigade 
taking the shorter route close to Blaauwberg Hill, while the British Second Brigade took the 
longer route further towards Jan Mostert's farm.  
The road network shown in the Read map (M1/2064–2071) is, however, different to the 
Janssens' map and the Smart map (Smart 1806). The main north-south route splits and 
rejoins similarly to the routes depicted in the other maps, but the pattern differs, also the 
east-west routes differ drastically from the other maps.  
4.2.4. Captains Read and Long’s (of the Royal Staff Corps) map of 24 September 1806 
The 24 September 1806 map of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg (Figure 8) drawn by Captains 
Read and Long of the Royal Staff Corps (M3/21) depicts various aspects of the battle. Like 
the Smart map (Smart 1806) and the Read map (M1/2064–2071), the scale is small, and the 
map depicts the coastline from Melkbosstrand to Cape Town and the adjacent interior. The 
map also depicts the British campsite in Melkbosstrand and the battle itself. Due to the size 
of the map, Figure 8 only shows the furthest southern edge of the British campsite in 
Melkbosstrand up to the northern extent of Cape Town. The map also includes various 
positions the British regiments occupied during the aftermath of the battle, to represent a 
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full timeline from their debarkation to just before the capitulation of Cape Town. The British 
advance on the battlefield towards the Batavian defensive line is not shown as in the 
Janssens' map19 and the Smart map (Smart 1806). It only illustrates the positions before the 
engagement. 
 
Figure 8. The Captains Read and Long map of 24 September 1806 (M3/21) 
An enlargement of the battlefield and adjacent areas as seen in Figure 9 required discussion. 
Firstly, the positions of both Jan Mostert's farm and Blaauwbergsvlei are like those positions 
depicted in both Janssens' map and the Smart map (Smart 1806), as they all place Jan 
Mostert's farm towards the north-northeast of Blaauwbergsvlei. The network of routes 
across the landscape are further shown in Figure 9 and are like the Read map (M1/2064–
2071) but differs from Janssens' map and the Smart map (Smart 1806).  
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Figure 9. An enlargement of the Captains Read and Long map of 24 September 1806 (M3/21) 
An enlargement of the Captains Read and Long map (M3/21) (Figure 10) emphasises the 
battlefield and engagement between the two armies. Firstly, the positioning of the Batavian 
troops is in contrast to the verbatim copy of Janssens report (VC80: 26), with the positions of 
the Hottentot Light Infantry and jaegers of Waldeck being changed over. Secondly, 
Janssens20 indicates the Regiment of Waldeck as straddling one of the north–south leading 
routes, while the map by Captains Read and Long (M3/21) in turn indicates the French 
Marines as spanning one of the north–south routes. This was problematic as the 
reconstruction of the historical landscape and subsequent placement of events was reliant 
on the positioning of the various regiments.  
The Batavian artillery positions are indicated on both the flanks, well forward of the line as 
well as directly in front of the line in the gap between regiments. The map by Captains Read 
and Long (M3/21) also shows three artillery positions near the British regiments (Figure 10)  
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Figure 10. A further enlargement of the map by Captains Read and Long, of 24 September 1806 (M3/21) 
The two artillery positions associated with the British First Brigade and only one in 
association with the British Second Brigade are shown in Figure 10. The light 6-pounder 
battalion cannon (Figure 20) was the preferred cannon at the time of the 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg and these were normally attached to a battalion of infantry in pairs. The 
Battalion Artillery marched and fought with their attached infantry and provided close 
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support during deployment and attack (Caruana 1977: 7; Dawson et al. 2007: 203). 
Unfortunately, horses were unavailable to pull the light 6-pounder cannons and men had to 
drag the cannons through the thick sand and impenetrable bush. It is of interest that three 
artillery positions are indicated, possibly representing three pairs of light 6-pounder cannons 
the British had at their disposal. Further, two pairs are associated with the British First 
Brigade and only one pair with the British Second Brigade, but the map indicates this pair as 
trailing the 93rd Regiment of the Second Brigade. This could probably be attributed to the 
absence of horses drawing the cannons and the thick sand and bush through which the men 
had to pull the cannons. This artillery could probably not have been able to fire at the 
opposition, as it would have placed its own men in danger.  
4.2.5. Royal Engineers' map of 1819/1820 
The Royal Engineers' map of 1819/1820 (Castle Military Museum) (Figure 11) is another 
version of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg produced several years after the battle. This map 
portrays the coastal area from beyond Melkbosstrand in the north to further than Cape 
Town in the south, incorporating various geographic features such as Robben Island, Table 
Mountain and the inland areas next to Table Bay. The Royal Engineer map (Castle Military 
Museum) indicates a time span for the battle, depicting the British campsite in 
Melkbosstrand, their positions on the battlefield and subsequent approach before the 
engagement with the enemy. Due to its small scale and coverage of such a large area, 
specific details are not included and an enlargement of the map focusing on the battlefield 
and immediate surrounding areas are represented in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. An enlargement of the Royal Engineers' map of 1819/1820 (Castle Military Museum) 
The aspects to be discussed for the Royal Engineers' map (Castle Military Museum) are like 
the previous discussions and relate to the positions of the farmhouses, the network of 
routes, the positions of the Batavian forces and associated artillery. Firstly, the position of 
Jan Mostert's farm is also inland, but cannot be oriented in relation to Blaauwbergsvlei, as 
the latter is not indicated on the map. Secondly, the road network compares favourably to 
Janssens' map21, as it indicates the distinct east-west routes and has noticeable similarities in 
the main north-south routes. However, there is also a resemblance to the Read map 
(M1/2064–2071) and the map by Captains Read and Long (M3/21), therefore, maybe this 
map was produced as a copy and hybrid of the other maps. 
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Further, the order and positioning of the Batavian defensive line concurs with the order and 
positioning portrayed in the other maps, but there is no specific regiment straddling a north-
south route. One of the north-south routes is positioned in the opening between the 
Hottentot Light Infantry and the Jaegers of Waldeck. 
The maps produced by Janssens22 and Smart (Smart 1806) both indicate the Batavian 
artillery on its left flank, far forward of the artillery on the right flank. The Read map 
(M1/2064–2071), the Read and Long map (M3/21) and the Royal Engineer map (Castle 
Military Museum), in contrast, have positioned the artillery on the Batavian left flank in line 
with the artillery on the Batavian right flank. This posed a challenge for the archaeological 
research to identify the exact artillery positions. 
4.3. Conclusion 
The personal or eyewitness accounts and maps available to the research provided diverse 
views on the battle. Selected opinions and views were obtained and analysed from these 
accounts to study the battle events. These accounts provided insight into the course and 
development of the battle and gave me an understanding of both the conditions and 
experiences of the people involved. Though not all aspects mentioned in these accounts 
were archaeologically investigated, certain aspects provided enough detail to guide the 
archaeological research. The subsequent results, therefore, either affirmed or conflicted the 
personal accounts provided. From an archaeological point of view, these accounts were 
important to understand an event that occurred over 200 years ago. 
After a thorough consultation of both primary and secondary sources, together with a 
detailed analysis of archaeological projects that focus on battlefields across the world, a 
clear methodology was designed to approach the archaeological research into the 1806 
Battle of Blaauwberg. CHAPTER 5 provides the details about the methodology used during 
this research and focuses on the reconstruction of the historical landscape, the eventual 
field surveys and subsequent detailed analysis of the artefacts.  
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CHAPTER 5. METHODOLOGY 
To recognise the unique character of a battlefield the systematic archaeological investigation 
of sites of armed conflict is required. Ragragio (2005: 104) elaborates that battlefield 
archaeology methodology is a fascinating arrangement of old and new techniques. Sagona 
(2015: 36) alludes to the long history of field survey used in archaeology. Similar techniques 
are of interest in the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg research. The spatial dimensions of human 
behaviour are analysed and interpreted through accurate and meticulous surveying and 
recording techniques. The spatial distribution of the battle remnants was a major focus in 
the research and in association with the documentary resources and landscape 
reconstruction, formed the basis for the interpretation and reconstruction of the events. 
To accomplish a spatial distribution of battle remnants meticulous archaeological survey was 
conducted with the assistance of geophysical equipment. Using non-intrusive and non-
destructive methods of archaeological investigation is ingrained in the discipline and is 
increasingly being followed. Remote sensing and the use of geophysical equipment as 
archaeological tools are becoming more common (Connor & Scott 1998: 76). These tools 
have become indispensable in the archaeological survey of battlefields. The use of 
geophysical equipment and technologies has had great success in the identification of the 
sub-surface archaeological material on several archaeological sites. Archaeological surveys of 
battlefields have in the past used metal detectors for the identification of artefacts. Metal 
detectors are relatively cheap, easy to obtain, use, and have proven to be very successful. 
(Heckman 2005: 2). Magnetometer surveys have proven successful in the identification of 
sub-surface features and artefacts such as in the Confederate Prisoner-of-War camp in 
Georgia (Bigman 2015), but ground-truthing (or archaeological testing) is required to 
substantiate the data collected through magnetometer surveys. 
A further example of the successful use of geophysical equipment on battle sites is on the 
World War I battlefield of Pozières in northern France. To investigate the feasibility of 
geophysics in locating sub-surface features, a resistivity survey was conducted. Resistivity 
surveys could be a useful tool to locate buried linear features, while acknowledging that test 
excavations were still required to determine the extent and nature of the features (Hunter et 
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al. 2014). Further, Michael Pratt has made effective use of remote sensing techniques at the 
Fallen Timbers battlefield in Ohio. Through metal detecting surveys, numerous battle-related 
artefacts were identified and retrieved. They also successfully located the battlefield and 
retrieved enough information to interpret the events (Pratt 2003). 
Noguera et al. (2012: 853) provide a methodological reflection on the use of metal detectors 
on camps related to the Second Punic War in north-eastern Spain. Even though alternative 
methods were also used to identify sites and artefacts within this area, the metal detector 
surveys were highly effective. They warn of the possible catastrophic results if the metal 
detector surveys are applied indiscriminately. 
Connor and Scott (1998: 76) allude to the fact that metal detecting has become associated 
with artefact hunters and has made metal detectors synonymous with site looting. They also 
acknowledge the value of metal detecting on archaeological sites. Metal detectors are 
inexpensive and effective remote sensing devices that could be valuable in archaeological 
research if their application is correct. Sivilich and Stone (2009: 102) recognise the worth of 
metal detecting in its ability to identify ferrous and nonferrous artefacts quickly and 
therefore speed up the survey of large areas effectively. Don Rickey (1958) was one of the 
first documented to use metal detectors with great success, to identify the firing lines on the 
battlefields of Little Bighorn and Big Hole (Sivilich & Stone 2009: 103). Heckman (2005: 2) 
warns of the flaws in metal detector surveys on battlefields as they typically use sweeps in 
parallel transects. Depending on the purpose and goal of the survey, the transects were 
separated by various distances (perhaps three to ten metres). It is very difficult to maintain a 
uniform coverage throughout a survey block, because the metal detector operator drifts off 
from the parallel transects. Further, the vegetation also disrupts the possibility of a constant 
spatial sampling. 
The battlefield of the Boyne at Oldbridge was looted by illegal metal detecting in the past, 
with much of the fine locational detail being lost, making the material worthless for 
interpretation (Cooney et al. 2002: 10). Connor and Scott (1998: 76) also refer to the looting 
of sites by artefact hunters and argue that this might be the primary reason for the use of 
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metal detectors being underutilised in archaeological investigations. This approach to metal 
detecting has given its use in archaeology a bad reputation. 
Sharpe (2013: 44) also warns of the dangers of metal detecting on battle sites as it was 
scorned by archaeologists who associated it with looters. However, the obvious advantages 
of metal detectors are also identified because soldiers shed metal in the form of buckles, 
buttons, hooks, ammunition and weaponry. Connor and Scott (1998: 76) reason that the 
main difference between the looting of sites by metal detector operators and the use of 
metal detectors as an effective archaeological tool is in the way in which it is used. The 
method and accuracy used during the retrieval, recording and documentation of the artefact 
become crucial in the validity of the resulting spatial distribution.  
In a comparative study, William Lees evaluated the impact of metal detectors on battlefields. 
Lees (1996) states he approached the topic knowing that metal detector operators 
undesirably influenced historical sites. By evaluating two battle sites, the Mine Creek Civil 
War battlefield in Kansas and the Honey Springs Civil War battlefield in Oklahoma, Lees 
concludes that on the Mine Creek site, the patterns of identified and retrieved artefacts are 
misleading. The patterns on land previously detected did not differ from the patterns on 
land not previously detected. The Honey Springs site showed that the patterning on 
retrieved artefacts appears to be skewed. According to Lees (2002), this is because metal 
detector operators focus on so-called hot spots and therefore remove many artefacts from 
these areas, hence providing a distorted spatial distribution. Finally, Lees (2002: 17) 
concludes that his results were inconclusive as land previously detected does not necessarily 
show a difference in the patterns of retrieved artefacts. He further says that his 
“observations are offered as a precaution, however, and not as a condemnation of the metal 
detector practice on sites such as battlefields.”  
Lees (2002: 17) comments that the physical remains provide clues to different aspects of a 
battle, predominantly bullets and artillery projectiles. He further differentiates between 
ammunition fired during the battle and those, which may have been dropped, discarded or 
lost. The unfired ammunition could mark the location of specific soldiers or regiments, while 
the fired ammunition might identify the location of a fallen soldier during the event. 
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To advance the research on the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg, specific areas of research were 
targeted. The landscape of the early 1800s first needed to be reconstructed thoroughly, to 
achieve enough accuracy (Foard 2003: 9) to place the historical events within it, before the 
impact of the landscape on the battle events and the strategic use of the landscape could be 
investigated and evaluated.  
The reconstruction of the historical landscape involved the layering of military and historical 
maps, using GIS software programmes. Contemporary maps with the overlay of historical 
maps were used to identify landscape features, main routes and subsidiary routes. Journals, 
letters and other personal accounts (James 1837: 44; Smith 1892; Theal 1899) provided 
additional evidence on the landscape supplementary in reconstructing the historical 
landscape. Documentary research into the military strategy of the time provided insight into 
the defensive, attack and strategic positioning doctrine. The consideration of weaponry was 
important to calculate distances, trajectories and ranges to suggest areas that could have 
been utilised.  
Foard (2003: 11) argues that the real test for the reconstruction of the historical landscape is 
the systematic investigation of the archaeology of the battlefield, particularly the evidence 
of the distribution of musket shot, grapeshot and round shot from the artillery. During this 
research, systematic and meticulous metal detector surveys were conducted to identify the 
archaeological material of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg. Documentation and analysis of the 
artefacts were used to produce maps of most of the battle-related artefacts. Subsequently, 
the spatial distribution of the artefacts was used to situate the battle and related events 
within the larger historical landscape, which suggested critical moments or areas within the 
course of the battle (Foard 2003: 10). 
Five main geographic areas within the battlefield landscape were investigated:  
• The position of Batavian defensive line; 
• The locations of Batavian artillery; 
• The locations of British artillery and the routes used for the advance of the British 
regiments; 
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• The skirmish on Kleinberg; and 
• The location and extent of the main area of engagement. 
The strategic use of the historical landscape and the impact the landscape had on the events 
were concluded once the locational issues of the battle were resolved (Foard 2003: 7). 
Carman (2005: 220) indicates that locations are not mere points on a map, but are social and 
cultural sites of meaning. He states that landscapes represent threats or opportunities and it 
provides for the effective or ineffective use of such areas. Lastly, the use of positions within 
the historical landscape is strategic and the result of conscious preparation and execution. 
The advantages gained from the use of specific landscape features and positions were 
evaluated against the historical and archaeological evidence to understand the events. 
5.1. Reconstruction of the historical landscape 
The reconstruction of the historical landscape focused on several aspects namely: 
• The analysis of historical and contemporary maps; 
• The field survey;  
• The topographic analysis of the area; and  
• The identification of possible historical routes. 
General Janssens set up his defensive line straddling the main north-south route joining Jan 
Mostert’s Farm to Blaauwbergsvlei (Anderson 2008; Erasmus 1972; Krynauw 1990; 
Steenkamp 2005). The north-south spatial distribution and the east-west placement of the 
different Batavian regiments were investigated through the identification and analysis of the 
specific battle-related remnants. The locations of the defensive artillery positions forward 
and towards the flanks of the Batavian line were investigated within the accessible areas of 
the historical landscape. Ballistic analysis, calculations and trajectories of different 
projectiles were used to determine the most likely locations for the artillery. 
The British heavy artillery positions and the routes used for the advance of the British 
regiments and field artillery (Hutten 2015) were studied through the analysis of the 
projectile trajectories. The examination of battle remnants on the slopes of Kleinberg was 
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used to identify the location and extent of the skirmish on the slopes of Kleinberg. Further, 
intensive and systematic field surveys of the pre-determined areas, together with ballistic 
analysis and the spatial distribution of battle-related remnants, were used to scrutinise areas 
representing the main area of engagement. 
5.2. Systematic field survey of the identified areas 
Metal detectors have proven their worth on the site of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg as 
such a large number of artefacts would not have been identified without this equipment and 
their skilled operators. The vast extent of the battlefield makes the use of other geophysical 
equipment, such as magnetometers, impractical. Initially, the use of a magnetometer was 
planned for the identification of sub-surface artefacts, but its use was considered as 
ineffectual. It was found that a layer of ferricrete lies just below the surface, which affected 
the magnetometer results. However, by using a stringent methodological approach the 
metal detectors have been remarkably successful. 
 
Figure 12. The 100 m x 100 m survey grid established across the study area 
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The metal detector surveys started within the 96 hectares cleared as part of the ongoing 
Sand Plain Fynbos restoration project within the BBNR. Access to this area would later 
become limited since the sensitive indigenous vegetation was in the process of re-
establishing. Within a GIS programme, 100 m x 100 m grids (Figure 12) were established to 
cover the extent of the battlefield. These corner points were marked by the placement of 
poles. All survey grids were subsequently demarcated with brightly coloured baler twine to 
provide guidance and assistance to the survey team. Within the 100 m x 100 m grids, the 
metal detectors surveyed in linear transects as tightly as possible, but not more than two 
metres apart. Volunteers assisted the metal detector to keep to stringent lines by placing 
marker poles as navigation beacons. Fortunately, these initial grids were cleared of all 
vegetation improving visibility and as near as possible to complete coverage of the grid could 
be obtained. This initial area was strategic during the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg as it 
revealed the landscape used by the British forces for their initial artillery fire. It was also 
within this area that the British forces deployed into line formations to expose their full 
strength to the Batavian forces. 
After the 96 hectares of the Sand Plain Fynbos Restoration Project, surveys started within 
the rest of the battlefield that has not been cleared of vegetation. Certain areas were 
naturally open and a similar methodology could be followed as in the cleared areas. 
Overgrown areas were also encountered that hampered the effectiveness of the surveys and 
the grids were adapted by subdividing into smaller grids. Even within the smaller areas, the 
detectors would survey shorter distances, to sustain a comprehensive coverage and 
accuracy during the surveys.  
The group of experienced metal detectors, using their personal machines during the surveys 
included: 
• Alan Wright – Garrett Sea Hunter Mark II metal detector; 
• Robert Turvey – Minelab CTX 3030 metal detector; 
• Frank Ihle – Garret ACE 350 metal detector;  
• Clayton Alison – Garrett Sea Hunter Mark II metal detector; 
• Jason Loeve – Minelab Excalibur metal detector; 
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• Steph Little – Minelab 505 metal detector; 
• Gerhard Oosthuizen – Minelab Safari and Minelab Quattro MP metal detectors; 
• Heinie Oosthuizen – Fisher F4 metal detector;  
• John Gravenor – Minelab 705 metal detector; and 
• Lance Turner – Minelab CTX 3030 metal detector. 
The process followed during the field survey could be summarised as follows: 
• Setting up a survey grid; 
• Identification of a survey area; 
• Metal detector surveys; 
• Excavation and retrieving of finds; 
• Documentation of finds; 
• Mapping of finds; 
• Analysis of finds; and  
• Curation of finds. 
A group of dedicated excavators and recorders joined the metal detectors during the surveys 
and comprised: 
• Louisa Hutten (archaeologist, UCT); 
• Ian van Oordt (historian); 
• Roy Fuller-Gee (FoBCA); 
• Joe Ribaudo (FoBCA); 
• Garry Thomson (FoBCA); 
• Marius Breytenbach (UNISA & UCT – postgraduate archaeology student); 
• Anja Huisman (UNISA – archaeology student); 
• Bridget Cohen (UCT – postgraduate archaeology student); 
• Tiffany van Zyl (UCT – postgraduate archaeology student); 
• Stanley Stanford (volunteer); 
• Ryno Hutten (volunteer); 
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg – an archaeological perspective 
88 
• Francois van Lill (UNISA – postgraduate archaeology student); 
• Helene Booyens (volunteer); 
• Barend Bierman (UNISA – postgraduate biblical archaeology student); 
• Dave Honour (FoBCA); 
• Harriet Cliff (archaeologist, City of Cape Town); 
• Cade Little (volunteer); 
• Ben Marais (UCT & UNISA – postgraduate archaeology student); and 
• Jani Louw (UCT – postgraduate archaeology student). 
Survey teams, comprising a metal detector and at least one recorder, transected 
predetermined grids and identified metallic objects. These objects were retrieved, 
documented and bagged. It became clear that the recorder also required a handheld metal 
detector, or a pin-pointer to assist in the retrieval of small objects. The recorder was also 
required to assist the metal detector in maintaining accurate survey transects, by placing 
marker posts at regular intervals. This method worked extremely well in the areas cleared of 
vegetation, but in the overgrown areas (Figure 13) surveying along transect lines became 
increasingly challenging. The metal detector, therefore, divided the survey grid into smaller 
areas to maintain the accurate and comprehensive coverage of a grid.  
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Figure 13. Extremely dense alien vegetation in specific areas of the battlefield 
The field recorder played an integral role in the documentation by keeping accurate records 
of all finds. The recorder was equipped with a clipboard, pencil, recording sheets, and 
handheld GPS to document the artefacts. Once retrieved, each find was placed in a sealable 
plastic bag with the completed identification label (Figure 14). The label contained a specific 
find number, date and find description. The recorder also recorded the artefact on a finds 
list that included the coordinates as obtained from the handheld GPS (Figure 15). 
 
Figure 14. Example of field completed artefact label placed in a sealable plastic bag 
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Figure 15. Example of completed finds list used to document retrieved artefacts during field surveys. 
In the laboratory, the artefacts were provisionally cleaned, while care was taken to ensure 
that correct artefact sequence numbers were assigned. GPS coordinates were downloaded 
into the Garmin Basecamp software from where these were exported to either Google Earth 
or a GIS programme.  
During the later stages of the survey, the field recording process was streamlined without 
losing any accuracy. It made the time spent in the laboratory more extensive. The recorder 
was only equipped with a handheld GPS and sealable bags with numbered tags. Each 
retrieved artefact was placed into the sealable bag and assigned a numbered tag. The same 
number would then be assigned to the GPS coordinate. In the laboratory, the GPS data was 
then downloaded and the correct sequential number assigned to each artefact. Labels were 
completed and placed in the sealable plastic bag and the finds list was updated.  
5.3. Analysis of artefacts 
The analysis of the artefacts formed an integral part of the research and provided valuable 
information for the comprehension of the battle. During the field surveys, metallic and non-
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metallic artefacts such as ceramic, glass fragments and lithic artefacts were identified. Due 
to the area being used for other activities over time, not all the artefacts have relevance to 
the battle and were not analysed. 
The following artefacts were analysed: 
• Musket balls; 
• Cannon projectiles; 
• Buttons; 
• Buckles; and 
• Coins. 
5.3.1. Analysis of musket balls 
5.3.1.1. Introduction 
The musket balls retrieved from the battlefield of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg are 
classified as the artefact class with the highest number in total and it is therefore vital to 
investigate the use and position of the musket balls. Scott et al. (2017: 1) state that the 
smoothbore flintlock musket was used during battles but also in commerce and trade. 
Reichmann (1945: 4) argues that by the end of the 18th century the basic strategy during a 
battle had changed little since the late Roman Empire. The physical engagement of the two 
armies was the main objective, and the outcome depended on the effectiveness of the 
cavalry charge. The firing power of the infantry during the 18th century was not at all 
profitable because the eventual bayonet charge was used to subdue the enemy (Reichmann 
1945: 5).  
The Reverend Martyn commented on the events during the early engagement of the battle, 
“then came such a long-drawn fire of musketry, that I could not conceive anything like it. We 
all shuddered at considering what a multitude of souls must be passing into eternity” (Smith 
1892: 122). From this, it is obvious that numerous smoothbore flintlock muskets were 
discharged. The analysis of the musket balls, therefore, not only focused on the projectiles 
but also required an investigation into the different muskets used during the battle.  
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A study of smoothbore flintlock muskets was required to understand the use of the weapons 
and the associated projectiles (Scott et al. 2017: 1). Since very few weapons or parts of 
weapons form part of the archaeological record, the focus of the research was on making 
sense of the projectiles. Even though the musket ball might be an insignificant archaeological 
find, battlefield and conflict archaeology require an analysis of this artefact class (Shiels 
2011). Shiels (2011) further states that many musket balls do not come from muskets but 
could represent many other forms of weapons that were used on battlefields such as 
cannons discharging canister shot filled with many musket balls. Musket balls could shed 
light onto the positions of different soldiers on a battlefield. The accurate recording of the 
position of the musket ball provides the archaeologist with a unique plan of how the battle 
developed and how the fight progressed. It is therefore possible that the archaeological 
record of musket balls can significantly alter previous interpretations of the battle that were 
entirely based on historical accounts (Shiels 2011).  
Musket balls are significant as they provide palpable evidence of an event that was violent 
and traumatic for those involved. These musket balls were deposited during a short period 
and bear evidence of the purpose to kill. It is poignant to remember that they were last 
handled by individuals experiencing severe anxiety while taking part in a defining event in 
their own life, and in the history South Africa. These artefacts and the assemblage justify 
being analysed as they offer brilliant insights to the battle (Shiels 2011). 
Zabecki (2014: 642) states that the flintlock mechanism made its appearance during 1610 
and by 1660 had replaced both the matchlock and wheel lock musket mechanisms. From a 
German perspective, the Prussian 1723 and 1740 model muskets were the first standardised 
firearms adopted by German armies, while the Prussian Jaeger flintlock rifle was introduced 
in about 1750. The jaegers23 were specialised light infantrymen who used these rifles 
because of their superior range and accuracy. The smoothbore musket did not have the 
rifling that created spin on the projectile to improve accuracy (Haythornthwaite 1979: 13). 
The flintlock comprised a couple of main parts including the hammer, a cock, a clamped flint, 
the frizzen, pan, trigger and spring. Once cocked, the trigger made the hammer and flint 
                                                     
23 German for hunters 
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crash on the frizzen to create a spark that would ignite the gunpowder and send the musket 
ball down the barrel. Most soldiers prepared a cartridge in advance, comprising a musket 
ball and accurately measured gunpowder wrapped in a piece of greased paper, to be more 
effective during the reloading process (Haythornthwaite 1979: 15). Haythornthwaite (1979: 
19) further discusses the effective ranges of firing a flintlock musket, and according to tests 
conducted during the early parts of the 1800s, the French, British and Prussian muskets were 
the most accurate at shorter distances, below 75 metres, while the accuracy drastically 
dropped when the distances were increased. As an example, Haythornthwaite (1979: 20) 
mentions the Battle of Talavera (27–28 July 1809) during the Peninsular War in Spain, where 
between 1250 and 1300 French soldiers were shot during successive volleys of musket fire 
by the British. Calculating the success of the musket fire it was found that the British fired 
about 30 000 shots, of which only 4 per cent was effective.  
Since 1718, the French have been manufacturing infantry muskets at Charleville, under the 
control of the so-called Corps Royal de Vartilerie. Gradually, the French Charleville musket 
became superior to many other countries' products and was hence widely used. Although 
the ball was slightly smaller than that of the British, so-called ‘Brown Bess’ musket, its range 
was more superior (Hicks & Todd 1937: 75). Reichman (1945: 7) also comments that the 
French Charleville musket, especially the 1763 model, became the regulation weapon of the 
French army, while the British used the Brown Bess. Brown Bess was merely a nickname 
given to the weapon officially known as the Land Pattern Musket, but subsequently included 
variations such as the Short and Long Land Pattern, the India Pattern, the New Land Pattern 
and the Sea Service Pattern muskets. Reichman (1945:7) further notes that due to their 
popularity and effectiveness both Charleville and Brown Bess muskets were used during the 
American Revolutionary War from 1775 to 1783. According to Osborne (2007: 1), the Brown 
Bess musket was the best-known British musket and was extremely widely used.  
The Prussian 1782-pattern musket and muskets such as the Danish 1791-pattern musket 
were based on the British musket construction, emphasising that even though countries 
manufactured their own weapons, a common technology was used. During wartime, even 
Britain procured muskets from manufacturers in other countries, such as Russia 
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(Haythornthwaite 1979: 22). The Dutch initially also procured weapons and parts from 
Germany that led to the assembly and later the manufacture of their own. Dutch military 
and civilian weapons were mostly manufactured in urban centres and eventually became a 
large export commodity since their quality control was superb (Kist et al. 1974: 33). Mathieu 
Willemsen, curator of the Nationaal Militair Museum in the Netherlands commented on the 
standard military issue of muskets before 1806, stating that the Dutch did not have a 
standard military issue as other countries had standard patterns from the period before 
1807. Several patterns of muskets were in use, with different calibres. For example, officers' 
muskets had smaller calibres than those of the standard soldier. Typical Dutch muskets are 
the extreme long brass barrel bands. Infantry muskets had a calibre of 16 balls per pound, 
artillery muskets a calibre of 20 balls per pound, and jaeger rifles had a calibre of 18 balls per 
pound (Mathieu Willemsen, pers. comm. 22 February 2018).  
It is, therefore, possible that the different regiments were associated with a specific musket. 
The British forces would likely have been issued with Brown Bess muskets, the French 
Marines could have been using the French Charleville, while the German Jaegers of Waldeck 
probably used Jaeger rifles. Exactly which type of musket the Dutch, Hottentot Light Infantry, 
Waldeck Infantry and local militia used remains unclear, as a variety of smoothbore flintlock 
muskets could have been used. 
5.3.1.2. Curation and measurements 
The analysis of musket balls started with the preliminary cleaning of the soiled musket balls, 
making use of a soft dry brush. Special care was taken not to damage the musket balls 
through excessive abrasion. Various techniques of cleaning were investigated, but an initial 
attempt to clean the musket balls through the process of electrolysis proved unsuccessful as 
it resulted in the disintegration of the lead artefact (Van Oordt, pers. comm. 20 May 2016). It 
was decided to commence with thorough cleaning just before the final curation, after the 
consultation about cleaning of heavily soiled and corroded items had been completed. The 
soft dry brush technique was used to remove excess soil from the musket balls to measure, 
observe and accurately document any specific features. Fortunately, the nature of the 
retrieved lead musket balls is such, that few of the musket balls were corroded, with the 
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majority still in an excellent condition with a fine patina. The musket balls that were 
impacted, similarly, showed little evidence of corrosion or oxidation. It was, therefore, 
possible to measure the musket balls without rigorous cleaning.  
The depth of the musket balls, and all other artefacts were noted but ignored for the 
analysis of the musket balls. Although the retrieved depth could prove significant in 
interpreting several aspects of the battlefield, such as sand movement, dune stability and 
the effect of ploughing on specific areas within the battlefield, it was decided not to use the 
retrieved depth for this research. Further, the excessive activity of ground burrowing moles 
and rodents has churned up the sandy soil so much that the retrieved depth of the artefacts 
could also prove to be inaccurate or futile to determine accurately.  
During the field survey a significant attribute of all artefacts, their geographic position, was 
recorded making use of a handheld GPS. From the resulting musket ball distribution map, 
analysis was conducted on the significance of any patterns or high density areas. 
Subsequently, the distribution maps were compiled to reveal different attributes of the 
musket balls, such as impacted versus non-impacted balls and balls originating from 
different weapons. 
The examination of every musket ball was conducted to determine a range of aspects 
including: 
• Mould seam; 
• Casting sprue; 
• Patina; 
• Ramrod marks; 
• Impact and level of impact; 
• Indentations and marks; and 
• Corrosion or encrustation. 
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Figure 16. Musket ball sprue and seam 
 
Figure 17. Indentation on a musket ball  
Sprue 
Seam 
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Figure 18. An impacted musket ball  
 
Figure 19. Three different musket ball sizes 
All musket ball observations were made using a magnifying glass as it was regularly found 
that with the naked eye not all the details were observed. The mould seam (Figure 16) 
represents the seam or edge resulting from the casting process. The musket ball moulds 
comprise two halves, to enable the easy removal of the cast. A seam line protrudes with the 
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size depending on how tight the fit between the two halves was (Foard 2009: 18). Similarly, 
the casting sprue reveals part of the manufacturing process of the musket balls. The single 
ball cast, with the two halves closed, had an opening in which the molten lead was poured, 
the sprue was subsequently cut off using a nipping tool or a knife, resulting in a sprue mark 
(Figure 16). Multiple ball casts would have multiple sprue marks on a ball, as the cast would 
allow molten lead to flow from one ball cavity to the adjacent ball cavity. Regularly the 
transportation of musket balls in crates or even pouches resulted in the musket balls 
bumping against each other, with the abrasion removing the casting sprue mark and mould 
seam (Foard 2009: 16).  
The ramrod marks on the musket balls resemble the mark created by ramming the musket 
ball down the barrel (Figure 17). This was necessary before every shot fired as it ensured the 
ball snugly fit the base of the barrel. If the ball was not rammed down, the gap between the 
black powder igniting and the ball could cause the barrel to explode and kill the shooter 
(Foard 2009: 23). Single or multiple marks could be visible on the musket ball; depending on 
how many times the shooter shoved the ramrod down the barrel. 
Impact on a musket ball was noted if the ball was not its original spherical shape (Figure 18). 
The impact was hence graded as being heavy, medium or slight impact. The impact was 
purely noted and graded based on observations only, with deformed balls graded as heavy 
impacted, balls that still have half the ball in a spherical shape graded as medium impact, 
with slightly impacted balls revealing a little impact or only an indentation. 
Alternatively, indentations on the balls were also noted that could have resulted from being 
shot as part of the collection of balls in a canister shot. These indentations on musket balls 
could mean that they were not shot from muskets but from the barrel of a cannon, like 
shotgun projectiles. The adjacent balls would bump into each other as they exit the barrel of 
the cannon resulting in multiple indentations and a deformed ball (Foard 2009: 13).  
Other marks on the musket balls could also be determined such as scratch marks, chew 
marks, or hammer marks. Corrosion or encrustation was also visible on some balls, but most 
showed no signs of encrustation or corrosion. Most of the sand encrusted on the surface of 
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the balls could easily be removed through brushing with a soft brush, but some had a hard 
crust challenging to remove; these were left with the encrustation as excessive abrasion 
could damage the ball. 
Measurements were conducted to determine the size and weight of the balls. The balls' 
diameter was measured using a digital calliper at a 90o angle to the mould seam, as the 
protruding seam could cause an inaccurate measurement (Figure 19). Deformed balls were 
measured as accurately as possible in an area deemed to be least affected. As these 
measurements obviously could not be used to determine the original ball size, it was purely 
conducted to record the detailed characteristics of the artefact. 
Weighing of the musket balls started using a digital scale with an accuracy of 0,05 grams. It 
was determined that with the aptly named ‘Sivilich formula’, the weight of a deformed 
musket ball could be used to calculate the ball diameter. Dan Sivilich, through his research 
on amongst others, the Monmouth Battlefield, devised a formula that incorporates the 
average density of lead as 10 479 grams per cm3. The weight of the ball becomes the 
variable in the following calculation: 
Musket ball diameter = 0,223204 X (weight in grams)1/3 (Sivilich 1996: 104) 
During a musket ball ballistic test, Scott et al. (2017: 75) concluded that the ‘Sivilich formula’ 
was consistent and precise. A comparison between two data sets was conducted and 
according to Scott et al. (2017: 75) Sivilich’s calculation is inclined to overestimate the ball 
diameter, but the difference is too small to be significant. From the ballistic experiments, it 
was concluded that the Sivilich formula was consistent, reliable and precise for determining 
the original ball size using its weight (Scott et al. 2017: 75). 
Once the ball diameters could be determined, the association could be made with the 
smoothbore flintlock musket or rifle used to fire the ball. Since not all musket balls were 
perfectly manufactured the results of the measured and weighed musket balls should, 
therefore, be taken as an average and a range for each ball size determined. 
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The Sivilich formula was developed in the United States where the Imperial System of 
measurement is used, so the musket ball sizes are reflected in inches. It was therefore 
decided to continue with the Imperial System for the musket ball measurements, and 
conversions have been made from millimetres to inches to concur with the reference 
towards musket ball sizes.  
5.3.2. Analysis of cannon projectiles 
5.3.2.1. Introduction 
The analysis of cannon projectiles requires an understanding of both British and Batavian 
artillery organisation and use. During the late 1700s and early 1800s, British military 
organisation of the artillery was under the control of the Board of Ordnance, specialising in 
the provision of arms (Dawson et al. 2007: 96). The Board of Ordnance was charged with the 
acquisition, regulation, control, and production of arms for the British military and navy 
(Caruana 1997: 7). During deployment, the British artillery was answerable to the Master 
General of the Board of Ordnance and not to the army headquarters (Kiley 2004: 158). 
The British artillery was divided into two main divisions namely the Park of Artillery Division 
that included the heavy or siege artillery cannons and the mobile Battalion Artillery Division. 
The Park of Artillery normally had the siege cannons and heavy artillery (12-pounder and 
above and heavy howitzers 8 inches and above) while the Battalion Artillery comprised the 
lighter and more mobile artillery cannons (3-pounders, 6-pounders and Royal howitzers, 5½ 
inch, or the Coehoorn howitzer of 4,4 inch) (Caruana 1977: 7).  
The Battalion Artillery was assigned to a specific battalion of infantry and manned partly by 
selected infantrymen known as Additional Gunners (Caruana 1977: 7). The light 6-pounder 
Battalion cannon (Figure 20) was the preferred cannon at the time of the 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg and these were normally attached to a battalion of infantry in pairs. The 
Battalion Artillery marched and fought with their attached infantry and provided close 
support during deployment and attack. 
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Figure 20. The British light 6-pounder cannon (Rudyerd 1793) 
Artillery tactics by all the European armies relied on the manoeuvrability and mobility of the 
Battalion Artillery. Napoleon pioneered the use of the artillery to achieve strategic objectives 
during the battle. Therefore, the artillery became more mobile. By 1778, the mobility of 
warfare had increased so much that a new branch of artillery was created, named the Horse 
Artillery. Military doctrine of the time believed the proximity of the return fire of the 6-
pounder cannons boosted the morale of the troops when subjected to an artillery 
bombardment (Caruana 1977: 7; Dawson et al. 2007: 203).  
A howitzer (Figure 21) is a short, large-calibre weapon used to fire an explosive shell with 
potential massive damage to the target (Caruana 1997: 7; Muller 1779: 65). It had the 
advantage that the projectile could be shot with a high trajectory over the heads of friendly 
troops (Hughes 1969: 35). The projectiles could have been the common shell, a hollow shell 
filled with gunpowder, or shrapnel shell filled with gunpowder and lead balls, or grapeshot, 
or canister, also named case shot. Case shot was filled with metal fragments or balls like a 
contemporary shotgun cartridge and could cause absolute carnage to the enemy line at 
close range. Grapeshot was a canvas bag filled with large metal balls and tied down to 
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resemble a cluster of grapes (Hughes 1969: 53). The howitzer was used as stationary cannon 
during battle and the position thereof was crucial and strategic. Long-range projectiles were 
the common shell, which upon explosion would disintegrate into multiple lethal fragments, 
while short-range projectiles comprised the grapeshot and canister or case shot (Henry 
2002: 18). 
 
Figure 21. Cross-sectional image of a British 5½ inch brass howitzer (Rudyerd 1793) 
The British battle organisation was normally divided into two brigades, each comprising 
three regiments, and each issued with two 5½ inch howitzers and six light 6-pounder 
battalion cannons. This grouping matches the British forces deployed at the 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg exactly as the British were divided into the First Brigade or English Brigade and 
the Second Brigade or Scottish Brigade each comprising three regiments. The Second 
Brigade comprised the 93rd Regiment, the 71st Regiment and the 72nd Regiment, while the 
First Brigade comprised the 24th Regiment, the 83rd Regiment and the 59th Regiment (Baird 
1806). As the organisation was according to the standard it could, therefore, be assumed the 
cannons would be divided similarly. There is, however no reference to the specific 
attachment or placement of the cannons during the battle in any of the post-battle reports.  
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg – an archaeological perspective 
103 
The two howitzers were most probably placed between the two brigades and the six light 6-
pounders were probably divided into three pairs and placed in strategic positions. The 
strategic positioning could be that four of the light 6-pounders would be with the Second 
Brigade (as they formed the initial attacking force) while the remaining two light 6-pounder 
cannons were involved with the First Brigade. The light 6-pounder cannons advanced with 
the progression of the infantry. 
To turn the attention to the Batavian defensive line, General Janssens positioned his men 
strategically to cover the main route from Cape Town northwards. He positioned his artillery 
towards the east and west flanks and slightly in front of his defensive line. The Batavian 
artillery had two 24-pounder howitzers, six 6-pounder field cannons, two 3-pounder field 
cannons and six 1-pounder cannons (Theal 1908: 390; Janssens 1806; Van Oordt 2017). This 
brings the total number of artillery pieces the Batavians had at their disposal to 16. Van 
Oordt (2017: 46) argues that the discrepancy that exists between the number as quoted by 
General Janssens and the British reports, which quote 22, 23 and even 30, results from the 
timing and knowledge the British had when they compiled the various reports. After the 
battle, the British seized all artillery pieces, and this number was higher than the actual 
pieces present at the battlefield (Van Oordt 2017: 48).  
The actual Batavian artillery arrangement and positioning on the battlefield require further 
discussion. Janssens' positioning of the artillery is referred to in his report (VC80) as on the 
right wing the horse artillery, comprising two 3-pounder cannons, the Light Dragoons, also 
on the right flank, then the 9th Regiment of jaegers, the two howitzer and three of the 6-
pounder cannons, the 22nd Regiment of Infantry, the French Marines, the 5th Regiment of 
Waldeck and the two companies of Hottentot Light Infantry and then the Javanese Artillery 
with three 6-pounder cannons and six 1-pounder cannons and the jaegers of Waldeck. The 
burgher cavalry was positioned in the dune field. In his report Janssens omits mentioning the 
artillery position towards Kleinberg on the Batavian left flank, but he mentions (VC80: 26) 
that artillery pieces were occasionally taken from the line and placed where they were 
required.  
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5.3.2.2. Curation and measurements 
The cannon projectiles are significant as they provided much-needed insight into a specific 
aspect of the battle and the battlefield. The purpose behind the analysis of the cannon 
projectiles mostly involved the determination of size, calibre and origin. This revealed 
information pertaining to the cannon and artillery position, which were subsequently used 
to delineate the battlefield. 
The depth of the retrieved cannon projectiles was noted but was ignored for this research. 
Even though the retrieved depth could prove significant in interpreting several aspects of the 
cannon balls such as the direction of impact and velocity, it was excluded from this 
discussion. 
During the field survey, the geographic position of each projectile was recorded making use 
of a handheld GPS. The resultant distribution map was used to conduct calculations to 
determine firing positions and ranges. Subsequently, the high density areas of retrieved 
cannon projectiles were used to show the route used by the main body of the British 
approach and the positions of the Batavian defensive line. 
During the field surveys, the cannon projectiles were placed in sealable plastic bags and 
numbered according to the numbering system. It was noticed that the nature of the cannon 
projectile material was prone to corrosion and hence, immediate stabilising of the artefacts 
was required. The projectiles were removed from the plastic bags and placed in individual 
plastic containers containing silicon crystals, to prevent rapid deterioration and corrosion. 
Thorough cleaning and preservation of the cannon projectiles will be conducted once 
enough consultation about correct procedures has been concluded and is therefore not 
included as part of this study. 
The brittle and fragile outer layer of the projectiles was carefully cleaned with a soft brush to 
remove excess soil but not break the artefacts. On selected projectiles, a small section of the 
surface was thoroughly cleaned to remove the layer of corrosion. This enabled us to 
determine the thickness of the corrosion and thus derive a more accurate determination of 
the ball size or fragment curve and subsequently its circumference.  
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All projectiles were weighed and measured, while the material used to manufacture was 
noted and the level of corrosion assessed. Measurements were made with a digital calliper 
measuring the maximum and the minimum diameter of the spherical projectiles. Excessive 
protrusions that occur on several the balls were excluded from the measurements as they 
distorted the accuracy of the dimensions. Further, cannon shell fragments were also 
weighed and measured, but the emphasis was on the thickness of the shell fragment and the 
curvature that could be used to calculate both the inner and outer circumference.  
5.3.3. Analysis of buttons 
5.3.3.1. Introduction 
Marcel (1994) argues that although many aspects of life do not survive to become part of 
archaeological data, some artefacts such as buttons provide specific identifying features that 
offer insight into the history of a site or an event. According to Lindbergh (1999: 50), details 
of everyday life may be found in the small things that are lost, but are significant in the final 
assessment of the cultural material. On buttons retrieved from battlefields, Sharpe (2013: 
44) observes that during the fighting soldiers literally shed metal. These included buttons, 
hooks, parts of guns and swords lost from soldiers' coats, waistcoats, breeches, sleeves and 
cloaks during the fighting, or afterwards when their wounds were treated.  
Olsen and Campbell (1962) state that buttons bearing specific insignia or markings can be 
assigned a date with relative accuracy. According to Olsen (1963: 552), even the button form 
can be used with relative accuracy to date certain plain military buttons. According to 
Seeman (2001: 135), buttons require a separate discussion as they have a specialised 
function because they were used both as practical fasteners for clothing items and for 
display. Buttons provide much information ranging from the identification of the association 
of the bearer to dating and the position of the bearer at the time the button was lost. 
Olsen (1963: 552) argues that even though military buttons with insignia and other 
identifiable markings can easily be recognised, the plain military buttons also have 
distinctive patterns that can be given approximate dates of manufacture on their form 
alone. Olsen (1963: 552) further states that in 1767 the British War Office ordered that 
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regimental numbers were to be placed on the buttons of officers and men of other ranks. 
Unfortunately, this order was not widely accepted, as officers and civilians continued to 
wear the plain ‘gentleman's’ button. By 1784 soldiers of the Continental Army, during the 
American Revolutionary War, also wore buttons with insignia, which later became common 
practice in militaries across the world. Nevertheless, the buttons without the clear 
identification or insignia still provide insight into their date of manufacture. 
Olsen (1963: 552) classifies plain metal military buttons according to their shape, which 
changed over time. Manufacturing techniques also improved, while the material also 
differed over time. Early metal buttons were rough cast with a hole drilled in the shank 
(Table 1), often even by the bearer self should a button mould be available. Olsen (1964: 
389) explains that soldiers manufactured their own buttons with a simple button mould. 
These buttons were cast by melting the pewter or lead over a fire. During the French and 
Indian War (1756–1763), a plain cast white metal button with an iron-wire shank made its 
appearance (Table 1). This button also featured during the American Revolutionary War 
(1775–1783) and was worn by both American and British armies, but with the regimental 
number on the button face. Spun-back buttons, cast and machine spun to level the back, 
were manufactured and used from 1760 up to the end of the Revolutionary War. Buttons 
with a cast eye were used from the 1750s to roughly 1812.  
The so-called ‘bullet’ shaped buttons, or domed buttons, were used from 1812 to about 
1830, but soon afterwards manufacturers included their names at the back, which became 
common by 1820 (Table 1). Plain brass or bronze buttons, from 1800 onwards, had a simple 
eye soldered to the back of the disk. However, due to the numerous eyes that broke, a foot 
was added to the eye to improve the fastening of the eye. By 1830, two-piece brass buttons, 
that were less prominently domed than the ‘bullet’ buttons became popular (Olsen 1963: 
553).  
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Table 1. Button dating according to form (Olsen 1963) 
Date Button characteristics 
1700–1765 Rough cast brass or bronze buttons, hole drilled in the shank 
1760–1790 Plain cast, white metal, iron-wire shank 
1775–1783 Plain cast, white metal, iron-wire shank, a regimental number on the face 
1760–1785 Plain cast, white metal or brass, brass-wire eye set in boss, spun-back buttons 
1750–1812 Plain cast, white metal, heavy cast eye 
1812–1830 Two-piece brass buttons, domed or ‘bullet’ shape 
1785–1800 Plain brass or bronze buttons, coin-shaped disc, simple brass eye 
1800–1820 Some makers added their names at the back, by 1820 it was generally accepted 
1812–1820 
Plain brass or bronze buttons, coin-shaped disc, a brass eye with bent over ends, 
back stamp added: Treble gilt, Extra gilt, etc., some had their faces stamped at a 
later date 
1830– 
Two-piece brass buttons, domed (less than ‘bullet‘ buttons), plain and stamped 
design on face, a back stamp was common and bore maker's name 
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Figure 22. Button styles according to Olsen (1963: 553) 
Buttons with four eyes, called trouser buttons, have changed little since about 1750 (Olsen 
1963: 554). One identification marking on trouser buttons is that the early buttons, 1750 to 
1830, have centre holes that acted as guides for the turning tool during the manufacturing 
process. From 1800 to 1860, the trouser buttons were cast and, after 1870, two-piece 
trouser buttons, that were pressed together, became popular.  
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Normal wear might have resulted in the loosening and eventual loss of a button, but it is 
more likely that a button was lost during combat on a battlefield or even during the cleaning 
of the battlefield. Medical attention to wounded soldiers and the transporting of these 
soldiers might also have resulted in the loss of a button. Numerous metal buttons were 
identified during the surveys of the 1806 battlefield and provided valuable insight into the 
development of the battle. It is therefore also necessary to analyse the distribution patterns 
of the buttons on the battlefield. The distribution of buttons provided clues to high-intensity 
fighting and the location of the yet to be identified graves of fallen soldiers. 
5.3.3.2. Curation and measurements 
The analysis of buttons started with preliminary cleaning of the soiled buttons using a soft 
dry brush. Special care was taken not to damage the buttons through excessive abrasion. It 
was decided to start with thorough cleaning before final curation, after consultation about 
the cleaning of heavily soiled and corroded items had been completed. The soft dry brush 
technique was used to remove excess soil from both the front and back of the buttons to 
catalogue the various attributes of the buttons. It was noted that the copper alloy material, 
used to manufacture most of the buttons, made it easy to remove excess soil. The copper 
alloy also showed that it was less inclined to corrosion in the existing environmental 
conditions than other metal artefacts. Even though some corrosion was visible on many 
buttons, the corrosion did not negatively affect the identification and analysis of the 
buttons.  
The DAACS cataloguing manual for buttons (Aultman & Grillo 2012) was used to catalogue 
the 182 metal buttons. According to the DAACS cataloguing manual (Aultman & Grillo 2012), 
button terminology is not as standardised or as well known as terminology for other artefact 
classes, even though many historians have ventured into the identification of buttons. Due 
to the relative familiarity of buttons as everyday items and the easily identifiable 
characteristics such as makers' names, decorations and back stamps, it is easy to classify 
buttons according to their use and origin. Therefore, many historians and collectors have 
neglected the analysis and cataloguing of buttons (Lindbergh 1999: 50).  
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Many collectors and historians have websites and published books on historical and military 
buttons. While they all make valuable contributions to the identification of buttons based on 
their decorations and back stamps, most of them fail to indicate other significant aspects of 
buttons (Lindbergh 1999: 50). Over the years, military buttons have become synonymous 
with regimental colours due to their longevity. They have become valuable in recognising 
origin and date. Consequently, it has become important for the research to classify the 
buttons according to all characteristics.  
The cataloguing of buttons according to the DAACS cataloguing manual identified the 
following aspects of buttons (Aultman & Grillo 2012): 
• Completeness; 
• Button type; 
• The manufacturing technique of the button; 
• The manufacturing technique of the button face; 
• Button shape; 
• Button material; 
• The material of the button face; 
• Join method; 
• Number of eyes; 
• Shank style; 
• Shank material; 
• Shank condition; 
• Back stamp; 
• Decoration; 
• Measurement of button diameter; and 
• Measurement of button height. 
Complete buttons were noted as such, even though some showed minor damage or 
corrosion, as opposed to the incomplete ones that were either broken or missing a button 
component, such as a shank. According to the button type, the cataloguing showed four 
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different button types, namely flat disks, one-piece, two-piece, and three-piece buttons. A 
further differentiation was observed according to button type: those that were not flat were 
noted as domed or semi-domed. Flat disc buttons were classified differently to one-piece 
buttons due to their distinctive smooth and level character with a shank attached to the 
back. One-piece buttons either had sew-through holes or a shank attached to the back, but 
lacked the distinctive smooth flat surface (Aultman & Grillo 2012).  
The manufacturing technique of the buttons was a component of the cataloguing that was 
identified through careful observation. The main manufacturing techniques included those 
button components that were stamped, those cast and those that were cast with the backs 
spun. The buttons that were cast with their backs spun showed circular grooves at the back 
showing the machine marks to even out the back of the button. The button shape refers to 
the shape of the button as seen from the front. Most buttons appear to be round, but other 
shapes are also found such as oval, square and hexagonal. The shape of the button could 
differ as part of the button decoration. Oddly shaped buttons, however, hampered the 
effectiveness of their intended use as it becomes tedious and difficult to prise the button 
through the garment's button loop or eye (Aultman & Grillo 2012).  
The button material refers to the material from which the button was manufactured. 
Although glass, bone, wooden and even ceramic buttons are also available, metal detectors 
were used, and hence the buttons assemblage comprises metal buttons only. Pewter, lead, 
alloy and copper alloy materials were mostly used in the manufacturing of metal buttons. 
This was easily identified by making use of the technologically advanced metal detector 
equipment used during the surveys of the battlefield. The machines readily identified the 
material, but the corrosion characteristics also provided insight into the button material. 
Two-piece and three-piece buttons comprise various parts that were joined together 
according to a specific technique. These techniques include crimping and brazing and were 
distinguished through observation. Buttons were attached to the garment with a shank or 
through holes or eyes in the button. The number of eyes was noted as either four or two 
eyes. The button shank was used for attachment to the garment and various aspects of the 
shank were distinguished. The shank style refers to the method or style in which the shank 
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was attached to the button. The attachment styles include: alpha style, omega style, cast 
eye, a cone with wire eye, drilled eye, shank through the back plate, shank cast in boss, wire 
eye, and embedded wire shank. Close observation of the shank through a magnifying glass 
revealed the slight variations. Further observations about the button shank such as the 
material and the shank condition were also noted (Aultman & Grillo 2012). 
An aspect of the button analysis and identification pertinent to collectors' and historians' 
classification of buttons is the information in the back stamp of the button. The back stamp 
refers to the wording and/or decoration that appear on the back of a button. It was 
customary for button manufacturers to place their own name or the company's name on the 
back of a button. This information is helpful in dating buttons, as the historical information 
of the manufacturers is readily available and associated with a specific time. The front 
decoration on a button is probably the most notable aspect of a button through which both 
the purpose and origin of the button are identified (Aultman & Grillo 2012).  
The condition of the button refers to the preservation of the button and whether it was 
noted as broken, corroded, fair or good. Taking into consideration that the buttons from the 
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg battlefield are all metallic and prone to oxidation and corrosion, 
the preservation was important in making accurate observations. Lastly, the measurement 
of button diameter and button height was required to classify the button according to size. 
The size of the button was associated with the use of the button on a garment. The button 
height refers to the measurement from the front to the back inclusive of the shank. The 
significance of this measurement is to support observations made about the button. The 
differences between flat, semi-domed and domed buttons were determined through the 
ratio between the diameter and height of a button. The diameter of the button was used for 
further classification within a button class.  
5.3.4. Analysis of buckles 
5.3.4.1. Introduction 
White (2009: 239) argues that historical archaeologists are developing an understanding of 
how to interpret archaeological sites by studying artefacts. Instead of only interpreting main 
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artefact classes, the uncommon and previously overlooked artefacts now also become 
valuable. White (2009: 240) continues that specific artefact classes such as ceramics and 
glass have been at the focus of many site interpretations while other classes have been 
marginalised. Besides typological studies, artefacts have the potential to provide much-
needed insight into an archaeological site. White (2009: 240) advocates that all artefact 
classes can provide evidence for social behaviour change and lifestyle. White (2009: 251) 
argues that an artefact class, such as buckles, becomes a tool to assess the complexities of 
the past on both an individual level and at a larger group level. 
Rivers (1999: 29) stresses the importance of artefacts of personal adornment and states that 
clothing is one of the most important aspects of a person's life and since the cloth does not 
last, the archaeologists only have the buttons, buckles, hooks and eyes left to study. 
Whitehead (1996: 2) remarks that early buckles, those before the 13th century, were 
regarded as status symbols and only later did they become part of everyday dress. 
Most buckles for general wear and dress were manufactured from copper alloy, while iron 
and steel buckles were mostly used on horse equipment (Whitehead 1996: 3). White (2009: 
241) observes that even though buckles are the most common type of fastener for clothing, 
the function of many buckles has not been recognised as fasteners on a knee, boot or garter, 
girdle, hat, stock and spur. 
Since the identification of buckles for the use in the military shows no difference to those 
used as civilian wear, individual buckle style or use could not contribute to answering the 
research questions. The spatial distribution of the buckles added significance to the 
understanding of the routes on the battlefield, and subsequently, provide a thorough 
understanding of the battlefield. 
5.3.4.2. Curation and measurements 
Buckle analysis firstly focused on the recording of the buckle as retrieved during the 
archaeological surveys. The spatial distribution of the buckles was recorded using handheld 
GPSs and plotted within Google Earth Pro and a GIS software program to facilitate the 
mapping as part of the analysis process. 
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg – an archaeological perspective 
114 
Subsequently, the retrieved artefacts were preliminarily cleaned to make the 
measurements, weighing and observations. Detailed cleaning would start at a later stage 
only after completion of sufficient consultation about the cleaning process. Cleaning was 
conducted using a soft brush to remove the excess soil and sometimes the slight 
encrustation. Fortunately, most of the buckles were manufactured from a copper alloy that 
is not prone to heavy encrustation or corrosion which made the cleaning process easy. Some 
buckles, however, were manufactured from iron or steel and have suffered heavy corrosion, 
making the cleaning and conservation of the buckle complicated. Notwithstanding, the 
identification and classification of these buckles could proceed since most of these 
characteristics were still discernible.   
The buckles were subsequently classified making use of a combination of the DAACS 
cataloguing manual for buckles (2003) and Buckles 1250–1800 (Whitehead 1996), focusing 
on the following buckle attributes: 
• The material of manufacture; 




• Length;  
• Width; 
• Hook type; 
• Pin; 
• Tongue; 
• Decoration; and  
• Use. 
The buckles were observed with the use of a magnifying glass to note all the aspects 
required for an analysis. The material used to manufacture could be readily discerned by 
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close observation, and through the metal identification function of the metal detectors used 
to identify the artefacts during the field surveys. 
The completeness of the buckle could be determined through observation, as any breakage 
was easy to see. The absence of the hook, pin or tongue proved harder to identify but was 
noted. Likewise, could the presence of a chape and the shape of the buckle be observed? 
The shape could be classified as either single- or double-framed, with single-framed being 
classified as a circle, D-shape, square or rectangular and trapezoid. The double-framed 
buckles are classified as D-shaped, square or rectangular and trapezoid (Figure 23) 
(Whitehead 1996; DAACS 2003). 
 
Figure 23. Buckle shape classification guide according to the DAACS cataloguing manual for buckles (2003) 
Complete and accurate measurements of the length and width of the buckles were 
conducted using a digital calliper. The hook type, pin, tongue and decoration of the buckle 
were also observed through close inspection and recorded. The features were described by 
making use of the DAACS cataloguing manual as a guide (Whitehead 1996; DAACS 2003). 
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Once all the features of the buckles were recorded individually, identifiable buckles were 
used to configure the spatial distribution to have a better understanding of the battle 
events. 
5.3.5. The analysis of coins 
5.3.5.1. Introduction 
Kemmers and Myrberg (2011: 87) argue that coins offer excellent insights into issues of the 
economy and state organisation, but also into so-called ‘small histories’, such as cultural 
values and the activity of humans. Kemmers and Myrberg (2011: 87) further argue that while 
the study of coins was important in the early years of archaeology as a discipline, it is no 
longer the case. The study of coins, or numismatics, has played a significant role in the 
development of new ideas and methods by ordering and describing the retrieved artefacts, 
but as the field of archaeology has developed, numismatics has played a diminishing role. In 
archaeology, numismatics is currently regarded as mostly descriptive and largely obsolete. It 
is argued that it fails to engage with broader archaeological topics and does not contribute 
much to an understanding of the people or societies that generated the material culture. 
The value of numismatics has since been primarily focused on providing a chronological 
sequence based on the classification, stylistic changes and dating of coins (Kemmers and 
Myrberg 2011: 87). 
Kemmers and Myrberg (2011: 87), however, advocate that coins form part of the 
archaeological assemblage and therefore should not be treated as artefacts that can only 
provide a sequential chronology. Mostly because of their wide use and manufacture as 
symbols of exchange, power and status, coins could provide the archaeologist with much-
needed insight into the site and the social life. Myrberg (2007: 157) adds that an approach to 
material culture that includes numismatics might present information such as social 
relations and patterns in society. 
Myrberg (2007: 158) debates whether coins should be discussed and studied within a 
context, which she divides into primary, secondary and tertiary context. The primary context 
is the details of the coin itself, such as size, value, date, material and decoration, while the 
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secondary context refers to the use, transfer and alteration to a coin. Tertiary context, in 
turn, refers to the deposition of the coin that provides information about stratigraphy and 
spatial distribution. 
Within the context of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg, the identification and retrieval of coins 
have a relatively low significance. Coins travel both geographically and through time 
(Kemmers & Myrberg 2011: 100) and it is, therefore, difficult to prove their presence at the 
battle. Having said this, the spatial distribution of the coins has the potential to provide 
insight into various aspects of the battlefield itself. 
Some argue that coins in specific areas of the battlefield provide insight into the complex 
road or track network within the larger battlefield area. I argue that losing coins might occur 
through the difficulty of travelling along barely navigable roads or during the breaks at the 
outspan area.  
5.3.5.2. Curation and identification 
Analysis of coins from the battlefield started with a preliminary cleaning of the soiled coins 
using a soft dry brush. Fortunately, most coins retrieved from the battlefield showed little 
sign of corrosion or crustation. Special care was taken not to damage the coins through 
excessive abrasion, while a soft dry brush proved to be effective in removing excess dust and 
soil. Various techniques of cleaning were investigated but it was decided to start with the 
thorough cleaning only before final curation, after consultation about the cleaning of soiled 
and corroded items had been completed. The soft dry brush technique removed excess soil 
from both the front and back of the coins to identify the markings on the coins and other 
relevant attributes.  
The markings on the coins could be readily identified, and the following information about 
the coins was noted: 
• The date of the coin; 
• The country of origin; 
• The monetary value of the coin; 
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• The inscriptions and images on both sides; and  
• The material of the coin. 
Many collectors and historians have designed websites and published books on historical 
coins, and they all make a valuable contribution to the identification of specific coins. These 
websites, catalogues and books are, however, aimed at the collector and for general trade24. 
Still, it is very convenient to trace and identify coins within these collections, while the 
information gathered about specific coins is invaluable. 
5.4.  Conclusion 
The methodology used during the research is an important aspect that guides the research 
to achieve accurate results and make pertinent conclusions. The field survey methodology 
was established through consultation with various role-players, and the practices at other 
battlefield sites with similar research questions and objectives. During the research, the 
methodology was further adapted to become more efficient, while not affecting the 
accuracy of the fieldwork. The eventual methodology was sound and effective, while the 
data collection was successful. 
The analysis of the artefacts was exceptionally challenging as few similar analyses have been 
conducted on material within the South African context. To obtain reference samples for the 
exceedingly large sample retrieved from the battlefield was a challenge that required 
extensive consultation and research. Especially the musket ball and cannon projectile 
analyses provided a variety of material that required in-depth research to make conclusions. 
Once the analyses of the different artefact classes had been completed, the results could be 
collated to compile the various distribution maps. The distribution maps provided me with 
the opportunity to make conclusions about their location and presence on the battlefield. 
CHAPTER 6 provides the results and discussion of the various analyses of artefact classes, 
while the reconstruction of the historical landscape proved to be instrumental in the 
complete understanding of the battle events.  
                                                     
24 Examples: http://numismatics.org/newocreinterface/; http://www.coins-of-the-uk.co.uk/coins.html 
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CHAPTER 6. RESULTS 
6.1.  Reconstruction of the historical landscape 
The current landscape of the study area does not resemble the historical landscape in which 
the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg was fought. Although several geographic features and 
characteristics are undoubtedly similar, major environmental changes have occurred to alter 
the landscape so much it is hard to visualise the original battlefield. The main geological 
features including Blaauwberg Hill, Kleinberg and the adjacent hills have not transformed 
over the past 200 years, with the topography, being as it was during the 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg. Further, the historical position of natural springs, as shown Figure 24 and Figure 
25, is still the same as the current natural springs within the study area. 
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Figure 24. A diagram of Farm 431 encompassing various smaller properties, but also showing the position of 
the fresh water spring named Borrel dam (as shown by the red arrow) (S.G. 8234/65) 
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Figure 25. A diagram of the title deed in which the spring and outspan area in relation to the farm 
Blaauwbergsvlei can be seen (shown by the red arrows) (Diagram 289/1872) 
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Figure 26. The location of two natural springs within the study area 
The locations of the two natural springs within the study area are shown with Borrel dam 
located towards the north-west, while Blaauwbergsvlei is situated in the south-western 
corner of the BBNR (Figure 26). 
Three environmental aspects and features merit discussion as two of these have been 
noticeably altered, and the third has had the potential to change. Firstly, the position of the 
routes, roads or tracks does not appear to be in the same location as in 1806. By overlaying 
historical maps25 on current maps, the contemporary route, road or track network differs 
from the historical network. Since the road network is significant in resolving locational 
issues of the battle positions, it requires investigation to determine the position of the 
historical routes. The battle positions as shown on the maps make it possible to assume their 
positions from the archaeological evidence collected. The archaeological evidence can 
                                                     
25 NL-HaNA, Janssens / Kaarten, 4.JSF, inv.nr. 13; Smart 1809; M1/2064 - 2071; M3/21; Castle Military Museum 
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indicate the position of the various battle positions and provide evidence for the position of 
the roads. 
 
Figure 27. The location of a north–south and adjacent route associated with the locations of horseshoes and 
wheel rings 
The high concentrations of artefacts associated with transport, such as horseshoes and 
wagon parts, provide an indication of potential historical routes. Figure 27 shows the 
locations of horseshoes and wheel rings that could be associated with the positions of 
historical routes. The north–south linear distribution of horseshoes could point towards 
horseshoes being lost while travelling along the main north–south route through the study 
area.  
The positions of a reconstruction of the main north-south route and a route leading to the 
east were superimposed on the map (Figure 27) and this possible historical route is in a 
different position to the current main route providing access to the battlefield as seen on the 
1:50 000 topographic map sheet (3318 CD & DC Chief Directorate: Surveys and Mapping). 
From the archaeological evidence, it is possible to find out the position of a main north–
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south route from Blaauwbergsvlei to Jan Mostert's farm, but according to the historical 
maps26, a network of routes traversed the area, including various routes leading to the 
north. 
The archaeological evidence has not provided clarity on the positions of individual routes but 
has rather provided proof of the location of the main routes. Since these routes were 
situated nearby, it could be suggested that the main body of the British army, specifically the 
Second Brigade, advanced along this route as suggested in Figure 27, and hence its position 
delineates a significant area of the battlefield.  
 
Figure 28. An aerial view of a portion of the study area showing the dune field and possible historical routes 
indicated by the red arrows 
An aerial view across the study area from the north facing south indicates the dune field to 
the west and possible historical routes (shown by the red arrows Figure 28). It is argued that 
these elongated depressions could be the remnants of historical routes that traversed the 
study area. It is possible that the continual use of these routes by travellers over time 
                                                     
26 NL-HaNA, Janssens / Kaarten, 4.JSF, inv.nr. 13; Smart 1809; M1/2064 - 2071; M3/21; Castle Military Museum 
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established deep tracks that are still clear. Throughout the study area, even in the densely 
vegetated areas, these elongated depressions occur, and they could represent the historical 
route network through this area. 
Secondly, the most obvious difference between the historical landscape and the 
contemporary landscape is the change in vegetation. Acacia saligna or Port Jackson willow 
was introduced to the west coast of South Africa during the earlier parts of the 19th century 
to assist in the stabilising of the wind-blown dunes. Acacia saligna is a tree originally from 
Western Australia (Midgely & Turnbull 2003: 92) but became an invasive species in the 
Western Cape with a wide range of impacts. This is clear in the unique South African Fynbos 
systems where it has displaced the native species (Musil 1993: 362; Holmes 2002: 111). 
Three endangered vegetation types occur within the BBNR: Cape Flats Sand Fynbos (critically 
endangered), Cape Flats Dune Strandveld (endangered) and Swartland Shale Renosterveld 
(critically endangered) (Mucina & Rutherford 2006). 
An alien vegetation clearing and Sand Plain Fynbos restoration programme was started on 
96 hectares on the northern perimeter of the reserve. This programme included the removal 
of alien vegetation, the conservation and the re-establishment of indigenous fauna and flora. 
Unfortunately, a large portion of the battlefield and study area is still covered in alien 
vegetation that has altered the landscape. The historical landscape was covered in low 
growing shrubs, that according to historical evidence was “impenetrable brushwood” 
(Atkinson 1940: 76), compared to the current dense tree coverage of the Acacia saligna. 
Thirdly, an aspect of the historical landscape that had the potential to be altered over time is 
the position of the dune field. Blaauwberg Hill is surrounded by dune fields, both to the east 
and the west. The main routes were positioned inland because a dune field is situated on the 
coastal side. Inland or to the east of Blaauwberg Hill is another dune field that also affected 
the position of the routes. These dune fields made travelling difficult and therefore the 
routes were commonly situated on the outskirts of the dune field.  
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Figure 29. An aerial view of the dune field towards the east of Blaauwberg Hill. Blaauwberg Hill is situated 
just out of the picture to the right. This view also shows a portion of the 96-hectare vegetation restoration 
programme. 
An aerial view (taken from the north towards the south) of a portion of the battlefield shows 
the dune field (Figure 29). Covered in dense alien vegetation, the dune field is not as visible 
as in the cleared areas, therefore obscuring understanding of the physical aspects of the 
battlefield. Since Acacia saligna was introduced to this area to stabilise wind-blown dunes, it 
begs the question of how the dune field has changed since the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg. 
Further, has the movement of sand covered up battle-related artefacts? 
During the field surveys, the depth of retrieval of artefacts was recorded and found that it 
ranged between the surface and 30 cm deep. Even though the metal detectors could identify 
artefacts slightly deeper, few artefacts were identified at a deeper depth. Table 2 indicates 
the percentage of artefacts retrieved at various depth intervals and points out that a large 
percentage (56.5%) of artefacts were retrieved at a depth of less than 10 cm. Combining the 
artefacts that were identified on the surface with the artefacts retrieved no deeper than 10 
cm, it shows that 71.5 per cent of artefacts were retrieved no deeper than 10 cm. Few 
artefacts (6% in total) were retrieved at a deeper depth than 20 cm.  
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Table 2. Artefact retrieval depth comparison 
Artefact retrieval depth Percentage 
Surface 15% 
0 cm–10 cm 56.5% 
11 cm–20 cm 22.5% 
21 cm–30 cm 5% 
31 cm–40 cm 1% 
Total 100% 
The retrieval depth of artefacts could indicate the lack of penetration depth of the metal 
detectors used, but since artefacts were retrieved at depths deeper than 20 cm, it shows 
that the machines can identify artefacts at that depth. Further, the depth of the artefacts 
could indicate that the sand movement across the battlefield over the past 200 years was 
inconspicuous, as it does not appear to have influenced the retrieval of artefacts. 
Even though the movement of the sand dunes through wind action was not studied as such, 
it can be concluded that the movement of dunes was not noticeable, and therefore their 
current position is like their position at the time of the battle.  
6.2. Musket ball results and discussion 
Of the 402 musket balls retrieved from the battlefield, 63 had sprue marks. These marks 
show the excess lead that was cut off during the casting process. Thirty-six musket balls had 
signs of indentations varying from large to slight indentations while some had multiple 
indentations. The source or reason for the indentation is not clear as it differs from the 
marks present on the impacted musket balls. These indentations could be the marks made 
during the ramming of the ball down the barrel of the musket. This would suggest that these 
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balls have been fired and not dropped. Indentations could also result from multiple balls 
bumping into each other during the transportation of the ammunition, or even being fired 
together as part of a canister shot.  
A further 58 musket balls revealed scratch marks. These scratch marks could be the tooth 
marks of rodents gnawing on the musket ball as several marks proved to be relatively new. 
This was determined through the difference in colour on the ball compared to the brighter 
shiny surface revealed in the grooves created by the scratch marks. 
Several musket balls have signs of impact and were classified as heavy impact, medium 
impact and slight impact. Figure 30 shows the 402 musket balls that have been analysed that 
reflected signs of impact. Forty-five musket balls were heavily impacted, with the ball 
different from its spherical form. Sixteen balls were classified as medium impact, while 46 
balls were only slightly impacted. Six musket balls had a double impact, while two musket 
balls were completely flattened. The rest of the balls, 287 in total, showed no signs of 
impact. 
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Figure 30. Number of musket balls that have been impacted 
The balls that were heavily impacted, medium impacted and slightly impacted (Figure 30) 
could be those that struck a soldier or a horse during the battle. However, it is also possible 
these balls struck a hard object present during the battle, such as a cannon, a carriage, a tree 
trunk or even the ground. Those balls that showed no signs of impact (Figure 30), were fired 
but missed their targets, and subsequently came to rest on the ground without deforming.  
I tried to determine which musket balls were shot and which balls were spoilt or dropped 
without being shot. In the haste and confusion of reloading a musket after a shot has been 
fired, a soldier might drop a ball without retrieving it. However, the initial results were 
inconclusive and have been omitted from this analysis. Further investigation into the musket 
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Six musket balls revealed a double impact (Figure 30) indicating that they may have been 
fired as part of a canister shot by the artillery. These balls typically reveal impacts from 
various sides as the other balls from within the canister have impacted them.  
Two musket balls (Figure 31) proved to be interesting, as they have been completely 
flattened into the shape of a round disk. The purpose of this is unknown, but the owner 
hammered and worked the musket ball into a near perfect round disk the size of a large 
coin. Figure 32 indicates that both musket balls have been retrieved near the farmhouse of 
Justinus Keer. It is, therefore, possible that the two flattened musket balls were dropped by 
wounded soldiers during their treatment at the field hospital or that these musket balls were 
hammered and worked during the soldiers' recovery period at the field hospital. 
 
Figure 31. Flattened musket balls 
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Figure 32. Position of flattened musket balls 
The distribution of all the musket balls provides great insight into the battle (Figure 33). The 
locations of the musket balls across the battlefield and several aspects about their location 
warrant further discussion. Firstly, the locations indicate a concentration of balls in a relative 
north-south distribution. It must, however, be noted that the area towards the east of the 
BBNR was not surveyed as no permit was obtained to extend the survey into the adjacent 
areas. It is, however, clear that the distribution of musket balls, with such a high 
concentration near the current fence line of the BBNR, probably extends into the adjacent 
vacant land.  
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Figure 33. Distribution of musket balls 
The extent of the battlefield based on the distribution of the musket balls are also revealed 
(Figure 33). Besides the skirmish on Kleinberg, where a couple of musket balls were 
retrieved, and several musket balls retrieved among the periphery of the dune field, the 
majority were retrieved in an area measuring 500 m x 1500 m. It is, however, unclear how 
far the battlefield extends towards the east. I believe the musket balls indicate where men 
were positioned and where the fighting occurred. Figure 34 indicates the position of the 
historical routes in relation to the musket balls and provides an interesting view of the 
battle. It appears as if most musket balls, and therefore the fighting, occurred near the major 
north-south routes. This could be attributed to the harsh conditions as mentioned by various 
British soldiers. Baird (Hook 1832: 113; Theal 1899: 272) describes the environment as 
“deep, heavy and dry sand, covered with shrubs, scarcely pervious by light bodies of 
infantry; and above all, the total privation of water under the effect of a burning sun that 
nearly exhausted our gallant fellows in the moment of victory; and with the greatest 
difficulty were we able to reach Rietvlei.” Captain John Graham, in his letter to Thomas 
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Graham (Atkinson 1940), describes the difficult terrain they had to negotiate as very deep 
sand, covered with impenetrable brushwood. It is, therefore, possible that instead of 
maintaining the typical line formation during the British advance, they eventually funnelled 
into the area covered by the roads. A further possibility arises that the British Second 
Brigade targeted the gap in the Batavian defensive line created through the retreat of the 5th 
Regiment of Waldeck. This notion is further enhanced because the Batavian forces 
positioned the horse artillery and light dragoons on their right flank and continuously kept 
up a heavy fire (VC80: 34–35). Janssens further noted that the Batavian artillery influenced 
the British as they altered their advance because of the effect of the artillery (VC80: 30). 
 
Figure 34. Musket balls with possible historical routes 
Insight into the development of the battle can also be ascertained from the musket ball 
distribution (Figure 34). The furthest south musket balls were identified is near the 
farmhouse of Justinus Keer. It can be assumed that no further fighting occurred beyond the 
farmhouse, and it appears that the British did not pursue the Batavian forces as they 
retreated. Captain John Graham states in his letter that men died due to a lack of water 
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because of the adversity they endured. This together with the fact that the men might have 
been out of shape, as Krynauw (1999: 103) argues, could have led to the British not pursuing 
the Batavian forces (Atkinson 1940: 76).  
The locations of the impacted and non-impacted musket balls provide insight into specific 
aspects of the battle (Figure 35). The pink indicating the heavily impacted balls, the yellow 
indicating medium impacted balls and the green indicating slightly impacted musket balls 
(Figure 35). It is evident from the distribution that fighting occurred across the whole 
battlefield although a couple of high concentration areas of impacted musket balls are 
visible. 
 
Figure 35. Distribution of impacted and non-impacted musket balls 
The distribution of impacted and non-impacted musket balls is indicated, with the high 
concentration areas highlighted (Figure 36). Area 1 might be associated with musket balls 
from the field hospital area as these have probably been discarded or lost during the medical 
activities at the farmhouse. Both impacted and non-impacted balls have been identified in 
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this area. Breytenbach (2016) identified the location of the farmhouse by making use of 
ground penetrating radar and subsequent excavations. Through surface collection, 
Breytenbach also provided clarity on the use of the area surrounding the farmhouse. 
Area 2 might be associated with the outspan area as this area was a well-used stopover for 
travellers en route from Cape Town to the north, with access to a natural spring. Although it 
is possible that fighting still occurred within this area, most retrieved balls probably can be 
associated with the men resting at the source of water.  
 
Figure 36. High concentration areas of musket balls 
The areas numbered 3 to 8 (Figure 36) indicate high density areas of musket balls that could 
be associated with intense fighting. These areas are significant in understanding the 
development of the battle as it could be attributed to various groups of soldiers on the 
Batavian side that fought to contain the British advance. It is hence possible that while the 
Batavian defence was initially positioned as a single line, the fighting and resistance did not 
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg – an archaeological perspective 
136 
occur along the entire line. As some troops retreated, others were holding the enemy at bay, 
hence creating a staggered defensive line. 
To delineate the battlefield, it is important to differentiate between the different musket 
balls used during the battle. Since different smoothbore flintlock muskets were used, it is 
possible to associate a specific musket ball with the musket it was shot from and, hence, 
associate it with a specific group of men. After measuring all musket balls and calculating the 
size of the impacted balls using the ‘Sivilich Formula‘, the sizes and numbers were plotted on 
a line graph (Figure 37). The musket ball sizes (in inch), the number of balls per ball size and 
three distinct peaks are indicated. The first and highest peak is for the ball sizes 0.69 inch to 
0.71 inch and represents balls of sizes 0.69 inch with 50 balls. Size 0.70 inch with 136 balls 
and 0.71 inch with 43 balls. The balls that fall within this range numbered 229.  
The second peak (Figure 37) represents the balls with size 0.65 inch, 13; 0.66 inch, 32; and 
0.67 inch, eight. Fifty-three balls fall within this size range. The third peak (Figure 37) 
represents musket balls that fall within the range of 0.61 inch to 0.58 inch, and it totals 59 
musket balls.  
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Figure 37. Number of musket balls per ball size 
The challenging task of distinguishing between specific musket balls and the associated 
smoothbore flintlock muskets required an understanding of specific weaponry used by 
different groups. The British probably made use of the Brown Bess musket, which technically 
was the Land Pattern musket and its derivatives the Long Land Pattern, the Short Land 
Pattern, the India Pattern, the New Land Pattern musket and the Sea Service musket, that 
were introduced later. These muskets had a similar bore size and used the same ball size, a 
0.69 inch musket ball (Table 3). The Baker rifle, officially known as the Pattern 1800 Infantry 
rifle was introduced to the service in 1801 and could have been used at the Battle of 
Blaauwberg in 1806. The Baker rifle had a bore size of 0.62 inch and used a musket ball of 
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Table 3. Musket and rifle bore size and ball size 
Musket / Rifle  Barrel size / Bore (inch) Ball size (inch) 
Brown Bess musket 0.75'' 0.69'' 
Charleville musket 0.69'' 0.63'' 
Potsdam musket 0.75'' 0.69'' 
Baker rifle 0.625'' 0.615'' 
Prussian Jaeger rifle (Hesse Kassel) 0.65'' ˂ 0.60'' 
The Charleville musket, probably used by the French Marines, had a bore size of 0.69 inch 
and a ball size of 0.63 inch, while the rifles probably used by the Waldeck Jaegers, could 
probably have a bore size of 0.65 inch with the musket balls being smaller than 0.60 inch.  
The distribution of musket balls that fall within the range of 0.58 inch to 0.61 inch and 0.65 
inch to 0.67 inch potentially indicates the positioning of different soldiers during the battle 
(Figure 38). The musket balls indicated with green dots (Figure 38) appear to be situated 
more to the west, while the musket balls indicated with red dots appear to be situated more 
towards the east. This could be a sign as to the positioning of different men using different 
flintlock muskets. The musket balls indicated with green represent musket balls with the 
smaller size, namely 0.58 inch to 0.61 inch while the red dots indicate the slightly larger 
musket balls with a ball size of 0.65 inch to 0.67 inch. 
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Figure 38. Musket ball distribution indicating musket balls sizes 0.58'' - 0.61" and 0.65'' - 0.67" 
Two high density areas of musket balls are visible (Figure 38 indicated by the two arrows), 
and probably indicate areas where heavy fighting occurred. It represents how the Batavian 
soldiers held out against the onslaught of the British forces, but also indicates how they 
retreated systematically, staggering their defence. 
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Figure 39. Distribution of various sizes of musket balls 
The distribution of all three identifiable musket ball sizes according to Table 3 are seen in 
Figure 39. The yellow dots indicate the musket balls of size 0.69 inch to 0.71 inch. 
Unfortunately, these musket balls cannot be exclusively linked to the British muskets but are 
also possibly linked to other muskets. The distribution, therefore, does not indicate the 
positions of specific soldiers, but rather indicate the battle development during the 
encounter.  
The distribution of the musket balls of size 0.6 inch to 0.71 inch (Figure 39) shows a relatively 
uniform distribution across the battlefield, with high density areas occurring. These musket 
balls appear from the red curved line (Figure 39) southwards. This probably indicates the 
furthest north the Batavian defensive line was positioned, and all subsequent fighting 
occurred from this point southwards. Further, the distribution illustrates various high density 
areas indicating positions where heavy fighting occurred. The high density areas appear to 
be staggered from the original Batavian position, near the red curved line (Figure 39), 
southwards, indicating a staggered Batavian retreat. 
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6.3. Cannon projectiles results and discussion 
Fifty-seven cannon projectiles were retrieved from the battlefield of the 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg. Forty-two spherical cannon balls were retrieved, while 15 shell fragments 
accounted for the cannon projectile assemblage.  
The weight of the 15 cannon shell fragments ranges from 77.5 grams, the smallest, to 734 
grams, the largest (Figure 40) and depended on the relative size of the fragment. The larger 
the fragment the heavier its respective weight. From Figure 40, it can be deduced that at 
least four of the fragments are relatively large fragments that will fit in the palm of a man's 
hand. The lighter fragments are much smaller, but substantial enough to cause a huge 
impact on its target. 
 
Figure 40. Cannon shell fragment weights 
The cannon shell fragments are all cast iron fragments prone to corrosion and thus hinder 
accurate measurements of the original size. It was concluded that the shell fragments all 
concur with the howitzer common shell, but the origin is unclear. Since both British and 
Batavian artillery had at its disposal two howitzers, further investigation into the shell 
fragments is required to be able to clarify their origin. By studying the cannon shell fragment 
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Figure 41. Cannon shell fragment distribution 
The locations of the 15 retrieved cannon shell fragments are indicated and offers several 
aspects for discussion (Figure 41). Firstly, 11 shell fragments occur in a relatively small area 
while a single shell fragment occurs far north, and three more fragments are located further 
to the south.  
Merely by analysing the above-mentioned locations of shell fragments (Figure 41) the single 
shell fragment to the north is unlikely to be of British origin, as this area is situated on a rise 
where the British most probably positioned their own howitzers. It is therefore possible that 
the single shell fragment originates from a Batavian howitzer common shell fired from the 
Batavian artillery positions and aimed at the British artillery position. Unfortunately, no 
other shell fragments were identified during the surveys in this area (Hutten 2015). 
According to Adye (1804: 156), the extreme range of a 24-pounder howitzer would be 1390 
yards to 1745 yards, which, converted to metres, translates to 1270 metres to about 1600 
metres. 
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Figure 42. Cannon shell fragment distribution indicating the extreme ranges of the howitzer (the blue curved 
lines) 
The extreme range of a howitzer measured from the single shell fragment southwards was 
measured and the two curved blue lines indicate 1270 metres and 1600 metres respectively 
and could point towards a possible location of at least one of the two Batavian howitzer 
positions (Figure 42). If the furthest south curved blue line indicates the extreme range of 
the howitzer, it suggests that the Batavian defensive line would not have been positioned 
much further south than the indicated position. 
Identification of the shell fragments to determine their origin proved to be inconclusive since 
the size of the shell fragments and level of corrosion affected the accuracy of the 
measurements. The difference in size is negligible and the origin could not be determined 
with certainty. Should the 11 shell fragments near one another be of British origin, it might 
indicate the position of the Batavian defensive line and the position of the 5th Regiment of 
Waldeck. General Janssens, in his report, referred to the first British howitzer shells that 
landed on the right wing of the Waldeck Regiment and caused more confusion than he had 
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expected (VC80: 29, 30). Should this be the case, it places the Batavian defensive line less 
than 800 metres from the British initial positions. The Batavian artillery had a much greater 
effect on the battle through its proximity, than from what we can gather from the historical 
documents.  
Further, in between the location of the shell fragments, many other cannon projectiles were 
identified that point rather to Batavian origin than British origin. Based on the location of 
these shell fragments, they are more likely to be of Batavian origin than British origin. 
Further studies will be conducted on the shell fragments to clarify their origin and will 
include an investigation into the composition of the material used to cast the shells. 
If the 11 shell fragments prove to be of Batavian origin, as is more likely, this offers insight 
into the development of the battle and the route the main body of the Second Brigade 
followed during their advance towards the Batavian defensive line. It also provides an 
indication of the position of the Batavian artillery. 
Firstly, the Batavian howitzers would have aimed at a target much closer than the extreme 
range discussed above, and by using common exploding shell would create carnage among 
the British infantry on their advance. The howitzers were positioned towards the right flank 
of the Batavian defensive line between the 9th Regiment of Jaegers and the 22nd Regiment of 
Infantry and would fire the shell at the infantry at around 500 metres. As the Batavian troops 
retreated, the artillery would also fall back, but continue their fire at the advancing British 
troops, possibly resulting in the three shell fragments that were located further south.  
These three shell fragments situated to the south could also be of British origin. There is a 
possibility that they represent the howitzer shells aimed at the centre of the Batavian 
defensive line. Should this be the case, then this position shows the position of the 5th 
Regiment of Waldeck, but also the north-south and east-west distribution of the Batavian 
defensive line. The cleaning of these shell fragments, to remove the layer of corrosion, and 
the subsequent measuring might clarify their origin. 
The spherical cannon projectiles were weighed and measured to determine their original 
size and then to conjecture the specific cannon that fired them and subsequently their origin 
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as either Batavian or British. Forty-two cannonballs were analysed, but once again, the 
accuracy of the measurements was affected by the level of corrosion. The different weights 
of the spherical cannon projectiles are indicated and gives an indication as to the different 
ball sizes used in the artillery (Figure 43). 
 
Figure 43. Weight of cannonballs  
The cannonballs could provisionally be classified into three weight classes; those light, up to 
122.5 grams; those between 200 grams and about 600 grams and lastly the heavy balls 
exceeding 2500 grams (according to Figure 43). It should, however, be taken into 
consideration that the British had at their disposal the howitzers and the light 6-pounder 
field cannons, while the Batavian artillery comprised 1-pounder, 3-pounder, 6-pounder 
cannons and 24-pounder howitzers. Except for the 1-pounder cannon, which only fired solid 
shot, the 3-pounder and 6-pounder cannons would fire both solid shot and grapeshot, while 
the howitzers could also be fired with grapeshot. This resulted in six potential different ball 
sizes across the battlefield. 
From Table 4 and the variety of cannonballs, it can be construed that a simple division of the 
cannonball sizes is not possible. Both the weight and the ball size need to be taken into 
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Table 4. Cannonball sizes according to Adye (1804: 255-257) 
Cannon Type of shot Weight (lbs / oz) Diameter (inch) 
1-pounder Solid / round shot  1,92'' 
3-pounder Solid / round shot  2,775'' 
Grapeshot 4 oz  
6-pounder Solid / round shot  3,498'' 
Grapeshot 8 oz  
24-pounder  Grapeshot 2 lbs  
Six different cannonball types were identified from the assemblage of spherical cannon 
projectiles, while three could not be associated with specific cannons (Figure 44). It must be 
noted that some cannonballs might have been so corroded that the ball had lost material 
and therefore its weight might have been less, although according to its size, it could still be 
associated with a specific cannon. Further, should the identification of a specific ball be 
troublesome, it was decided to associate it with similar balls within the range of its 
measurements. By doing this, the unidentifiable balls were fewer and the locational analysis 
more conclusive. 
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Figure 44. Number of cannonballs per type 
Twelve balls could probably be associated with 1-pounder solid shot, 14 balls associated with 
3-pounder grapeshot, two with 6-pounder solid shot, three could probably be associated 
with 6-pounder grapeshot, while seven balls could be from 24-pounder grapeshot. One 
cannonball was measured and weighed and is likely to be an 8-pounder solid shot. Since no 
8-pounder cannons were part of the battle, and the specific cannonball was identified near a 
historical homestead against the slopes of Blaauwberg Hill, it was decided that it bears no 
significance to the battle. Probably, the inhabitants of the homestead brought in this 
cannonball from elsewhere well after the battle in 1806.  
Five projectiles can be associated with 6-pounder cannons, of which two are solid shot and 
three could be grapeshot. Either their association could be of British or Batavian cannons as 
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Figure 45. Distribution of all spherical cannon projectiles 
The distribution of all the spherical cannon projectiles is shown and indicates a high density 
area significant in the discussion of the cannonballs (Figure 45). The distribution maps for 
each individual cannonball class (Figure 46, Figure 47, Figure 48, and Figure 49) demonstrate 
similar patterns for each cannonball type. The high density area of cannonballs overlaps with 
the high density area for the cannon shell fragments and indicates an area targeted by the 
artillery. It is therefore likely that the 6-pounder cannonballs were fired from Batavian 
cannons and not from British cannons since the 6-pounder cannonballs are located among 
the other projectiles.  
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Figure 46. Distribution of 3-pounder grapeshot 
The 3-pounder grapeshot distribution (Figure 46) indicates a high density area towards the 
north and several shots distributed towards the south. Two 3-pounder cannons were active 
on the battlefield and associated with the horse artillery on the right flank of the Batavian 
line (VC80: 26; Van Oordt 2017: 47). Lieutenant Pelegrini oversaw this unit and fired at the 
British advancing troops from the east. General Janssens commented that he had to order 
this unit to vacate their positions as they still fired at the opposition after the retreat was 
ordered (VC80: 35). This could explain the distribution of cannon balls from the high density 
area southwards, because the horse artillery unit was firing at the British troops even after 
they had passed their positions.  
Pelegrini's Horse Artillery towards the right wing of the Batavian line was situated outside 
the current study area and boundary fence of the BBNR. The high density distribution of 
artefacts identified near the fence line suggests that the battlefield extends beyond the 
fence line. Therefore, Pelegrini's position would also be situated towards the east of the 
fence line. 
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Figure 47. Distribution of 1-pounder solid shot 
Twelve possible 1-pounder solid shots were identified, and the distribution is illustrated in 
Figure 47. The distribution, like the distribution of the other cannon projectiles, indicates a 
high density area and a single shot towards the south. The Batavians had six 1-pounder 
cannons manned by the Javanese Artillery and positioned between the Hottentot Light 
Infantry and the Jaegers of Waldeck (VC80: 26; Van Oordt 2017: 47). Exactly where the 
Javanese Artillery was positioned can be calculated taking into consideration the number of 
men standing side by side in every regiment. From this calculation, the length of the 
Batavian defensive line could be determined. The accuracy of this method is debatable as 
the fluid nature of the event over 200 years ago and the diverse circumstances need to be 
taken into consideration, but it provides an indication where the different regiments might 
have been situated. This means that the high density area of 1-pounder cannonballs is 
situated slightly to the northeast from where the Javanese Artillery was positioned. From the 
high density area of cannonballs, it suggests that the Javanese Artillery and the horse 
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artillery were aiming at the same target, most probably the centre of the advancing British 
Second Brigade. 
 
Figure 48. Distribution of 24-pounder grapeshot 
The distribution of seven probable 24-pounder howitzer grapeshot is indicated and, like the 
rest of the cannonball distribution, shows a high density area and a single shot towards the 
south (Figure 48). The howitzers of the 5th Artillery Regiment were positioned towards the 
right flank of the Batavian defensive line between the 9th Regiment of Jaegers and the 22nd 
Regiment of Infantry (VC80: 26), although General Janssens also mentions they could have 
been moved as required. Their initial position would place them in between the Javanese 
Artillery to their west and the mobile horse artillery to their east. It is therefore foreseen 
that they would fire at a target straight ahead of them. But, taking into consideration the 
development of the battle and the initial setup of the Batavian defensive line, it is argued 
that, with the early collapse of the 5th Regiment of Waldeck, and the subsequent apparent 
weakness created in the defensive line, the British Second Brigade might have steered away 
from the threat of the horse artillery and the light dragoons on the Batavian right flank. The 
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opening created in the defensive line, through the collapse of the 5th Regiment of Waldeck, 
might have been the target the British Second Brigade aimed for. It would, therefore, be 
possible that the 5th Artillery Regiment fired at a target slightly to the west of north. Once 
they withdrew, similarly as discussed above, they continued to fire at the enemy to ensure a 
safe retreat. 
 
Figure 49. Distribution of 6-pounder grapeshot (green) and 6-pounder solid shots (orange) 
The distribution of both the 6-pounder solid shot and the 6-pounder grapeshot are shown, 
as two 6-pounder solid shot and three 6-pounder grapeshot have been identified on the 
battlefield (Figure 49). It is believed that, because of their specific locations, they are of 
Batavian origin. Firstly, the grapeshot was identified in the same high density area as both 
the 3-pounder and 1-pounder cannon projectiles, suggesting they were fired at the same 
target. Secondly, the distribution southwards is like the distribution of the other Batavian 
cannon projectiles, suggesting that they were fired from a position further south than their 
original positions. They fired at the enemy during their retreat, to ensure a safe departure. 
Thirdly, the single 6-pounder solid shot far north was retrieved near the single 24-pounder 
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howitzer shell fragment in a location believed to have been that of the British 24-pounder 
howitzers. It is therefore suggested that the 6-pounder shot was aimed at the British artillery 
(Hutten 2015). According to Adye (1804: 158), the extreme range of a light 6-pounder 
cannon was between 800 to 1300 yards, which equates to roughly between 730 to 1200 
metres, which from the suggested 5th Artillery and the Javanese Artillery position was 
possible.  
Both the 5th Artillery and the Javanese Artillery had 6-pounder cannons, and it is therefore 
not possible to determine that the retrieved 6-pounder solid shot, aimed at the British 
artillery position, was fired from the Javanese Artillery or from the 5th Artillery. Although the 
Javanese Artillery, because their position on the battlefield was more towards the west than 
the 5th Artillery, could have aimed at the target almost straight ahead, the 5th Artillery also 
aimed at this target with the 24-pounder howitzers at their disposal. Any of these units could 
have been the origin of the single 6-pounder solid retrieved from this area.  
The association of the 6-pounder cannonballs with the Batavian cannons was solely made 
based on the location near the other cannon projectiles that cannot be confused with British 
cannon projectiles. This makes for an interesting aspect about the battle – the absence of 
any retrieved British light 6-pounder cannonballs. The absence of the artefacts can be 
because it was not identified and not necessarily because of their non-presence. Due to the 
lack of horses, men had to draw the light 6-pounder field cannons through the thick sand 
and impenetrable brushwood (Hook 1832: 113; Theal 1899: 272; Atkinson 1940: 76). It is 
possible that the troops advanced in front of the cannons. The artillery could not fire over 
the heads of their own troops and explains the absence of British 6-pounder shot. However, 
it must also be taken into consideration, that despite accurate and concise reporting thereof 
(VC80: 26), fired British howitzer shells have not been identified and retrieved on the 
battlefield. 
General Janssens stated that cannons were occasionally moved to where they were 
required, suggesting that one cannon might have been moved towards Kleinberg (VC80: 26). 
Graham also noted that the Batavian artillery positioned one cannon near Kleinberg 
(Atkinson 1940: 76). From the archaeological evidence retrieved from the Kleinberg area, it 
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was not possible to determine the exact location of the Batavian cannon near Kleinberg. 
Even though no cannon projectiles were retrieved from this area, the metal canister casing 
was identified. It is likely that the canister was fired from a Batavian howitzer positioned 
slightly to the east of Kleinberg.  
6.4. Button collection results and discussion 
6.4.1. Button classification 
From the 182 retrieved buttons, 11 distinctive classes were identified during the button 
classification based on distinct characteristics. Further or finer classification yielded 34 
groups with 62 different identified button sub-groups (Table 5).  
Table 5. Button collection from the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg 





Class 1 One-piece buttons, four eyes 8 28 15.4 
Class 2 Two-piece domed buttons 3 7 3.8 
Class 3 Three-piece domed buttons 2 7 3.8 
Class 4 Three-piece buttons 2 3 1.6 
Class 5 Two-piece flat buttons 1 1 0.5 
Class 6 One-piece domed buttons 9 14 7.7 
Class 7 One-piece semi-domed buttons 12 26 14.3 
Class 8 Flat disk buttons, large 8 19 10.4 
Class 9 Flat disk buttons, medium 9 57 31.3 
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Class 10 Flat disk buttons, small 5 17 9.3 
Class 11 A-typical buttons 3 3 1.6 
Total   182  
Various button classes that randomly numbered and sub-numbered and indicate the 
number of buttons analysed in each button class (Table 5 and Figure 50). 
 
Figure 50. Number of buttons per class 
The analysed buttons were classified according to specific characteristics and are illustrated 
in Table 6. 
Table 6. Button classes and descriptions 
Class Group Description 
Class 1 
One-piece buttons, four eyes 
Group 1 Buttons with a convex shape and decorations on the 
inner ring around the four eyes. 
Group 2 Buttons with a narrow outer edge and relatively 
large inner convex. 
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Class Group Description 
Button has a prominent ridge at the bottom of the 
outer edge. 
Group 3.2 Buttons with a low height of the inner convex. 
Button has no ridge at the back of the outer edge. 
Group 4.1 Buttons with a prominent height of the inner 
convex. 
Buttons have a decorated inner ring around the 
convex. 
Buttons have a prominent ridge on the outer edge. 
Group 4.2 Buttons with a prominent height of the inner 
convex. 
Buttons have a prominent ridge on the outer edge. 
Group 5.1 Buttons with a prominent height of the inner 
convex. 
Buttons have a decorated inner ring around the 
convex. 
Buttons have a prominent ridge at the back of the 
outer edge. 
Buttons have a smooth edge. 
Group 5.2 Buttons with a prominent height of the inner 
convex. 
Buttons have a smooth edge. 
Class 2  
Two-piece domed buttons 
Group 6.1 Small buttons. 
Button comprises alpha style shank. 
Button face is crimped in position.  
Buttons have no decoration. 
Group 6.2 Small buttons. 
Button comprises alpha style shank. 
Button face is crimped in position.  
Buttons are decorated. 
Group 7.1 Large buttons. 
Alpha shank 
Button face crimped on edge. 
Decorated on button face. 
Class 3  
Three-piece domed buttons 
Group 8 Large buttons. 
Shank through back plate. 
Button face crimped on edge. 
Decorated on button face. 
Group 9 Medium buttons. 
Shank through back plate. 
Button face crimped around edge. 
Face is different material or inlay. 
Class 4  
Three-piece buttons 
Group 10 Convex buttons. 
Shank is stamped. 
Outer band crimped on edge. 
Inlay inserted. 
Group 12 Unidentified three-piece buttons 
Class 5  Group 11 Small buttons. 
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Class Group Description 
Two-piece flat buttons Face crimped on edge. 
Decorated on face. 
Class 6  
One-piece domed buttons 
Group 13 Small button. 
Solid cast button. 
Decorated. 
Drilled shank. 




Group 15 Undecorated. 
Shank is single pin. 
Group 16 Undecorated button. 
Rolled edge. 
Omega shank. 
Group 17 Cast button. 
Undecorated. 
Shank cast and drilled. 
















Class 7  
One-piece semi-domed 
Group 19 Bevelled edge. 
Cast with a spun back. 
Drilled eye in cast shank. 
Group 20.1 Ridge on outer edge - top and back. 
Flat back. 
Decorated button. 
Group 20.2 Flat back. 
Decorated button. 
Group 21.1 Medium button. 
Ridge on back. 
Back stamp.  
Alpha shank. 
Group 21.2 Small button. 
Ridge on back. 
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Class Group Description 
Back stamp 
Alpha shank. 
Group 22.1 Decorated button. 
Omega shank. 
Large button. 
Group 22.2 Decorated button. 
Omega shank. 
Small button. 
Group 23.1 Small button. 
Alpha shank. 
Undecorated. 
Group 23.2 Medium button. 
Alpha shank. 
Undecorated. 
Group 23.3 Large button. 
Alpha shank. 
Undecorated. 
Group 23.4 Undecorated button. 
Drilled shank. 
Group 24 Unidentified. 
Class 8  
Flat disk buttons, large 
Group 25.1 Decorated button. 
Cast shank drilled. 
Group 25.2 Decorated button. 
Alpha shank. 
Group 25.3 Decorated button. 
Cone wire eye. 
Group 25.4 Decorated button. 
Unidentified shank. 
Group 26.1 Undecorated button. 
Backs tamp. 
Alpha shank. 
Group 26.2 Undecorated button. 
Alpha shank. 
Group 27.1 Undecorated button. 
Cone wire eye, 
 Group 27.2 Undecorated button. 
Unidentified shank. 
Class 9  
Flat disk buttons, medium 
Group 28.1 Decorated button. 
Cast drilled eye. 
Group 28.2 Decorated button. 
Alpha shank. 
Group 28.3 Decorated button. 
Unidentified shank. 
Group 29.1 Undecorated button. 
Cast drilled eye. 
Group 29.2 Undecorated button. 
Alpha shank. 
Group 29.3 Undecorated button. 
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Class Group Description 
Unidentified shank. 
Group 29.4 Undecorated button. 
Back stamp 
Group 29.5 Undecorated button. 
Cone wire eye. 
Group 29.6 Undecorated button 
Omega shank. 
Class 10  
Flat disk buttons, small 
Group 30.1 Decorated button. 
Omega shank. 
Group 30.2 Decorated button. 
Unidentified shank. 
Group 31.1 Undecorated button. 
Alpha shank. 
Group 31.2 Undecorated button. 
Back stamp. 
Group 31.3 Undecorated button. 
Unidentified shank. 
Class 11  
Atypical buttons  
Group 32 Two-piece button. 
Round. 
Four eyes. 
Group 33 Cuff-link 
Group 34 Unidentified button. 
6.4.2. Button distribution 
Information about the distribution of the buttons from the battlefield is provided and the 
artefacts indicate the extent of the battle action but unfortunately, only up to the modern-
day fence of the BBNR (Figure 51). I believe the battle extended beyond the modern-day 
boundary fence of the BBNR, but no surveys have yet been undertaken in the adjacent 
areas, as it is not covered under the HWC permit conditions. This could not be substantiated 
without the required archaeological evidence. The modern-day boundary fence was not 
erected according to a specific geographic feature or obstruction, such as a river, that could 
have had an influence on the extent of the battle. Further, the artefacts retrieved near the 
fence line suggest that the retrieval pattern would most probably continue beyond the fence 
line. 
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Figure 51. Distribution of buttons retrieved from the battlefield 
Several significant button clusters can be identified from the button distribution map (Figure 
51; Figure 52). The buttons from area 1 (Figure 52) most probably have little significance to 
the battle, as they were retrieved near the remnants of a historical homestead, that has 
since been destroyed. This area had little significance in the battle as the men of the First 
Brigade only marched through this area en route to the area of engagement. Further, these 
buttons retrieved from the homestead area are most probably civilian buttons and not 
military. 
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Figure 52. High concentration areas of retrieved buttons 
Buttons retrieved from area 2 (Figure 52) are highly significance to the battle as they are 
often associated with the field hospital. Justinus Keer, the farmer and occupant of the 
farmhouse and buildings, made his property available as a field hospital during the 
aftermath of the battle (Smith 1892: 123). Marius Breytenbach (2015) determined the 
location of the farmhouse and identified several high density areas of surface artefacts or 
midden areas that could be associated with the farm buildings. The distribution of metal 
artefacts and buttons within the same area provides similar evidence.  
As this area was used as a farmhouse, civilian buttons among the collection are highly likely. 
However, the sheer number of buttons retrieved near the farmhouse exceeds any 
expectation of what might be retrieved from an ordinary farmhouse site. The Reverend 
Martyn (Smith 1892: 123), on arriving at the scene of the battle and the field hospital, noted 
that about 200 wounded men lay strewn inside and outside the farmhouse. From the above 
discussion, it could be assumed that the buttons from this area are associated with the field 
hospital and the aftermath of the battle. 
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Area 3 (Figure 52) represents the area used as the outspan, with travellers unpacking and 
loading their wagons or horses near the water source. It could also resemble the place 
where both the Batavian forces and the British forces rested before and after the battle, 
respectively. High density areas 4 to 9 (Figure 52) represent areas significant during the 
battle. I argue that these areas represent intense fighting that resulted in the loss of the 
buttons. Similarly, to the distribution of musket balls, a staggered distribution of buttons is 
visible. This suggests that the Batavian defensive line did not retreat in a line, but that a 
staggered retreat occurred. Certain groups would keep the British at bay while other groups 
retreated some distance. They would then reverse the roles, allowing the ones in front to fall 
back.  
General Janssens set up his Batavian defence to combat the British forces approaching from 
the north in a line formation spreading from east to west (VC80: 26). The 5th Regiment of 
Waldeck formed the centre of the Batavian defensive line, but unfortunately, they left their 
positions relatively early in the battle and fled in great confusion (VC80: 32). Since the rest of 
the defensive line apparently held their positions bravely until the general retreat was 
sounded, one would expect to see a linear distribution in the artefact record and in the 
button distribution. Unfortunately, this linear distribution is not clear, but instead, several 
high concentrations of buttons appear (Figure 52). From the position of the Batavian 
defensive line towards the south, six prominent high concentration areas of buttons appear, 
suggesting that the battle did not occur along a singular line, but rather reveal several 
smaller encounters as the Batavian forces were retreating.  
Area 10 (Figure 52) was probably in front of the possible Batavian defensive line and 
therefore suggests that the buttons could be British buttons. Although the exact position of 
the Batavian artillery on the right flank of the Batavian line has not yet been identified, the 
area most likely for its position is towards the south-east of the high concentration area of 
buttons numbered area 10 (Figure 52). This area also revealed a high number of cannon 
projectiles in the form of canister shot, grapeshot and round shot. Using grape and canister 
shot suggests that the artillery position was relatively near. It is therefore likely that the high 
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concentration of buttons in this area is because of the loss of men on the British side due to 
the effective use of the Batavian artillery. 
Area 11 and area 12 (Figure 52) pose similar challenges interpreting the battle events. Both 
these two areas are relatively small and yielded a high density of buttons. Area 11 is situated 
150 metres from the farmhouse, used as a field hospital. Further, it is situated on the 
opposite side of the house from the water source for the farm. It is possible that area 11 
could be the position of the graves of the fallen soldiers.  
The aim of the research has never been to locate and identify the graves associated with the 
battle, but it is likely that the mole activity in the area has brought the buttons, buried at 
depth, to the surface. Since the metal detectors are also only effective up to a maximum 
depth of 400 mm, it was impossible to prove the existence and presence of a grave or graves 
at this location.   
Area 12 (Figure 52) is situated at the foothill of Kleinberg, where the British 24th Regiment 
encountered burgher militia. Several metal detector surveys surrounding the area have 
yielded no evidence of any further military action besides the high density of buttons in a 
relatively small area. Among the buttons, however, several canister shots were identified, 
once again suggesting the location of the Batavian artillery nearby.  
I think that area 12 could mark the graves associated with the skirmish on Kleinberg since 
the proximity of many buttons in a radius of about 20 metres suggests that several men in 
military uniform congregated at this spot. 
6.5. Buckle results and discussion 
Seventy-three buckles that could be analysed were retrieved during the archaeological 
surveys on the battlefield. Most of these buckles were manufactured from copper alloy, with 
the rest manufactured of iron or steel. Fifty-five buckles were copper alloy and 18 iron or 
steel buckles made up the assemblage (Figure 53). 
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Figure 53. Number of buckles per material used to manufacture 
According to the classification of the buckles, a total of seven buckles were classified as so-
called stock buckles or clasps, 29 buckles have double frames, 34 have single frames, with 
three fragmented buckles that could not be classified (Figure 54).  
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The classification of buckles according to their shape revealed that most buckles, 43, have a 
rectangular shape, with both the D-shape and circle and D-shape buckles seven in total. 
Square buckles numbered five, with the other shapes three or less (Figure 55).  
The double shaped buckles that have a combination between the D-shape and either circle, 
rectangle or square and the rectangle with wings, are typically horse harness buckles and 
provide specific insight into the routes across the study area. 
 
Figure 55. Buckle shape 
By investigating the use of the buckles, it could be determined that 22 buckles might have 
been used for clothing, while 33 buckles were probably used as part of a horse's harness. 
The function of 18 buckles could not be determined and they were classified as unidentified 
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Figure 56. Use of buckles 
The investigation into individual buttons revealed little additional information that could 
unravel the intricacies of the battle, but two specific sets of buckles were of interest. Firstly, 
two small double buckles with a movable tongue showed the inscriptions ‘Paris‘ and ‘Solide‘. 
The French association warranted further investigation as it could confirm the presence of 
French Marines at the battle. According to the recorded positions on the battlefield from the 
two retrieved French buckles, as indicated in Figure 57, they fall in line with the possible 
historical position of the French Marines as General Janssens placed them at the outset of 
the battle.  
Various catalogues and websites of collectors and forums have been searched to determine 
the era or time of use of these buckles and, as far as determined, they date from 1720–1790. 
Whitehead (1996: 112) describes these buckles as copper alloy with a drilled frame for 
separate spindles. This could place the buckles at the battlefield and position the French 















Figure 57. Location of possible French buckles 
Seven further buckles or stock buckles are of interest as they might have been worn during 
the battle. In his review of the military regulations of 1802, Carman (1940) observes, “black 
leather stocks were to be worn by the non-commissioned officers, drummers, fifers and 
privates of the guards and by every other description of regiments or corps of infantry.” The 
main purpose of the stock buckle was to keep the bearer's neck in a straight and upright 
position to improve the posture of the soldier; it then also acted as a guard to protect the 
neck from slashes by an opponent's blade (Carman 1940). It is possible that soldiers lost the 
stock buckles during the battle. The soldiers could either have been wounded, killed or could 
have removed the neck stock to gain relief from the discomfort during the heat. The leather 
perished over the years, with the stock buckles remaining on the battlefield. 
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Figure 58. Geographic position of neck stock buckles 
The position of the neck stock buckles is indicated on the battlefield (Figure 58 and Figure 
59). These buckle positions have significance to the battle. The two buckles retrieved the 
furthest north, were located near each other and could be linked. The one forms the hook to 
connect to the other and could have been connected to the same leather neck stock and 
worn by a single soldier. All, but one, of the positions indicated are positions where heavy 
fighting could have occurred during the battle. However, the buckle retrieved furthest south 
was located near the farmhouse and this buckle could be from a wounded or killed soldier.  
The neck stock buckle retrieved from the area near Kleinberg could be associated with the 
skirmish on Kleinberg as it was located near most of the buttons from this area. It is also 
possible that this buckle and the buttons indicate the position of graves near Kleinberg. 
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Figure 59. Neck stock buckle 
 
Figure 60. Buckle distribution 
The positions of the buckles across the battlefield are indicated with five areas of high 
concentration that have been identified that merit further discussion (Figure 60 and Figure 
61). 
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Figure 61. Five high concentration areas of buckles 
The five high concentration areas of buckles with the area furthest south, can be associated 
with the farmhouse of Justinus Keer. Both iron or steel and copper alloy buckles have been 
retrieved from this area and resemble a combination of buckles used for clothing fasteners 
and those buckles used for horse harnesses. The buckles retrieved from this area might 
represent buckles to fasten general farm implements but could also be buckles from the 
clothing of the soldiers who received medical attention after the battle. 
The second area (Figure 61) resembles the outspan area just adjacent to the farmhouse. This 
area is significant as many travellers rested here to water their animals at the nearby fresh 
water spring. The yoking and unyoking of the animals could have resulted in the loss of 
buckles from the harnesses. The Batavian forces spent the night before the battle at 
Blaauwbergsvlei, while the British forces rested at Blaauwbergsvlei after the battle, which 
could also have resulted in the loss of buckles.  
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The third and fourth high concentration areas of buckles (Figure 61) are two near the main 
north-south route leading from Blaauwbergsvlei to Jan Mostert's farm. From an 
archaeological point of view, these two areas could be associated with the routes and 
travelling along the routes over time but could also be associated with the 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg as intense fighting occurred within these two areas.  
The last area (Figure 61) is of interest as it occurs in the position of the British heavy artillery 
(Hutten 2015). The high concentration of 22 buckles retrieved within an area measuring 12 
m x 20 m are indicated in Figure 62.  
 
Figure 62. High concentration of buckles near the British heavy artillery positions 
The Batavian forces under command of General Janssens fired at the start of the battle, and 
hollow howitzer common shell was fired at the enemy with the purpose of striking the 
artillery (Caruana 1997: 7; Muller 1779: 65). A single fragment of a howitzer shell was 
identified about 50 m from the high concentration of buckles (Figure 63).  
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The howitzer shell fragment was fired by the Batavian artillery as measurements confirm the 
cannon shell fragment size to that generally manufactured in Austria (Dawson et al. 2007: 
102). It was therefore not fired by the British since shells associated with them had a slightly 
smaller diameter. 
 
Figure 63. High concentration of buckles in relation to the howitzer shell fragment 
It is, however, impossible to prove the connection between the cannon shell fragment and 
the high concentration of buckles at this location. There is a possibility that the buckles 
originate from the harness of a horse killed by the impact of this or other shell fragments.  
6.6. Coin results and discussion 
Fifty-two coins were retrieved from the battlefield and used for the analysis. Unfortunately, 
five could not be identified as they were heavily soiled or corroded, so much that the 
markings were incomprehensible and identification not possible. One coin, even though 
heavily soiled, could be partially identified as only the date was visible. 
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Through the identification of the dates on the coins, an initial division was conducted per 
era. It was decided to group the coins per 50 years to provide an indication of the time 
distribution of the coins. The two oldest coins dated back to the 1650 to 1699 period, for the 
period 1700 to 1749, one coin was identified, for 1750 to 1799, five coins, for the period 
1800 to 1849, 11 coins, for the period 1850 to 1899, four coins, while the periods 1900 to 
1949 and 1950 onwards counted 14 and ten coins respectively (Figure 64). 
 
Figure 64. Number of coins per 50 years 
The analysis of coins further involved the identification of the country of origin. Forty-six 
coins were studied that revealed the country of origin. South Africa was the country that 
featured the most with 21 coins; British coins numbered 20, four coins were from the 
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Figure 65. Number of coins per country 
Krynauw (1999: 91) states that General Janssens occupied the main route from Cape Town 
northwards to halt the British progress to Cape Town. The routes used mostly traversed the 
landscape leading from one farm to the next. Travellers en route also used these from Cape 
Town to Saldanha Bay and other destinations north of Cape Town. The maps produced after 
the battle to capture the battle events, also indicate several routes crossing the battlefield 
(M1/2064-2071; M3/21). Breytenbach (2016: 25), in his research on the farmhouse of 
Justinus Keer and the adjacent outspan area, also mentions the well-travelled routes within 
the area. The outspan area was officially designated on 22 April 1794 (SG Dgm 30/1794). 
According to the conditions of the outspan, the owner was “obliged and bounded to allow 
all those inclined to unyoke, to remain free and uncontested and not to disturb the pastures 
of their cattle” and also “to properly clean and keep clean a certain dam, on nearly 60 
morgen of his land, in order to be likewise used undisturbed by the passing country 
inhabitants” (CO 8433/5). From the evidence above, not only the combatants, but also many 
travellers over time traversed the study area. The coins from the battlefield cover both a 
large area and an extended period.  
To investigate the geographical distribution of the coins a coin distribution map was 
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Figure 66. Coin distribution map 
The coin distribution map shows a high concentration of coins towards the southern parts of 
the battlefield and further north the concentration becomes less. By analysing the 
distribution map several significant areas were identified (Figure 67). Further, three circles 
representing high concentrations of coins, and three lines representing the linear 
distribution of coins are indicated (Figure 67). 
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Figure 67. Significant areas of coin distribution 
The most southerly high concentration area of coins represents coins retrieved from the 
farmhouse area (Figure 67). This area was used as the farmhouse of Justinus Keer from the 
late 1700s and, while the original house could only partially be determined (Breytenbach 
2016), the location was subsequently used to build a 20th-century house which was 
demolished during the early 1980s. The farmyard was normally a hive of activity since farm 
workers and visitors congregate near the buildings. It is understandable that coins were 
often lost by their owners within this area. As the residence of Justinus Keer was used as 
field hospital after the battle (Krynauw 1999; Erasmus 1972), the possibility of coins lost by 
wounded soldiers or medical personnel is also likely. 
The high concentration area slightly north-east of the farmhouse represents the outspan 
area (Figure 25). The coins from this area relate to those that have been lost by travellers 
during the yoking and unyoking process of their animals and wagons as they stopped at the 
outspan area to water their animals. 
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The third circle in Figure 67 represents the coins at the fresh water spring named Borrel dam 
(Figure 24). Water was not readily available within this area (Atkinson 1940: 76; Hook 1832: 
113; Theal 1899: 272) and a fresh water spring was, therefore, a welcome haven in this 
harsh environment. Similarly to the outspan area, travellers within this area likely made use 
of the opportunity to water their animals and this could have resulted in the loss of coins.  
The three blue lines (Figure 67) reflecting a linear distribution of coins represents roads or 
routes traversed by travellers across the study area. By creating an overlay of the significant 
coin areas on maps representing the historical routes (Figure 68 and Figure 69), it could be 
determined that the linear distribution of the coins coincides with the position of the 
historical routes. Figure 68 is an extract of the 1806 map produced by Captain Read and 
indicates the positions of the Batavian and British forces before the battle. Significant to the 
analysis of the spatial distribution of the retrieved coins is the position of the historical 
routes.  
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Figure 68. 1806 map – Captain Read (M1/2064-2071) 
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Figure 69. A second map of the battle site, drawn by Read & Long, dating to 24 September 1806. The map 
further indicates the position of the historical routes (M3/21). 
Two relative parallel roads leading north are shown with a route leading north-west (Figure 
68). An extract of the 1806 map produced by Captains Long and Read (Figure 69) indicates 
the positions of both the Batavian and British forces, but after the British forces had 
approached the Batavian defensive line. The historical routes are also visible and show the 
two parallel roads leading north and the route leading to the north-west. The blue lines 
drawn show the linear distribution of the coins (Figure 67) that coincide with the routes on 
the historical maps. The archaeological evidence could reconstruct the positions of the 
possible historical routes as indicated on the two 1806 maps (Figure 68 and Figure 69). 
Only eight coins could have been present at the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg as their dates are 
before 1806. Three coins date from 1797 and are of British origin, four coins are Dutch, and 
one French coin dates to before 1806. The three British coins are the so-called ‘cartwheel 
pennies’ and were minted as the first copper pennies that became the pay for the army 
(Snodgrass 2003: 51). Even though the coins were minted for several years, the date, 1797, 
N 
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stayed the same. It is possible that the three copper pennies were present at the battle and 
that they represent the position of three different British soldiers at the battle (Figure 70).  
 
Figure 70. Map indicating the position of the three so-called ‘cartwheel pennies’ 
The first copper penny was retrieved from the area next to Borrel dam. It is possible that the 
British soldier stopped and rested at the spring and in the process lost the coin (Figure 70). 
As this position is slightly away from the main battlefield, two other possibilities could 
explain the soldier and coin at the spring. Firstly, the British Second Brigade advanced 
towards the Batavian line to confront them in battle, as they were positioned directly 
opposite the Batavian defensive line (Cannon 1848; 1852). The British First Brigade came in 
at an angle and fell in behind the Second Brigade. As the route the British First Brigade 
followed passed Borrel dam, it is possible that the soldier/s stopped for a water break. A 
second perhaps more realistic suggestion for the coin near Borrel dam is that the 24th 
Regiment passed this area after the battle. The 24th Regiment was sent to Kleinberg to 
dislodge the burgher cavalry at the start of the battle, in which they succeeded (Cannon 
1848; 1852). It is likely that that they rested at Borrel dam to take in some much-needed 
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water on their way to Blaauwbergsvlei. This is also the route the Reverend Martyn took to 
reach the battlefield (Smith 1892: 123). 
The second copper penny (Figure 70) was retrieved in the main battlefield and could possibly 
have been lost by a British soldier during the battle. The third copper penny (Figure 70) was 
retrieved in the outspan area, probably because it was lost by a British soldier during a rest 
break at the outspan area. 
 
Figure 71. Distribution of Dutch and French coins 
The first coin of interest is the French coin with a value of two Sols (Figure 71). Even though 
the date was not clear, the marking on both sides of the coin suggests that it dates from 
1738 to 1760. The date itself suggests that it was possible for the coin to be present during 
the battle and probably belonged to a French marine. A further aspect about this coin is that 
it has a small hole close to the edge, suggesting that it was worn as a pendant.  
To establish the east–west positioning of the Batavian forces, retrieved artefacts with a 
specific French, German or Dutch origin or character are significant. The order of the 
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Batavian regiments could easily be derived from the various maps produced after the battle 
and primary documents (M3/21; M1/2064–2071; VC80: 26), but the question remains 
exactly where, geographically, were these regiments positioned? The French coin suggests 
the position of the French Marines in the east–west positioning of the Batavian troops. 
Unfortunately, the French coin was not retrieved from a position that might suggest the 
original location of the French Marines but was instead retrieved near the field hospital. This 
suggests that the bearer of this coin pendant might have been wounded or killed during 
action on the battlefield.  
The four Dutch coins retrieved from the battlefield pose a different problem in the analysis 
process. Two of the coins, dating to 1679, and 1602 to 1690, respectively, were most 
probably too old to have been present on the battlefield. The first Stuiver Kampen coin, 
dating to 1679, could pinpoint a route travelled by one of the earliest European travellers 
within this area. The second coin, a six Stuiver Dutch coin, is heavily worn, but from the 
markings, it could be established that it dates from 1602 to 1690. Similarly to the Kampen 
coin, this coin shows some of the earliest routes travelled within this area. 
The other two Dutch coins, dating to 1766 to 1792, and 1788, respectively, could have been 
present at the battle and probably belonged to Dutch soldiers. The 1766 to 1792 Zeeland 
coin was identified by making use of the markings as the date has been worn away, while 
the other coin is a VOC 1788 coin. The locations of these two coins could suggest either the 
positions of the Dutch troops during the battle or the routes travelled within this area.  
6.7. Conclusion 
The individual analyses of the various artefact classes provided information about the 1806 
Battle of Blaauwberg. While the analysis itself proved significant, the spatial distribution of 
the artefacts shed valuable light on the course of the battle. Individual spatial distribution 
maps reveal aspects of the battle that cannot be obtained from historical documentation, 
but the artefact classes cannot be studied independently as they all form part of the whole 
sequence of battle. 
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By overlaying the spatial distribution of various artefact classes, high density areas are 
observed, like individual artefact classes. These high density areas, or superimposed areas, 
however, either reveal diverse aspects of the battle, or confirm conclusions made during the 
analysis. Firstly, the impacted musket balls in relation to the retrieved buttons is important 
(Figure 72) as the correspondence between the high density areas in both artefact classes 
suggests possible areas of intense fighting. In addition, the location of the high density areas, 
as discussed previously, resembles the general retreat of the Batavian defensive line. This 
retreat did not occur along a single line, but was staggered, with different regiments or 
groups keeping the enemy at bay, allowing the others to retreat, and then reversing the 
roles. Since the high density areas of buttons reveal areas of intense fighting, the spatial 
distribution of both buttons and impacted musket balls (Figure 72), similarly Figure 73, also 
shows the distribution of buckles. The spatial distribution of high density areas reveals a 
similar pattern, confirming the areas of intense fighting during the Batavian general retreat. 
 
Figure 72. Distribution of impacted musket balls and the retrieved buttons 
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg – an archaeological perspective 
184 
 
Figure 73. Distribution of impacted musket balls, buttons and buckles 
The main north-south route was used by the British Second Brigade to advance across the 
battlefield, but was most probably also used by the Batavian forces to retreat from the 
battle. The route has therefore played a significant role during the development and course 
of the battle. The archaeological evidence confirms the significance of this route, as a high 
density of finds has been located near this route.  
The delineation of the battlefield and the exact positioning of all the regiments remains a 
contentious topic as it would provide a clear depiction of precisely how the battle 
transpired. Unfortunately, the archaeological evidence is not complete, and any delineation 
or attempt to position the various regiments would be based on assumptions. The 
incomplete archaeological evidence is because of permit conditions that did not allow for 
surveys beyond the boundaries of the BBNR, and an extremely dense overgrown area within 
the battlefield that proved to be a significant challenge. However, the archaeological 
evidence has confirmed that the battlefield extended beyond the eastern boundaries of the 
BBNR, into privately owned land. The Batavian mounted artillery of Pelegrini and the cavalry 
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg – an archaeological perspective 
185 
were positioned out of the confines of the study area, and their positions were not 
investigated. Since a high density area of cannon projectiles has been identified, Pelegrini's 
possible position could be assumed but not confirmed. Unfortunately, the high density area 
of retrieved cannon projectiles has been identified within an area extremely overgrown with 
alien vegetation. This area could not be completely covered during the field surveys to 
obtain comprehensive archaeological evidence.  
The historical landscape had a significant impact on, not only the location of the battle, but 
also on the course of the battle. The landscape did not determine the outcome of the battle, 
even though it influenced decisions taken during the battle. Firstly, the location of the battle 
inland or east of Blaauwberg Hill, beyond the dune field, is because of the main north-south 
route circumventing the sandy coastline and dune fields. General Baird was aware of the 
environment and planned his march to Cape Town along this route. General Janssens, 
consequently, also viewed this route as the main access route that required defence and his 
intervention. As discussed above, the landscape further affected the course of the battle as, 
from the archaeological evidence, it is unlikely that the British made use of their light 6-
pounder field cannons, since these were dragged by marines through the thick sand. The 
infantry advanced more rapidly, with the light 6-pounder field cannons trailing and unable to 
fire. Further, the excessive heat, absence of water, thick sand and difficult vegetation to 
traverse, possibly resulted in the British not pursuing the retreating Batavian forces beyond 
Blaauwbergsvlei farmhouse. The environmental aspects, together with the Batavian 
mounted artillery and cavalry, positioned towards the east, probably resulted in the British 
Second Brigade targeting the gap within the Batavian defence line created by the collapse of 
the 5th Regiment of Waldeck. The Second Brigade appears to have attempted to make use of 
the easier route since the archaeological evidence points towards a more funnelled 
approach than a line approach. 
The archaeological evidence further provides confirmation of the presence and location of 
both the spring at Borrel dam, and the outspan at Blaauwbergsvlei. The archaeological 
evidence retrieved from Borrel dam also points to the route followed by the 24th Regiment 
after the skirmish at Kleinberg. The high density of artefacts retrieved from the area near 
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Kleinberg confirms the skirmish within this area, and suggests the possible location of graves 
within this area. 
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CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Historians have studied and produced several accounts of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg but 
there has long been uncertainty about the exact location of the battlefield and associated 
strategic positions. After the initial survey attempts, archaeological research was required to 
resolve aspects about the battle that the historical documents could not clarify.  
The aim of this research was to investigate the impact and the strategic use of the landscape 
during the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg and provide an archaeological perspective on the 
event. The historical records were of great help in reconstructing the events, but the 
archaeological evidence provided the details to complete our understanding of the battle. 
The reconstruction of the historical landscape was required to place the events within the 
larger landscape. This was only possible by studying the current geographical features and 
using their positions to interpret the archaeological evidence and the historical 
documentation. 
Five main geographic areas within the battlefield landscape were investigated, and yielded 
enough archaeological material to analyse and make conclusions. The archaeological 
assemblage included some material that was not battle-related, and this was ignored during 
the analysis. Five battle-related artefact classes were analysed and included musket balls, 
cannon projectiles, buttons, buckles, and coins. The results of the artefact analysis in 
association with the reconstruction of the historical landscape offered further clarity on the 
battle events.  
The archaeological research succeeded in addressing the following aspects of the battle: 
• To match historical features with current geographic features in reconstructing the 
historical landscape; 
• To provide clarity on the location of the historical routes; 
• To establish the geographic extent or spatial distribution of the battle; 
• To delineate the battlefield; 
• To provide insight into the progress and development of the battle; and 
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• To evaluate the influence of the landscape on the decisions and movement during 
the battle. 
The reconstruction of the historical landscape was an important aspect of the research to 
understand the development of the battle and associated decisions taken. It was necessary 
to study the historical maps27 and compare these to the current landscape. The current 
landscape has features that were also present in 1806. Figure 74 shows the location of the 
study area and indicates the most important features used in the landscape analysis.  
 
Figure 74. Location of the study area on an extract from 1:50 000 topographical maps (3318CB, CD, DC and 
DA c2000) showing the assumed location of the Battle of Blaauwberg (Chief Directorate: Surveys and 
Mapping 2010). Also indicated on the map are the most important features used in the landscape analysis. 
The locations of Jan Mostert’s farm and Blaauwbergsvlei are shown with Blaauwberg farm 
(Jan Mostert’s farm) situated to the west of north from Blaauwbergsvlei (Figure 74). On the 
historical maps, Jan Mostert’s farm is situated towards the east of north from 
Blaauwbergsvlei. This places doubt on the accuracy of the historical maps. A possible reason 
                                                     
27 NL-HaNA, Janssens / Kaarten, 4.JSF, inv.nr. 13; Smart 1809; M1/2064 - 2071; M3/21; Castle Military Museum 
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for this could be that the historical maps were oriented towards magnetic north and not true 
north. The slight variation that occurs could be the difference in angle between true north 
and magnetic north. 
The dune fields situated to the east and the west of Blaauwberg Hill are important features 
that influenced the battle. Their location determined the position of the main routes within 
this area. Even though there were routes through the dune fields, the main north–south 
route was situated towards the east of the dune field. This route also determined the 
defensive strategy of General Janssens, and the approach by the British. This route was 
therefore an important factor in determining the position of the battlefield. 
The various routes cross the landscape in several directions but also form a distinctive 
pattern. These routes have disappeared over time and are mostly covered by alien 
vegetation. The archaeological surveys brought forth evidence for some of these routes. It 
was not possible to determine the exact location of each individual route, but the pattern of 
the routes was identified. High concentration areas of archaeological material provided 
evidence of the routes. The locations of artefacts associated with transport, such as wheel 
parts and horseshoes, were significant in determining the locations of the routes.  
Two main routes were identified leading from Blaauwbergsvlei to Jan Mostert’s farm. The 
high concentration of artefacts along these areas showed the position of the routes. One 
east–west route and another route through the dune field were identified. These routes are 
significant in understanding the development of the battle as they were used as approach 
and retreat paths.  
The two north–south routes show the approach by the British Second Brigade as they 
advanced across the battlefield. It is also argued that the British approach was not extended 
across a broad front, but rather funnelled near the roads. This is in contrast with the general 
understanding of the typical European battle style during the Napoleonic era (Figure 75).  
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Figure 75. Undated painting showing the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg (Artist unknown, 44995 Library of 
Parliament, Cape Town) 
The battle, from an artist’s point of view, illustrates the battle in typical European style 
(Figure 75). Both armies were spread out, while the British were advancing. The 
archaeological evidence, however, suggests that the British did not advance in line 
formation. Their advance was along the easier routes and not spread out as shown by the 
artist.  
Pelegrini's Horse Artillery was situated on the Batavian right flank (Figure 75) and continued 
their cannon fire even as the British passed their position. For Pelegrini to depart from the 
battlefield, he must have used a route towards the east. This east–west route was identified 
by the high concentration of artefacts and the coin distribution. This route made it possible 
for Pelegrini to have a great influence on the battle, while knowing that he was able to 
retreat unscathed.  
1806 Battle of Blaauwberg – an archaeological perspective 
191 
Unfortunately, the research could not confirm Pelegrini's artillery position because it was 
situated outside the BBNR. By calculating the firing distances of the cannon projectiles and 
identifying the east–west route, however, the location of the mobile horse artillery can be 
assumed. From this position, it was possible for Pelegrini to fire canister shot and grapeshot 
at the approaching British Second Brigade. Pelegrini was also able to retreat without 
hindrance, even after the British passed his position.  
The historical maps28 of the battle show the location of the battle but these maps are not 
accurate. The archaeological evidence reveals the extent of the battlefield and provides 
insight into the different areas of the battlefield. Figure 76 shows the extent of the 
battlefield as seen from the distribution of the artefacts. The eastern perimeter of the 
battlefield is not clear, as the BBNR fence line formed the boundary of the survey area. The 
high concentration of artefacts near the fence line suggested a similar pattern towards the 
east of the fence line. Towards the west, the concentration of artefacts ends near the dune 
field. Few artefacts were retrieved in the dune field suggesting that little fighting occurred 
within this area. Few artefacts were retrieved south of Blaauwbergsvlei, suggesting that no 
fighting occurred beyond the farmhouse. It further suggests that the British did not pursue 
the retreating Batavian forces.  
                                                     
28 NL-HaNA, Janssens / Kaarten, 4.JSF, inv.nr. 13; Smart 1809; M1/2064 - 2071; M3/21; Castle Military Museum 
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Figure 76. Artefact distribution on the battlefield 
The northern extent of the battlefield was more difficult to determine, as the dense alien 
vegetation affected the surveys. The British artillery area revealed few battle-related 
artefacts, but the two cannon projectiles suggest the British artillery positions. These two 
cannon projectiles also show the northern extent of the battlefield. The battlefield has an 
elongated shape and appears to be near the main north–south routes. The shape of the 
battlefield suggests that the British did not attack in a line formation. The battlefield was 
contained near the roads because the adjacent areas were too difficult to pass through. 
Further, the continuous cannon fire from the east, where the horse artillery and cavalry 
were situated, pushed the British towards the west, while the dune field to the west also 
limited the battlefield extent. Janssens' decision to position the horse artillery on the right 
strengthened the right flank, while the dune field on the west formed a natural barrier. The 
battlefield was therefore contained between a natural feature, and the strategic positioning 
of the horse artillery and cavalry. 
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The delineation of the battlefield was challenging as archaeological evidence in two areas 
was lacking. Firstly, no evidence to the east of the BBNR fence line was collected; and 
secondly, little evidence was retrieved from the overgrown areas. Further, insufficient 
information about the smoothbore flintlock muskets was obtained to clarify the distribution 
of all the musket balls. However, the archaeological data provided enough evidence to 
delineate the battlefield with relative accuracy (Figure 77). 
 
Figure 77. Delineation of the battlefield 
Area 1 (Figure 77), as the main dune field, played a role in the location and extent of the 
battlefield. Area 2 represents the high concentration of cannon projectiles and area 3 shows 
the skirmish near Kleinberg. Area 4 represents the main area of engagement between the 
two armies. The red arrows indicate the approach by the British army, with the First Brigade 
towards the west, and the Second Brigade towards the east. The 24th Regiment approached 
Kleinberg on the foot of Blaauwberg Hill and on the edge of the dune field. The Second 
Brigade's approach is indicated as funnelling between the two red lines. The British artillery 
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and howitzer positions are indicated with a red cross, while the Batavian artillery was 
situated in front of the Batavian defensive line.  
The delineation of the battlefield indicates that the battlefield is not situated where the 
topographical map29 symbol shows the battle took place. The actual battle took place almost 
800 m towards the north-east. 
Janssens' decision to position his men across the main north–south route was well 
considered and sound. He made use of the natural barrier to the west and eliminated the 
British cannons on the ships. If Janssens had attacked the British near the shore, the British 
cannons would have had an impact on the battle. Even though Janssens could not position 
his defensive line further north because of the early approach by the British, his positioning 
was sound. He used the layout of the area to his advantage and positioned the core of his 
army near the main routes, while fewer men were spread out in the dune field. Janssens also 
covered his left flank by positioning men on or near Kleinberg to prevent the British from 
striking from the west. As soon as Janssens realised that the grenadiers of the 24th Regiment 
had been sent to attack his troops on Kleinberg, he moved his artillery to assist. No cannon 
projectiles were retrieved but the archaeological evidence suggests a howitzer positioned 
near Kleinberg. Metal fragments that could be remnants of canister shot were retrieved near 
Kleinberg. 
General Janssens was realistic about his chances of defending Cape Town knowing full well 
he was outnumbered and did not have enough resources. However, contrary to the general 
perception that his defence was weak, the archaeological evidence suggests that the 
Batavian forces defended Cape Town tenaciously. Besides the Waldeck Regiment collapsing 
early in the battle, evidence shows intensive fighting across the length of the Batavian line. 
Groups of men fought valiantly, allowing others to withdraw, and creating a staggered 
retreat.  
The influence of the landscape on the battle events and decisions taken can be summarised 
as follows: 
                                                     
29 3318CB, CD, DC and DA 1:50000 topographical maps of 2010 (Chief Directorate: Surveys and mapping 2010) 
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• Janssens used the dune field as a natural barrier to protect his left flank. 
• Janssens' men occupied the heights on Kleinberg to ensure the British did not attack 
his left flank. 
• Janssens positioned his defensive line to cover the main route and occupied the 
route leading to the east. 
• Janssens positioned his cavalry and mobile horse artillery on his right flank to funnel 
the enemy between the dune field and the cavalry, towards his main army and 
artillery. 
• Pelegrini was able to continue firing at the enemy because he could safely escape 
even after the British had passed his position. 
• The approaching British were funnelled towards certain routes because the thick 
sand and brushwood made marching difficult. 
• The British 6-pounders trailed the advancing infantry and were unable to fire. 
• The thick sand and heat made marching difficult and prevented the British from 
pursuing the retreating Batavian troops.  
• The British howitzers were positioned on the high-lying area or small hill towards the 
north of the battlefield. 
The analysis of the artefacts proved significant in understanding the various aspects of the 
battle. Although only five artefact classes were analysed, they provided enough information 
to make relevant and viable conclusions. 
The musket ball analysis gave insight into the extent of the battlefield and the development 
of the battle. Further, it showed the positions of different soldiers on the battlefield. 
Unfortunately, this aspect could not be further investigated as insufficient information about 
the Dutch smoothbore flintlock muskets was available. The area in which the musket balls 
were retrieved can be directly linked to the positions and movement of soldiers across the 
battlefield. From the musket ball analysis, the combat areas were determined: high 
concentration areas show where intense fighting occurred. It is significant to note the 
uneven distribution of these areas which suggests pockets of intense fighting rather than 
fighting across the length of the Batavian line. This staggered fighting occurred within the 
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main area of engagement and not in the dune field. Further, the analysis of the musket balls 
shows that the fighting was funnelled towards Blaauwbergsvlei and was mainly near the 
main routes. 
The cannon projectile analysis was used to delineate specific aspects of the battle. From the 
primary documents, it was determined that the Batavian artillery positions were in front of 
the defensive line. The archaeological evidence could not establish the exact locations of 
these positions but from the analysis, these positions could be assumed. The area of high 
concentration of cannon projectiles shows the centre of the British approach towards 
Blaauwbergsvlei, near the main route. Further, this area could also indicate the position of 
the British graves. No graves have yet been identified but it is likely that soldiers were buried 
close to where they were killed.  
The British howitzers aimed at the centre of the Batavian line and the first shells landed on 
the right flank of the 5th Regiment of Waldeck (Hook 1832; Theal 1899; VC80). It was argued 
that evidence of British howitzer shell fragments would clarify the location of the Batavian 
line. Unfortunately, only two shell fragments were retrieved within the likely area and 
determining their origin was inconclusive. Small variations occur between the common 
shells the Batavians used, and those from the British howitzers. The measurements of the 
small shell fragments were not sufficiently accurate to confirm their origin. The small size of 
the fragment and the level of corrosion influenced the measurements and made the results 
inconclusive.  
The absence of evidence of British 6-pounder cannon balls was responsible for concluding 
that the British could not fire their 6-pounder cannons. As these cannons were associated 
with the advance of troops, they would constantly fire during the approach. Since no horses 
were available to pull the cannons, men had to drag the heavy cannons. These cannons fell 
behind the advancing soldiers and were unable to fire. This afforded the Batavian defence 
another opportunity to resist the British attack.  
The button and buckle analyses provided further information about the extent of the battle. 
However, the most important aspect of the button and buckle analyses was the location of 
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high concentration areas. These areas show a similar pattern to the musket ball distribution, 
and support the conclusion that the fighting occurred in pockets. These areas show that 
intense fighting occurred between smaller groups of soldiers and not along an extended 
Batavian line.  
The high concentration areas of buttons also reveal the possible graves. It is argued that the 
soldiers were buried near where they lost their lives. Many years of mole and rodent activity 
may have resulted in bringing the remnants to the surface. Two areas are of significance and 
require further investigation. Firstly, the area near Kleinberg had a high concentration of 
buttons in a small area. It is likely that the graves of the grenadiers of the 24th Regiment are 
situated in this location. Secondly, the area near Blaauwbergsvlei might be the graves of the 
soldiers who lost their lives because of the battle. These soldiers were buried by Justinus 
Keer not too far from his house. 
The analysis of coins shows the location of the outspan near Blaauwbergsvlei and the main 
routes through the area. The copper penny retrieved from the Borrel dam area indicates the 
route the 24th Regiment took to rejoin the main force. 
The influence of the landscape on specific battle events could only be concluded once the 
locational issues had been resolved. Once an understanding of the locality and extent of the 
events was obtained, the sequence of events was investigated. Only then was the influence 
of the landscape or geographical features on the events examined. The landscape clearly 
affected the events, and both General Janssens and General Baird, either intentionally or 
inadvertently, based certain decisions on the features of the landscape.  
Firstly, General Janssens and his troops spent the night before the battle, 7 January 1806, at 
Blaauwbergsvlei, wanting to push forward the next morning to be in a strategic position to 
oppose the British (VC80). Janssens, however, received notice early in the morning, that the 
British were already approaching, and he was unable to reach the position he had planned. 
Exactly what this position was is unclear as it is not stated in the historical documents 
consulted. Janssens pushed forward from Blaauwbergsvlei about 700 to 800 metres, where 
he positioned the Batavian defensive line. The defensive line was set up perpendicular to the 
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main north–south route, spreading east from the dune field located to the west. The best-
trained soldiers, the 5th Regiment of Waldeck, were placed in the centre of his defensive line.  
Janssens' positioning was sound as he blocked the main route and made use of the dune 
field to the west to prevent the British from attacking his left flank. The positioning of 
burgher sharpshooters on Kleinberg also highlights that Janssens covered his left flank from 
an attack by the British. Janssens further mentions that he moved artillery pieces as required 
(VC80); this was probably done once the 24th Regiment attacked the Batavian position on 
Kleinberg. 
Secondly, during the battle, it was customary for the light 6-pounder field cannons to 
advance with the infantry. Since no evidence of the British 6-pounder cannons has been 
retrieved, it can be assumed that the British did not fire extensively with the advancing 6-
pounder cannons. This might be because no horses were available to pull the carriages and 
men were used to drag the 6-pounder cannons through the thick sand, resulting in the 
cannons trailing the infantry and therefore being unable to fire. If this is the case (as 
discussed in Section 6.3), it further emphasises the influence of the landscape on the 
development and course of the battle. 
Thirdly, General Janssens commented that the artillery positioned on the Batavian right 
flank, under command of Lieutenant Pelegrini, still fired well after the general retreat was 
ordered (VC80: 35). Pelegrini's artillery was firing at the British Second Brigade from the east 
even though they had passed his position. Pelegrini must have known it was possible for him 
to retreat from the battlefield without encountering the British that had passed his position. 
All the historical maps30 showing the landscape and the battle indicate either one or two 
routes leading towards the east that Pelegrini could have used to retreat unscathed. 
Fourthly, few battle-related artefacts were retrieved within the dune field. A high density of 
artefacts was encountered up to the eastern perimeter of the dune field, suggesting that 
very little fighting occurred among the dunes. The main body of the advancing British 
Second Brigade therefore avoided the dune field, and rather stuck to the open areas of the 
                                                     
30 NL-HaNA, Janssens / Kaarten, 4.JSF, inv.nr. 13; Smart 1809; M1/2064 - 2071; M3/21; Castle Military Museum 
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main route. Towards the east, the battlefield probably extends beyond the boundary of the 
BBNR as high densities of artefacts were located up to the fence line. Since our permit 
conditions did not allow for surveys beyond the confines of the BBNR, the research could not 
determine the extent of the battlefield towards the east.  
Towards the south, it could be determined that the high density of battle-related artefacts 
did not extend beyond Blaauwbergsvlei, suggesting that the British did not pursue the 
retreating Batavian forces much further than Blaauwbergsvlei. This could be attributed to 
the landscape conditions that made it difficult for the infantry to march through the thick 
sand. The extreme heat, lack of water and poor fitness levels of the British troops added to 
their exhaustion, and probably prevented any pursuit of the retreating Batavian forces (Hook 
1832: 113; Theal 1899: 272). 
It is therefore clear that the landscape had a tremendous influence on the development and 
course of the battle even though it probably did not affect its eventual outcome. 
During the assessment of the secondary and primary sources as well as the maps, it became 
evident that specific aspects about the battle were dissimilarly represented. Although not 
possible with every aspect of contradiction, it was argued that dissimilar information could 
be a result of mistakes, or a lack of information that resulted in a different conclusion. By 
making use of primary sources to obtain insight into this event, one becomes aware of the 
differences, dissimilarities and possible mistakes. To determine the reason behind these 
differences is no easy task. We have no way of knowing why these inaccuracies, mistakes or 
differences were made and can only assume specific reasons. Further, to evaluate the 
accuracy of all the primary sources is also difficult, as not all address the same aspects. These 
sources, however, provide a broad picture of the events from different perspectives. The 
evaluation of the correctness of the sources could lead to the assumption that a certain bias 
occurred. We also have no real way of determining if this was the case but can only make 
assumptions. The archaeological evidence could therefore provide clarity on certain aspects, 
but unfortunately, due to the nature of archaeological evidence, it is impossible to provide 
insight into all the anomalous information provided in the source material. 
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The historical importance and relevance of the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg might have faded 
over the course of time, and is probably not part of the current popular discourse in South 
Africa. Still, many authors have produced their own accounts of the battle. Secondary 
sources might not be sufficiently critical sources of information to conduct effective 
research, but they do share information about a specific event that can be digested and 
discussed. From a historical point of view, the accounts produced by Erasmus, Krynauw and 
Steenkamp provide valuable insight into the battle as they have conducted in-depth archival 
and historical research on the events. Their input, discussion and points of view on many of 
the aspects of the battle are interesting and could easily generate specific archaeological 
research topics. It is important to use these documents with caution, as they do contain bias 
that could distract from the disinterested objectives of an archaeological project. 
An archaeological perspective on the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg is significant as it provides 
additional insight into the existing historical interpretation of the events. By evaluating the 
impact and use of landscape against both the historical information and the archaeological 
evidence, a better understanding of the events was reached to clarify any possible 
misrepresentation of the battle. The historical evidence projects a specific image of the 
battle that the archaeological perspective supports. The archaeological perspective and 
approach, however, provides alternative interpretations and further insight that could 
enhance our understanding of specific events, where words or documents do not capture all 
the details.  
The prominence of this research might be the impetus for a revitalised effort to stimulate 
and enhance the commercial and public interest in the battlefield through the effective 
management of this heritage resource. Enough archaeological evidence has been collected 
to capture the attention of the public and historians and this could assist in developing the 
tourism potential of this battle site. The history surrounding the battle has been neglected in 
recent times but it should not be forgotten as it signifies an important event in the history of 
South Africa. Further, the involvement of individuals from a wide range of nationalities 
should enable the event to regain its prominence as a significant European style war fought 
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on the African continent. The unknown and unmarked graves of the fallen soldiers require to 
be honoured with the dignity they deserve.   
The focus of this research is unique in context of South African battlefield archaeology as it 
could fix the battlefield within the larger landscape, contrary to investigating physical 
structures associated with a battlefield. Through the establishment of a sound methodology 
and research objectives, I managed to interact with a large range of volunteers working 
together towards a common goal, and establishing relationships across divides to the benefit 
of the domain of battlefield archaeology in South Africa. 
The contribution that the archaeological perspective into the 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg 
adds to the realm of battlefield archaeology in South Africa should not be underestimated. It 
provides reference for continued archaeological research into the large number of existing 
battlefields across South Africa. 
7.1. Recommendations 
During the research, the following aspects of battlefield archaeology and the 1806 Battle of 
Blaauwberg emerged: 
• There is a need for the identification of the graves of the fallen soldiers, as it would 
clarify one of the mysteries of the battle. The prominence of the battlefield would be 
elevated by the identification of the graves, as this would create a specific place of 
remembrance; 
• There is a need for the establishment of a memorial or monument on site to remember 
the battle, as there are no physical visible remnants of the battle that occurred just over 
two hundred years ago.  
• Access control of the site has for the duration of the research been problematic, with 
BBNR only relatively recently being fully enclosed. Illegal metal detecting, which has 
been occurring on battle sites throughout South Africa and the world, needs to be 
addressed, especially within the BBNR and the adjacent private property. Since the 
adjacent property is not fenced, access is easily obtained, but the significance of this area 
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to the battle has not yet been determined. The City of Cape Town, HWC and the BBNR 
need to address this as a matter of urgency. 
• South Africa is rich in heritage resources, which include many sites of battle, conflict and 
skirmishes. Archaeological research on these sites has been neglected and needs to be 
prioritised. Hobbyists using metal detectors are conducting their own research on these 
sites and are removing valuable information at alarming rates. The removal of artefacts 
without proper context or documentation is detrimental to the knowledge and 
understanding we have of these sites. The authorities need to intervene urgently.  
Volunteers on archaeological projects have become part of South African archaeology, but 
the use of metal detector volunteers within a controlled research environment needs to be 
cherished, as their expertise, skill and knowledge are crucial to the success of similar 
research projects. Even though criticism for inconsiderate metal detecting is valid, a large 
group of metal detectors approach their hobby in an ethical and responsible manner. This 
group need to be applauded and supported in their efforts to encourage similar behaviour 
by the metal detecting fraternity at large. 
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